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1
Introduction
Wei-Chiao Huang
Western Michigan University

American labor unions have experienced a precipitous decline in
membership and strength and are apparently at a crossroads today. Fac
ing the changing structure of the economy, management's increasing
resistance to union organizing and demand for concessions, and the grow
ing penetration of imports into domestic markets, it is urgent for organiz
ed labor to reassess its past practices and strategies and to seek new
methods and solutions.
Why are unions declining? Is the decline in the labor movement a
typical global pattern or is it unique to the U.S.? How are unions respond
ing to the changing world? What position is organized labor taking on
the various policy issues? What are some of the innovative ideas and
experiments currently undertaken to improve labor-management rela
tions? And are they here to stay or short-lived? Ultimately, what is the
future of American labor unions? Some of these questions were addressed
by six scholars in their lectures delivered at Western Michigan Univer
sity during the academic year 1987-1988. Those lectures form the basis
of this volume, while this introductory chapter will provide a general
flavor and summary of the six papers.
Sharon Smith starts with a case study of collective bargaining be
tween the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) and
the representing unions, primarily the Communications Workers of
America (CWA), from 1984 to 1986. The divestiture of AT&T, effec
tive in 1984, has essentially changed the world in which AT&T and
its unions bargained for the past forty years. In chapter 2, Smith gives
an interesting account of how AT&T and its unions responded to this
new world as manifested in their bargaining processes.
1
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With divestiture and the consequent loss of government-sanctioned
monopoly, the "new" AT&T found itself subjected to intense domestic
and foreign competition in the long-distance telephone service and in
formation systems markets. It was not in position to meet such com
petition because of high labor costs, inflexible job designs, and out
moded work practices inherited from its days as a regulated monopo
ly. Recognition of this problem led to talks with the CWA early in 1984
in an attempt to communicate to them the need to reduce costs by amend
ing the 1983 contract. These talks were unsuccessful. AT&T came back
in 1985 with a serious overture to labor leaders, seeking to terminate
the 1983 contract early and to bargain new three-year agreements. The
sensitive information AT&T shared with their unions essentially gave
the union insider status, while the company's proposal, including pro
fit sharing and a job bank offer differed drastically from previous bargain
ing positions. Nevertheless, partly due to internal division in the CWA,
this attempt yielded few results except that all parties agreed to move
up the contract termination date to May 31, 1986. During the crucial
1986 bargaining, AT&T continued to stress the need to strengthen its
competitive position by limiting wage and benefit increases, restruc
turing the workforce, consolidating contracts, etc. While the unions were
strongly committed to keeping the wage increases they had bargained
in previous contracts, they also pressed hard on issues of employment
security, retraining and pension increases. The negotiations proceeded
on schedule until they hit a snag over the size of the wage package,
along with some minor issues. A 26-day strike ensued and ended with
CWA accepting essentially the same offer made by AT&T before the
strike.
Smith points out that the wage difference between the two parties was
small, and would not previously have resulted in a strike. AT&T's new
hard-nosed policy on the small wage difference, a significant depar
ture from its predivestiture bargaining conduct, reflects its sense of urgen
cy in response to the new business environment. CWA, while not
unaware of the changing environment (evidenced by their insider status)
underestimated AT&T's resolve on the wage issue and fought to main
tain the status quo. They ultimately learned the hard way that now "they
were working for a different company in a different industry." Smith's
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paper demonstrates vividly that adjusting a given labor-management rela
tionship to a changing world can be a slow and painful process of learn
ing and compromise for both parties. Hopefully that process can be
smoother for other industries "when all parties recognize that even when
interests are in conflict, problems can best be solved to the mutual
satisfaction of all through a participative and collaborative approach,
and when parties share in the responsibility of the decision and the
rewards that result."
The telecommunication industry's adjustments in labor relations to
changes in the economic environment is not a unique case. In fact,
numerous experiments and innovations in labor-management relations
have occurred in so many industries that scholars have begun to ask
if those innovations will permanently transform traditional American
industrial relations. Valuable insights into this question are given by
Thomas Kochan and Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld in chapter 3. Based on
case studies of nine companies and associated unions, they examine four
major innovations under way in American industrial relations: employee
participation, flexible forms of work organization, participation in new
technology decisions, and participation in strategic management deci
sions. Regarding employee participation, they note that a plateau seems
to exist in the growth of the quality of worklife (QWL) initiative, and
that a narrowly focused QWL process itself cannot sustain widespread
support. Thus the QWL process can best serve as a useful starting point
for building mutual trust and learning participative problemsolving
methods. Subsequently, it requires commitment of the top level manage
ment and union leaders to expand the scope of participation into a wide
variety of issues involving work organization, technology and strategic
planning.
Regarding work organization reforms, it is found to be easier to in
troduce flexible work organization concepts in new worksites than to
retrofit an existing facility with new systems. To cope with the inherent
difficulty of retrofitting existing plants, Kochan and Cutcher-Gershenfeld
suggest doing it incrementally whenever natural "opportunities" (threat
of plant closing, potential of new investments, etc.) arise to stimulate
the change. As for setting up flexible work systems in new sites or in
completely refurbished unionized plants, they advise that, in light of
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the GM Fiero versus Lake Orion experiences, it should be done by
involving workers and union leaders in early stages of the design and
planning processes. Turning to the introduction of new technology, the
aforementioned principles are equally applicable. In addition, the
NUMMI experiment (GM-Toyota joint venture) underscores the need
for broadening the concept of technology to encompass many aspects
of organization design and human resource management practices.
Without integrating technology and human resource considerations,
management "faces longer learning periods for making the technology
work and greater resistance by employees to the full utilization of the
technology." To integrate technology and industrial relations, in turn,
requires "fundamental and lasting changes in the roles of union leaders,
workers and managers, and in their relationships."
The last innovation union participation in strategic management
decisions stands in sharp contrast to traditional U.S. labor relations,
in which management was to manage and labor was to labor and never
the twain to meet. Only when both parties are ready to break away from
that old mode and accept a broader role for labor can this innovation
be initiated and sustained. Such conditions, evidence again suggests,
will be met more likely and naturally through "bottom-up" incremen
tal expansions of participation rather than through direct formal board
representation by the union. Hence Kochan and Cutcher-Gershenfeld
emphasize that while the four union participations being discussed repre
sent discreet starting points for industrial relations innovations, none
of them can survive over time independent of others. Instead, when
those innovations are introduced at all levels of industrial relations and
reinforce and help sustain each other, they can be institutionalized and
result in permanent transformation of traditional industrial relations in
an organization.
Such transformation, however, cannot easily permeate industries,
given the deep-rooted stand against unions taken by the majority of
American managers. Kochan and Cutcher-Gershenfeld discuss various
strategies and choices facing American management, union, and govern
ment leaders for the wider diffusion of these innovations. They end their
chapter calling for "comprehensive review and updating of both the
specific labor laws and the array of economic, trade, regulatory, and
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employment and training policies" in order that the innovative prac
tices being experimented with in selected settings can be diffused to
broader settings.
This task of policy review is partially undertaken by George Johnson
in chapter 4, in which he examines organized labor's political agenda
with respect to four groups of policy issues: (1) domestic labor market
issues, (2) international trade policy, (3) monetary and fiscal policy,
and (4) policy related to women in the labor market. For each issue,
he reviews the AFL-CIO's position, explains the rationale behind it,
and evaluates its overall impact in terms of standard economic analysis.
It should be noted, however, that organized labor does not function as
a single entity, despite the seemingly high degree of political coopera
tion among unions. Furthermore, the AFL-CIO does not speak for all
unions, which have various and sometimes conflicting political priorities.
Particularly noteworthy among Johnson's discussions is labor's posi
tion on international trade and macroeconomic policies. It is interesting
to note that the same AFL-CIO, now so vehemently opposing free trade,
used to denounce opponents of lower tariffs in the 1950s as "protec
tionists." The radical change in labor's stand on trade over the past
30 years is understandable given that disproportionately more industries
and associated unions have suffered in recent years from the mounting
trade deficit than have benefited from trade. Does it follow then, as
the AFL-CIO clearly states, that the U.S. should adopt a more protec
tionist set of policies? Like most economists, Johnson does not think
so. Instead, he thinks those restrictive trade policies attack only the symp
tom, not the root cause of the trade crisis. The cause remains the same:
huge government deficits driving up the dollar, resulting in worsening
terms of trade. Thus, a more sensible solution, in his view, lies in ad
dressing the cause of the trade deficit, while improving trade adjust
ment assistance programs to alleviate the symptoms. How should the
government deficit be reduced? The AFL-CIO prefers raising taxes to
cutting federal spending, a rather long-sighted and seemingly reasonable
approach. In its own words, "skimping on infrastructure to cut the deficit
is a short-run expediency that will constrain growth in the future. The
far wiser course is to raise the necessary revenue and develop appropriate
spending priorities. ..."
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Equally noteworthy is the specific method of tax increase favored
by labor: leaving the 15 percent rate (up to about $40,000 income in
the current system) intact, but increasing both the higher rate (now 33
percent) on personal income and the profits rate from 34 percent to 38.5
percent. Johnson notes that the typical union member is above the mid
dle of the income distribution and would therefore be adversely affected
by the progressive tax hike. Thus it is not entirely self-interest that
motivates labor with respect to tax policy. Johnson concludes that while
many of the AFL-CIO's positions are motivated by the self-interest of
blocks of their member unions, political altruism cannot be ruled out
in some of their positions, and that there is a growing preference by
labor for government intervention in the economy at the micro level.
No innovative idea to cope with an economy's macroeconomic and
labor problems has attracted so much attention and controversy recent
ly as the idea of profit sharing (or more broadly, gain-sharing ar
rangements). In chapter 5, Martin Weitzman, the leading theorist and
proponent of profit sharing, gives a very complete nontechnical argu
ment about the overall advantage of tying some part of workers' pay
to the performance of the firm. Weitzman points out that the central
economic dilemma of our time is how to simultaneously reconcile
reasonably full employment with reasonable price stability. In his view,
the prevailing wage system of paying labor cannot help solve that dilem
ma and in fact is responsible for it, because the rigid money wage system
throws the entire burden of economic adjustment onto employment and
the price level. By contrast, a profit-sharing system (PSS), because of
its built-in flexibility puts in place exactly the right incentives to resist
unemployment and inflation, viz., the profit-sharing component of a
worker's wage acts like an automatic shock-absorbing cushion that helps
maintain full employment even when the economy is unbalanced by
some shock to the system. Thus, the major case for widespread adop
tion of PSS is its ability to help improve macroeconomic performance,
especially in a short-run disequilibrium situation. Furthermore, it can
also reduce the noninflationary rate of unemployment (NAIRU). Weitz
man enumerates several NAIRU theories and emphasizes that in no case
would a PSS cause a higher natural rate of unemployment, and in most
of the more reasonable scenarios it promises to generate lower long-
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run unemployment than the current wage system. He further suggests
that a PSS not only possesses favorable macroeconomic properties but
that it may also improve microeconomic performance in that the motiva
tional effects of such a system may increase productivity, and that a
share system might provide better employment stabilization to the firm.
Having extolled the virtues of PSS, Weitzman responds to the objec
tions commonly raised against profit sharing. Most of the objections
are dismissed as involving a fallacy of composition. The most noteworthy
example of fallacious reasoning is that profit sharing exposes workers
to unnecessary risk. Weitzman argues that this is true only for the in
dividual tenured worker (the insider) and is false for the aggregate of
all would-be workers, and that it is better for the risk to be shared by
everyone than a portion of them (the outsiders). However, he does ad
mit that the following question is legitimate: if profit sharing is so
desirable, why doesn't it spread spontaneously? Weitzman responds with
the externality or market-failure explanation: contract forms are chosen
by employed workers and firms involved, with no consideration of their
aggregate effect; hence, few individuals or firms would find it beneficial
to switch to a profit-sharing contract since the most obvious benefits
do not accrue to the inside parties. This market-failure argument
underscores the inherent difficulty of implementing Weitzman's idea
in an economy in that it requires society wide reform and government
intervention such as tax incentives for profit-sharing income. Thus, while
his theoretical arguments are well taken, there are still legitimate ques
tions regarding the workability of his model. But that is, of course,
beyond the scope of his paper.
In the next chapter, Richard Freeman takes us beyond the U.S. scene
to review the changing patterns of unionism in developed Western coun
tries, and to speculate about changes in union status in Communist
economies. His major point is that the deunionization experience in the
U.S. is not a "necessary" feature of advanced postindustrialized
capitalism. This is evidenced by the diverging trends of unionization
among developed OECD economies, with union density falling sharp
ly in countries like the U.S. and Japan, while reaching unprecedented
peaks in others like Denmark and Sweden. What causes this divergence?
Freeman claims that' 'the divergence results in large part from the degree
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to which country differences in the legal and institutional features of
industrial relations give employers the incentive and opportunity to op
pose unionization of their workers, not to 'inexorable' economic
changes." He refutes several nonconflictual explanations showing that
they are inconsistent with cross-country comparisons and detailed withincountry evidence. A case in point is the often given reasoning that shifts
in the composition of employment toward traditionally nonunion jobs
and types of workers lead to union decline in the U.S., which contradicts
the fact that other countries such as Canada have experienced similar
compositional changes but with thriving unionism. He then articulates
his thesis that the major cause of private sector union demise in the
U.S. is aggressive management opposition to union organizing, and that
the rising management offensive is not only due to the growing cost
of union presence to firms and to management's antiunion reflex, but
is particularly due to the accommodating legal structure that allows
virulent campaigns against union organizing drives and imposes lenient
penalties for illegal union-busting activities. By contrast, it is no coin
cidence that in those economies where unions are strong, either the labor
laws restrict management's ability to influence organizing, or manage
ment opposition is significantly muted, for example, by centralized wage
negotiations as found in neo-corporate systems. His thesis is further
substantiated by a pooled cross-country time series regression analysis
which firmly establishes the statistical significance of the impact of legal
and institutional factors on union density.
This in no way frees American unions from the blame for their own
trouble, however, given the substantial unexplained residuals left in the
regression results. For one thing, compared to unions in other coun
tries, American unions are often slow to realize the problems besetting
them and consequently respond to them too late. This may be due to
the low turnover and aging union leadership, and, Freeman suggests,
may also be due to the decentralized structure of American labor in
that "such a structure concentrates union efforts on local or sectoral
rather than national issues, guaranteeing slow reaction to problems that
affect unionism in its entirety." Finally, Freeman moves on to assess
the future of unions in the Communist world in the era of "glasnost"
and "perestroika." He speculates that because only autonomous unions
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can provide the needed counterforce to old-line managers and party func
tionaries who stand in the way of reform, and because only free unionism
offers the greatest promise to spark work effort that is necessary for
Communist economies to advance, growing independent union activi
ty will go hand in hand with the reform.
The final chapter by Orley Ashenfelter deals with another aspect of
labor relations, i.e., dispute resolution. His paper focuses on arbitra
tion as a dispute resolution system, specifically the "interest arbitra
tion" system for settling wage disputes, operating in the U.S. public
sector. Ashenfelter begins by describing how interest arbitration arose
to become a feature of public sector wage determination against the
background wherein labor in the public sector is permitted to unionize
and to bargain but not to strike. He then describes two common forms
of interest arbitration in use in the U.S.: conventional arbitration, in
which the arbitrator is selected to review cases presented by both sides
and to fashion any awards deemed suitable; and final-offer arbitration,
where the arbitrator must select one or the other party's offer without
compromise. One interesting twist of the second form is tri-offer ar
bitration used in Iowa, where a third offer determined by a neutral factfinder is also put on the table. The common view on these systems is
that conventional arbitration tends to produce a "chilling" effect on
bargaining because the disputing parties, presuming that the arbitrator
will simply split the difference, may present extreme demands in order
to gain from the compromise; whereas in final-offer arbitration, such
a standoff won't occur because the parties dare not go to extremes for
fear that the arbitrator might select a more reasonable offer made by
the other party. This view is seriously questioned by Ashenfelter as it
involves conflicting assumptions about arbitrators' behavior: they are
assumed to split the difference in conventional arbitration but not in
final-offer arbitration. Actually, if they also try to split the difference
in the latter, which amounts to flipping a fair coin to choose a final
offer, the chilling effect will resurge since the expected gain from present
ing the more extreme demand is greater!
Instead, Ashenfelter hypothesizes that the arbitrators behave consistent
ly, regardless of the type of system under which they are asked to
operate. Specifically, the arbitrator would use some unspecified exter-
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nal criteria to arrive independently at some notion of a "reasonable"
award in a given factual situation. Under conventional arbitration, he
would fashion an award taking into account both the positions of the
parties and his own notion of a reasonable award; under final-offer ar
bitration, he would choose whichever final offer was closer to his own
preferred award. Ashenfelter further hypothesizes that the arbitrators'
independently-formed, preferred awards can vary from place to place
and from arbitrator to arbitrator, rendering their final decisions truly
unpredictable by the parties and outside observers. Are these hypotheses
consistent with observed behavior? He proceeds to review quantitative
studies of arbitrator selection and decisionmaking in simulation ex
periments and in practice in Iowa and New Jersey. The statistical
evidence in these studies displays a remarkable stability in the operating
characteristics of the arbitration systems and strongly supports his
hypotheses. Thus, it appears that arbitral reference to external criteria
and arbitral uncertainty are the two central aspects of U.S. arbitration
systems. This also implies that neither system exhibits chilling effects
because the uncertainty associated with an arbitral award would motivate
the parties to negotiate their own settlement in order to avoid the gam
ble an arbitrator's decision entails. Although a great deal can be learn
ed from Ashenfelter's paper, some questions remain unanswered. For
instance, if arbitrators' decisions are uncertain, and if the parties are
risk averse, why does arbitration exist? Also, precisely why may ar
bitrator decisions be characterized in this way? Ashenfelter's conjec
ture that the answers may be related to the cooperative nature of the
arbitrator selection process awaits exploration in further research.
In closing, organized labor is said to be at a crossroads. Perhaps it
would be more appropriate to say that the entire labor-management rela
tionship is at a crossroads. Before driving through the intersection, we
must look both ways very carefully, because at stake are not only the
future of labor unions, and the way that labor and management will
interact with each other, but also the international competitiveness and
vitality of the U.S. economy. It is hoped that this volume will provide
some insights into the problems, the choices, and the future path fac
ing American industrial relations. Although the diversity of the six papers
allows no simple conclusions, one observation is in order. It seems to
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be a common view held by the authors, at least by Kochan, Johnson,
Freeman and Ashenfelter, that there is a need to study extensively the
propriety and efficacy of current labor laws and also of labor-related
public policies. Such an endeavor, however, will be the topic of a future
symposium. After all, as Freeman elegantly states, "there is no rest
in the practice or study of industrial relations."

2
Bargaining Realities
Responding to a Changing World
Sharon P. Smith
American Telephone & Telegraph Company

As unions in the United States begin their second century, it has
become increasingly obvious that they are in a stage of continuing and
sharp decline in numbers and in overall influence. The decline, though
not limited to the private sector, has been concentrated there. Union
penetration of the private labor market (as measured by percent
represented) reached a peak in 1953 and has now declined to the levels
of nearly 50 years ago. l At the same time, the industries in which unions
remain concentrated have been under pressure from a combination of
forces: technology has changed the nature of work; deregulation has
changed the ways many of these firms do business; and competition
from abroad and from nonunion domestic firms has increased pressure
on prices.
In response, collective bargaining has sometimes been observed to
have moved in new directions as "unions and companies were groping
to find ways to accommodate traditional union roles to very new
economic patterns. . . . Could the parties convert their skill at dividing
up the goodies to equally effective methods for combating the losses?" 2
The bargaining that occurs in these circumstances has often been term
ed "concession bargaining." To use such a label, however, ignores
the fact that unions, management, and stockholders all share in the out
come as firms respond to outside forces. Given this shared fate, it
becomes clear that unions and management must choose between work
ing jointly to meet the challenges of outside forces or fighting to main
tain the status quo and in doing so accelerate their own decline. 3
Nowhere have these changes been more dramatic and concentrated
than in the telecommunications industry. This industry was long at the
forefront of technological change in the workplace: where technology
13
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changes the nature of work but "technological blur" often makes it
difficult to distinguish between the functions performed by the worker
and those performed by the machine. For example, with the introduc
tion of LMOS/MLT (loop maintenance operations system/mechanized
loop testing), a high-skill technical job has been transformed into a largely
clerical job because the technical tasks that had been performed by the
worker are now performed by the machine with which the worker in
teracts. Moreover, in the 1980s, deregulation has changed the way firms
do business in this industry and has subjected them to competitive
pressures they have never experienced before. 4 Thus, a detailed ex
amination of the recent bargaining in one part of the telecommunica
tions industry AT&T can provide insight into how both sides of the
bargaining table in any industry should respond to change.
The basic reality of 1986 bargaining was that the world had changed
for both AT&T and its unions. A series of judicial and regulatory deci
sions since the beginning of the decade had transformed the company
into a very different employer from that which bargained its last con
tract in August 1983. As a result of these institutional changes, the 1986
contract was the first between parties with 40 years of bargaining history.
The issues that were resolved wages, benefits, employment security,
working practices had been addressed in previous bargainings, but the
answers were different because of the institutional changes and because
of company and union activities that took place between 1984 and 1986. 5

Institutional Background
AT&T began operations on January 1, 1984 as a divested company
with approximately 260,000 occupational (nonmanagement) employees,
of whom 90 percent were represented by unions. The principal unions
were the Communications Workers of America (CWA) and the Inter
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW). There were also
a number of smaller unions representing, in total, about 5 percent of
the employees. Since 1974, bargaining between the Bell System and
these unions had traditionally been carried on through a two-tier struc
ture: national bargaining covered issues of universal application such
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as wage and benefit improvements, and local bargaining covered issues
of regional or unit application generally referred to as working prac
tices. The relationship between the company and these unions was
generally excellent, as it had been characterized over recent years by
an openness and a growing commitment to participation among the dif
ferent parties.
The principal structural developments that influenced bargaining both
individually and interactively were: the Amended New Entities
Agreements (AMOA, effective in 1980, amended in 1982, and ter
minated in 1987); Computer Inquiry II; and the Consent Decree. 6 The
Amended New Entities Agreements applied to reassignments of
represented employees made in connection with any corporate
reorganization. They assured that no employee would lose representa
tion status or the provisions of the then-existing collective bargaining
agreements. In addition, the Agreements extended a number of
assurances concerning employees' wages, benefits, credited service,
and location.
Computer Inquiry n, issued in April 1980 as the Federal Communica
tions Commission's (FCC's) final decision in its second Computer In
quiry, represented the FCC's acknowledgment that the advance of
technology had muted the distinction between data processing (com
puters) and data transmission (telephones). Instead, the FCC drew a
new distinction between "basic services," which would remain sub
ject to regulation under the Communications Act of 1934, and "enhanced
services," which would be open to all competitors. Accordingly, in
keeping with this new distinction, AT&T was permitted to sell customer
premises equipment and enhanced telecommunications services under
the terms of this decision only through a subsidiary that was fully
separated from the regulated businesses providing "basic services."
The FCC made a ruling lifting this requirement in September 1985.
Prior to 1984, AT&T was the largest nonfmancial corporation in the
world and the dominant firm in three separate, though interrelated, in
dustries: the manufacture of telephone equipment, local telephone ser
vice, and long distance telephone service. In 1974, the U.S. Justice
Department filed a criminal antitrust suit against AT&T, charging it
with monopolization and conspiracy. After six years in discovery, the

16

Bargaining Realities

suit went to trial in 1981. On January 8, 1982, AT&T and the Justice
Department announced a Consent Decree to settle the suit out of court.
Under the Consent Decree, the former Bell System was split into AT&T
and seven Regional Holding Companies, which, in turn, encompassed
22 Bell Operating Companies (BOCs). In exchange for AT&T's
divesting itself of the operating companies, the antitrust suit was nullified
and major markets were deregulated. The fundamental principle guiding
the assignment of personnel in divestiture was that people would follow
their work. Represented employees were afforded the protections of
the AMOA. Therefore, when assigned, they carried with them their
representation status and contracts.
Early Bargaining Efforts
Early in 1984, shortly after divestiture and while still in the first con
tract year of the 1983 agreement, it became apparent that both AT&T
and the BOCs had too many employees and too high costs for their new
operating environments. At the same time, it was clear that AT&T's
"business" had changed far more than the BOC's. In essence, the BOCs
had kept the business they had before divestiture and that business was
not cyclically sensitive. AT&T, in contrast, was a new company which
faced an enormous integration problem. It had changed from a small,
staff-oriented entity to a large company, heavily concentrated in manufac
turing, but rapidly entering large, new ventures as well. Moreover, most
of AT&T's business was highly sensitive to cyclical economic
developments. In particular, AT&T was now facing domestic and foreign
competition in its traditional business while simultaneously attempting
to enter new businesses that were also highly competitive and in which
market conditions were changing rapidly.
Accordingly, late in the spring, AT&T began discussions with its two
principal unions intended to reduce costs by recasting their 1983 col
lective bargaining agreements. There followed the first educational
meetings with selected leaders of both unions to bring them to an
understanding of the changes divestiture had brought to the business in
terms of both the financial requirements and the standards of business
performance that would be necessary for this new business to succeed.
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The company sought to transform the second and third contract an
niversary increases, due in August of each year and consisting ofcostof-living adjustments (COLA) and bargained-for increases, into onetime issuances of stock. The "one-time" aspect of the payment would
reduce the subsequent cost impact of the increases and the stockowner
aspect was thought to provide a special incentive to improve operating
performance. However, this early bargaining effort went nowhere. The
principal reason was one of timing: the proposed change was introduc
ed too close to the August 1984 payment date for the unions to build
consensus for the ratification needed to rewrite the collective bargain
ing agreements.
Consequently, early hi 1985 and well before the August 1985 pay
ment date, the company began discussions with the unions under the
auspices of the Common Interest Forum (GIF) aimed not at amending
the 1983 agreements but actually terminating them early and bargain
ing new three-year agreements. The intention was to negotiate
agreements that would slow the growth in labor costs and change the
contract date from that held in common with the divested companies.
(The GIF had been established in the 1983 agreements as a vehicle with
a threefold mission: to communicate and discuss business developments
of mutual interest; to discuss and review jointly "innovative approaches
to enhance the competitiveness of the Company and improve employ
ment security;" and to avoid unnecessary disputes by cooperatively ad
dressing changes in the environment.)
The problem here was twofold. The Company had recognized that
divestiture had totally changed the business environment from one in
which many markets were guaranteed and costs were covered and returns
assured as long as the commissions agreed to set rates appropriately
to one in which there were many competitors, prices of products and
services were market driven and not set to cover both costs and a
specified rate of return. Therefore, in order to change its behavior ac
cordingly, the Company was attempting to slow the long-term rise in
costs. The second problem was to separate AT&T from the BOCs in
all future bargaining; bargaining had been common since 1974 but, with
business environments now dramatically different, an overt separation
of bargaining process and timing appeared appropriate.

18

Bargaining Realities

The GIF discussions began with a full-scale educational program for
the leaders of both unions to bring them to a better understanding of
the emerging nature of the business. This was clearly in the spirit of
the GIF contract language: that information would be shared and solu
tions sought in a fully participative fashion. Indeed, the information
presented to the unions was sufficiently sensitive and detailed to give
the union leaders insider status under the provisions of the Securities
and Exchange Act.
The theme of these discussions was the need to extend the participative
relationship between company and unions by putting into place a more
competitive cost structure that would promote profitability for the com
pany, generate jobs, and generally insure employment security.
Specifically, the company sought to abandon its past practice of bargain
ing for regular annual improvements in basic compensation and remove
wages from the bargaining arena. Instead, consistent with the par
ticipative approach, the company proposed to replace regular bargain
ed wage increases with profit sharing, thus making compensation con
tingent on firm performance. The lump sum nature of profit sharing
would also reduce the subsequent cost impact of the compensation in
crease. At the same time, the company directly addressed the union's
concerns over employment security with the offer of a job bank that
would guarantee a job offer to any union-represented worker with at
least five years of service who would otherwise be without a job.
Ultimately, this attempt at early bargaining, like the 1984 attempt,
was to no avail. In the course of the discussions, it became clear that
internal division in the CWA precluded the termination of the existing
agreement. (The company practice in this special bargaining was, as
in past ordinary bargaining, to seek agreement first with its major union,
the CWA, and to make no agreements otherwise with the IBEW or any
other smaller unions.) It became evident that the changes embodied in
this contract were too dramatic and potentially controversial to be en
dorsed publicly by the membership of the union.
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Changing the Contract Date

By fall 1985, there were no more savings to be made by moving
bargaining up, as the second anniversary and final contractual increase
had already been granted. Nevertheless, an earlier contract date than
August 1986 continued to have merit from the company's perspective
for two principal reasons: (1) it would put AT&T's bargaining before
the BOC's and thereby remove pressure to conform with their pattern;
and (2) it would ease the ratification process in union locals containing
both AT&T and BOC employees if there were no side-by-side com
parisons of different contracts.(This would be the first time that such
employees, who, in some instances, were still co-located, would not
receive the same wage treatment.)
Meanwhile, logistical problems began to emerge for the IBEW: the
simultaneous bargaining of AT&T and BOC contracts would require
key bargainers to be in multiple locations at the same time. Discus
sions begun late in 1985 suggested that the idea of moving the contract
date up was attractive to all concerned. Thus, all parties agreed to ter
minate the contract on May 31, 1986 rather than August 9, 1986, as
originally specified.
Issues in the 1986 Bargaining

Company Perspective
The basic company concern in 1986 bargaining remained the same
as it had been in the abortive attempts to bargain early: the need to
strengthen the company's competitive position. With divestiture, AT&T
had entered fast-paced, competitive, and largely nonrepresented markets,
saddled with a high cost structure, inflexible job designs, and outmod
ed work practices inherited from its days as a regulated monopoly. The
company had specific objectives in several areas.
The number one objective was to obtain a minimum economic set
tlement. At the outset, the company had clearly indicated to both unions
that it would not seek to cut wages or obtain similar concessions in benefit
areas but, rather, would attempt to slow the rate of increase in
compensation.
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In preparation for bargaining, the company had made a comprehen
sive analysis of its employees' relative wage position. This study con
firmed that AT&T's wages were consistently and substantially above
the market for comparable jobs (both in local labor markets and among
product/service market competitors). This advantageous wage position
had not happened overnight, but rather had developed gradually over
the previous dozen years due in large part to a rich COLA clause. In
deed, COLA accounted for over two-thirds of the total wage increase
during the period.
A specific objective, then, was to start to move AT&T's wages closer
to the market by bargaining a pattern of wage increases substantially
below the market norm. The company commissioned detailed forecasts
of expected increases in wage rates to estimate the parameters for
bargained increases that would still allow the market to outpace it. These
forecasts clearly suggested that progress could be made only if COLA
were either paid lump sum or eliminated from the contract. The com
pany recognized, however, that it had taken years to create the wage
advantage for AT&T workers and that it would also take years to move
them back closer to the market.
Minimizing the size of the contractual wage increases was only one
of several company bargaining objectives designed to put into place a
more competitive cost structure. It was equally important that key
workforces, namely, technical maintenance and installation, be restruc
tured to align their skills and wage rates with those of AT&T's com
petitors in this service market. In particular, the company proposed to
stratify this top technical force into three skill levels, job titles, and cor
responding wage schedules to align more closely with the practice of
competitors than did AT&T's traditional single-title organization.
Analogous changes for AT&T's factories included the consolidation of
manufacturing job grades to reduce costly movement of personnel and
the elimination of the wage incentive payment system as an expensive
and inappropriate wage adder in high-technology manufacturing.
Detailed analysis had confirmed that the employees' advantageous
wage position was compounded by a rich benefit package. Therefore,
the company's aim in bargaining was to make minimal improvements
small pension increases and the introduction of a 401 (k) plan only if
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the wage settlement was satisfactory. At the same time, the company
wished to continue to extend health care cost containment measures and,
in addition, make some major moves similar to those already im
plemented for management which were primarily designed to control
utilization.
The company recognized that in order to reach agreement with the
unions it would have to address satisfactorily the question of employ
ment security. At the same time, it was essential that this be done without
guarantees of employment or any commitments to make firm job of
fers when employment is terminated by layoff. Although such an offer
had been made during the 1985 GIF discussions, it was no longer a
point for discussion.
The AMOA had assured that employees brought their contracts with
them to new organizations. This meant that an individual entity could
have 22 separate contracts and, in fact, could have employees working
side-by-side with different contracts. Accordingly, a key company ob
jective in 1986 bargaining was to consolidate the provisions of multi
ple operating company contracts into one comprehensive contract for
each bargaining unit.
An equally important company objective was the replacement of
restrictive contracting-out language in the 1983 Contract with language
better suited to a competitive environment.
Union Perspective
Meanwile, developments within the company during the previous three
years, particularly the announcement in August 1985 of a major downsiz
ing amounting to 16,500 represented employees, as well as events in
other collective bargaining situations, had intensified union concerns
for their members' prospective compensation and employment securi
ty. The unions had specific objectives in several areas.
The unions were strongly committed to maintaining the form and size
of wage increases they had bargained in previous contracts. Indeed,
both unions indicated that they would seek to enhance the COLA por
tion of the increase by improving the payout ratio, a move that would
help support the same percent rise in wages in the face of the recent
quiescence in inflation. More importantly, the CWA took a strong public
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stand against concessions, two-tier arrangements, and lump sum ap
plications, arguing that this contract would mark a turning point not
only for their own union but also for the American labor movement
by reversing the recent trend toward settlements containing such
provisions.
The whole issue of employment security was of paramount concern
to the unions. The union objective in bargaining was to enhance ex
isting programs, such as the existing income protection programs for
surplus employees who terminate voluntarily, as well as to break new
ground in this area. The CWA, in particular, indicated that it would
seek to expand the job bank concept that had been offered in the abor
tive GIF discussions into a lifetime employment guarantee for employees
with at least two years of service. In addition, a key CWA goal was
the establishment of a company-funded, jointly administered, train
ing/retraining fund, in clear recognition that the only form of employ
ment security that can be sustained over the long term is one which
combines a series of different jobs with the training needed to perform
them.
Another union objective was to obtain some improvement, principally
in pension benefits and in the introduction of a 401 (k) plan, and to resist
any shifting of health care costs from the company to employees. The
thrust in the pension area appeared to reflect a union conviction that
their members had lost ground in pension benefits due to the plan's be
ing changed in 1980 from a final dollar to a dollar per month basis.
Progress of Bargaining
Early in 1986, the company's set of issues and the unions' set of issues
were exchanged and became the subjects of private discussions at various
levels. The normal give-and-take of public meetings and private discus
sions proceeded on schedule. The company was following past bargain
ing practice of making no agreement until it had settled with the CWA.
As the final day approached, however, thought was given to the possibili
ty that settlement could be reached with the IBEW and not the CWA.
As the midnight deadline drew closer, private discussions focused
on the size of the wage package, contracting, and minor issues that did
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not appear to stand in the way of a settlement. 7 The wage difference
between company and union positions was small an amount, in fact,
that would not have produced a strike in previous bargainings between
the two parties. Nevertheless, agreement on wages was not reached with
the CWA and a 26-day strike resulted. 8 Agreement was reached on time
with the DBEW and on the same terms that had been offered to the CWA.

Strike
Beginning with the decision to settle with the IBEW, through the time
that the CWA strike was settled, the company's behavior was very dif
ferent from its predivestiture bargaining conduct. All of the company's
actions had their origin in its determination to behave as a company
in the competitive arena rather than in a regulated environment, shielded
from market forces. This was manifested in three key decisions: (1) the
decision to make a final offer and to settle on this even if full agree
ment with all parties was not possible; (2) the decision to engage in
an aggressive public relations campaign to present this package direct
ly to the striking workers; and (3) the decision to hire people off the
street to replace striking operators, not to break the union but rather
to maintain customer service.
Once the company had acted on the first decision, it was imperative
to adhere to this as the only possible offer to emphasize its will to
stand on its position and to avoid embarrassing the parties already in
agreement. Meanwhile, the company's decision to wage an aggressive
public relations campaign became an essential tactic in the effort to bring
about agreement among all parties. The company adopted the philosophy
of going public on its final offer, based in large part on its concern that
the terms of that offer were clouded with the misinformation circulating
during the weekend the strike began.
The IBEW resolve to stand by its acceptance of the company's offer
also provided support to the points in this final offer. On June 10, the
leaders of the Telephone Coordinating Council (representing a mixture
of clerical and technical workers) recommended ratification to their
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members (whose ballot vote would be completed by July 5). Then, on
June 15, the members of the EM-3 (which is the manufacturing unit
of the IBEW and meets in convention to vote on an agreement) ratified
the contract.
When agreement was finally reached between the company and the
CWA, it was on essentially the same terms as the final offer. The dif
ferences, which were incorporated in the IBEW agreement, were essen
tially of an informational nature and reflected the clarification discus
sions that had been conducted since the strike began. There were three
principal changes: (1) the inclusion of the COLA language into the agree
ment, though the provisions were still inapplicable; (2) some additional
protections to employees affected by job-structure changes; and (3) some
changes in the language on contracting.

Reasons for the CWA Strike
To some extent, the failure to settle was a risk that was heightened
when each party agreed to negotiate early. With the AT&T contract
as front-runner to all the BOC negotiations, the settlement reached, which
many analysts had thought would be a floor for all the negotiations in
the former Bell System, became a ceiling for all the BOC settlements
to follow.9
At the most basic level, it appears that the strike reflected a union
miscalculation of company resolve on the wage issue. It is true that com
pany bargaining behavior predivestiture would, in fact, cast some doubt
on its willingness to take such a position and stand by it. Nevertheless,
there had been efforts for more than two years to bring the union to
an understanding of the changes in the company's operating environ
ment and the fact that cutting costs would help enhance overall business
performance of the company, which would help preserve jobs. Despite
the lengthy discussions and briefings, despite bringing the union into
insider status, each side ultimately failed to understand the other's posi
tion. The strike, then, became the ultimate means for each side to reach
such an understanding. 10
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The bargaining that took place from divestiture through the 1986 con
tract negotiations, viewed in its entirety, demonstrates that adjusting
to a changing environment can be a slow and painful process of learn
ing and compromise. Fischer has suggested that success in this area
is best achieved through the full cooperation and participation of manage
ment and labor.
Unions should review their 50-year history. The pre-1980
labor relations patterns represent a labor concession to the
most basic of management demands the unbridled right to
manage. Unions did not succeed in seriously eroding the right
of management to decide and to direct. . . . Now, when many
management forces seek to concede some of what they
previously rejected, unions are usually found protesting. . . .
Managers are not embracing worker involvement as a result
of an ideological conversion, but are merely responding to
new urgencies, new economic pressures, the broader and
more potent options of consumers. 11
Although this process has not always been smooth for AT&T and
the CWA and IBEW, progress has been achieved. Together they have
moved to reshape the company to fit its new competitive environment
while simultaneously addressing the employment needs of the workers
in this more uncertain world. Further progress will best be achieved
when all parties recognize that even when interests are in intrinsic con
flict, problems can best be solved to the mutual satisfaction of all through
a participative and collaborative approach, and when all parties share
in the responsibility of the decision and the rewards that result.
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The first half of the 1980s witnessed joint experimentation and ex
tensive innovation with new forms of labor-management relations. In
our earlier work (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986) we interpret both
tendencies as signals that many of the principles of what we term the
New Deal industrial relations system are no longer well-suited to the
contemporary environment or to the interests of workers, employers,
or the broader society. In that work we used a three-tier model to describe
both the key principles in the New Deal industrial relations system and
the efforts of labor-management to move to a new system. The focal
point of the New Deal system was the middle tier, i.e., the level at
which unions and employers negotiated collective bargaining agreements
over wages, hours, and working conditions. The key to the success of
this model was that collective bargaining "took wages out of competi
tion." At the top tier of the system, the governing principle was that
it was management's sole job or prerogative to manage the enterprise;
unions and workers were to negotiate over the impacts of strategic
management decisions if these decisions affected wages, hours, or work
ing conditions. At the bottom tier, the workplace, the collective bargain
ing agreement specified in detail worker rights and obligations and pro
vided workers a voice in day-to-day administration through the grievance
procedure. As we will see, the innovations under way in the 1980s
challenge each of these New Deal principles and practices.
27
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At the workplace, for example, efforts are under way in many set
tings to introduce more employee participation and greater flexibility
in the organization of work and utilization of people. At the level of
collective bargaining, negotiations continue to play an important role.
The inability of unions to take wages out of competition by standardiz
ing wages and benefits across the product market, however, has forced
the parties to give greater attention to employment issues and in some
cases to experiment with new wage criteria and formulas that link wage
increases to more firm-specific performance. Innovations under way
at the level of strategic decisionmaking stand in direct contrast with the
New Deal principles regarding managerial prerogatives. In a limited
number of settings, management and union leaders are experimenting
with different ways to involve union leaders earlier and more deeply
in decisions that heretofore would have been the sole province of
management.
Some innovative developments in industrial relations have proven
fragile. In part, this is because the early 1980s have also been a period
of increasing crisis and bitter conflict between labor and management
in American society. While strikes were less frequent in the 1980s than
in previous years since World War n, those that did occur were fre
quently hard-fought struggles for survival, rather than tactical exten
sions of the collective bargaining process. More than 40 percent of union
members covered under major collective bargaining agreements ex
perienced wage cuts or one or more years of no wage increase between
1980 and 1984. Many others experienced significant losses in real wages
and decreases in coverage or benefit levels in medical insurance or other
fringe benefit areas. Moreover, the long-term decline in the rate of union
membership accelerated during the early 1980s. This was partly a reflec
tion of overall employment declines in the sectors of the economy where
union membership is highest, but it was also the result of greater and
more open employer opposition to union representation in newly open
ed facilities (Dickens and Leonard 1985; Farber 1985). The early 1980s
were also characterized by an increasing polarization in the relation
ships between the labor movement and government policymakers. Union
representatives' frustrations in organizing and representing workers in
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the context of existing collective bargaining policies and procedures were
heightened by a sense of powerlessness to modify these policies.
The central question underlying the research summarized in this paper
is whether the innovations and experiments in labor-management rela
tions will diffuse to a broader array of bargaining relationships and
become institutionalized as regular aspects of labor-management rela
tions. Or alternatively, will they be aborted by the broader conflicts
between labor and management or between labor and government
policymakers over union representation and organization rights, or over
the very role of unions in society?
To address this issue, we will draw on a study of innovations in a
panel of nine companies and more than a dozen associated local and
international unions. These parties participated in a two-year study con
ducted by members of our research team with the support of the U.S.
Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor-Management Relations and
Cooperative Programs. These cases were selected because in each the
parties had initiated one or more of the types of innovations that we
believed challenged prevailing principles of the New Deal system. As
such, these are neither representative nor random samples from the
universe of contemporary collective bargaining relationships. Instead,
they are illustrative examples of the different avenues through which
labor and management can change their bargaining relationships in ways
that substantially depart from the traditional New Deal model.
Our sites and the nature of changes occurring in each are outlined
below and classified in Exhibit 1 within the three-tiered framework we
use for analyzing contemporary employment relationships.
The United Automobile Workers Union (UAW)
and General Motors (GM)
Our focus in this case was on the new Fiero and Lake Orion
assembly plants, both of which feature a fundamental reoganization of work design. The roles of labor and management have been
significantly modified to afford employees greater autonomy, less
supervision, and, in the case of Fiero, union representation in all
plant-level strategic and administrative decisions. During our
research, the joint design and creation of the Saturn Corporation
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was also solidified and the GM plant in Fremont, California, was
reopened (after a two-year shutdown) as a joint venture with
Toyota. We followed some aspects of both of these developments
as well.
The Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU)
and Xerox
The seven plants in Xerox's home manufacturing complex (near
Rochester, New York) show how narrowly focused quality circles
can evolve to encompass multiple forms of employee participa
tion and innovation in the organization of work, all of which is
reinforced via contractual language including a no-layoff guarantee,
joint decisionmaking regarding outsourcing, and gain-sharing. Fur
ther, the parties have built on a history of informal consultation
about strategic issues with the establishment of joint "horizon"
planning committees on human resource management and other
issues, the joint design of a new manufacturing facility, and union
involvement in new product development.
The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), the International Brother
hood of Teamsters (IBT), the Association of Flight Attendants
(ATA), and the Air Transport Employees (ATE) Western Airlines
A financial crisis brought on by industry deregulation led Western
to pose concession demands to all four unions. Though each of
the negotiations was different, all four unions ultimately emerged
with significant minority stock ownership for the members, a seat
on the board of directors, and, in one case, an agreement to pur
sue greater employee participation in daily decisions. Of particular
interest is the great variation in the strategies selected by the four
unions.
The International Association of Machinists (IAM) and the
Boeing Corporation
Rapid advances in manufacturing technology led the union to push
for joint roles in the exploration, selection, and implementation
of new technology. The operation of the joint structure that evolved

Innovation or Confrontation

31

over the course of two contract cycles in Boeing's Seattle,
Washington facility and a parallel quality circle effort were the
focus of this research.
The Aluminum, Brick and Glass Workers Union (ABGWU) and
Alcoa
A rolling mill, in a highly competitive portion of the aluminum
industry, was the setting in which these parties attempted to guide
employee involvement activities and work reorganization through
a period of major wage and benefit concessions. The concessions
also reflect decentralization of bargaining in the industry. We ex
plore the consequences within the local union and in a range of
joint activities.
The United Automobile Workers (UAW) and the Budd Company
These parties have sought to sustain employee involvement in
itiatives, limited just-in-time delivery, and quality control im
provements. These changes have been prompted by customer
pressure in the context of the highly competitive auto supply in
dustry. During our research, efforts were initiated to link plantlevel participative activities to cooperation at the corporate/inter
national union level. Also, one local negotiated an agreement to
accept significant work rule changes and the use of a team con
cept approach to work organization in return for reinvestment in
its facilities.
The Diesel Workers Union (DWU) and the Office and Clerical
Unit (OCU) and Cummins Engine
After nearly a decade of experimentation with the design of non
union facilities based on socio-technical principles, the parties are
now trying to integrate these innovations into the company's
unionized home manufacturing complex. We have followed the
diffusion of new systems for the organization of work, as well
as related changes in collective bargaining as they have evolved
during a period of layoffs and management turnover at the cor
porate level.

32

Innovation or Confrontation

The Paperworkers Union and Boise Cascade Corporation
Two decades of low performance in the company's newest and
largest facility, partly connected with an increasingly complex set
of work rules, led to company bargaining demands for a sweep
ing revision of the contract and hundreds of attached memoran
dums of agreement. After a lengthy strike, the company prevail
ed, and imposed a contract with only four job classifications, a
team-based, flexible work organization, a no-layoff pledge covering
current employees and substantial wage increases for those affected
by the job classification changes. Critical questions in this case
concern the implementation and evolution of such changes when
they are imposed by hard bargaining.
The United Rubber Workers Union (URW) and Goodyear
Corporation
Gradually, over about 10 years, the parties have made a series
of incremental changes in the organization of work and the struc
ture of union-management relations in their Lincoln, Nebraska
facility. We were interested in the process and results of these
changes.
Longitudinal case studies were conducted for each site by one or more
members of our research team. Interviews ranging in number from 15
to over 100 were conducted in each case. In some of the cases, we were
also able to draw on previous case studies or related research emerging
from our earlier work. Employee surveys were conducted in three cases
(Western, Boeing, and Xerox). In one case (Boise Cascade), we were
able to conduct a formal economic analysis of the effects of the changes
introduced.

The Processes of Institutionalization and Diffusion
The concept of institutionalization has a long history within the
behavioral sciences. It rests, in part, on Kurt Lewin's (1948) seminal
studies of social change, which positioned institutionalization as the end
point of a multistaged change process. The first stage of the process
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is often referred to as the process of "unfreezing" current organiza
tional practices. Stimulating or motivating change is usually some crisis
or set of severe external pressures. The second phase of the change
process normally involves implementing a set of experimental or
demonstration projects. The focus at this stage is on the factors that
lead to and then maintain the parties' commitments to the proposed
changes, and also on the evaluation of initial results. The third phase
is the institutionalization phase, viz., the process by which changes are
integrated into ongoing practices within the organization. This can be
thought of as a refreezing process, though one of our conclusions is
that this final institutionalizing stage is best thought of as dynamic, rather
than static in nature.
We will focus on the second and third stages of this model and ex
amine the management and union strategies and actions that affect the
institutionalization process. While we recognize that developments in
the external environment also have important effects on the course of
these innovations, we have discussed the importance of these external
factors elsewhere (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986). Our goal here
is to elaborate more fully on the internal dynamics of these processes.
We define institutionalization as the dynamic process by which daily
practices and decisionmaking at the workplace, collective bargaining,
and strategic levels of industrial relations are linked so as to respond
to the environment confronting the parties and their independent needs.
We believe that achieving this type of effective linkage in today's en
vironment requires fundamental transformations in practices across all
these levels of industrial relations activity. In this paper, we focus on
the following specific practices: employee participation, flexible forms
of work organization, participation in new technology decisions, and
participation in strategic management decisions. We see these as cen
tral features of what might be thought of as a new industrial relations
system more responsive to the demands of the environment and the needs
of the parties. At the same time, however, we don't claim that these
exhaust the range of innovations under way in American industrial rela
tions or that they constitute the sole characteristics of any new system.
Finally, we are interested not only in the conditions under which these
changes permanently transform a given labor-management relationship,

34

Innovation or Confrontation

but also in how widely these innovations will be diffused throughout
a given organization and across North American industry. A final sec
tion of this paper will therefore discuss the prospects for the wider dif
fusion of these changes.

Employee Participation Processes
By far the most frequent innovation initiated in industrial relations
hi the early 1980s was some form of employee participation. Some type
of QWL or similar participation effort was initiated in eight of the nine
cases in our panel. Many of these efforts came to be tied to work
organization changes and technological change, which are discussed
in greater detail in the following sections of this paper. The focus here
is just on participation.
An examination of the evolution of these various processes indicates
that in no case has it diffused smoothly over time to a point where a
large majority of employees are now actively participating in QWL problemsolving teams. On the other hand, it has been completely abandon
ed only in one case. Typically, the parties experienced an initial period
of growth and enthusiasm, followed by what appears retrospectively
as a predictable crisis. This crisis was usually characterized by a decline
in further employee volunteers to participate in the process, resistance
by middle and lower managers, and opposition by some union leaders,
all of which is often prompted by developments in other aspects of the
management organization, the union organization, and the collective
bargaining relationship. Thus, the resulting plateau in the growth of
the QWL initiative raised fundamental questions about the extent to which
it could or should affect the economic interests of the firm, the
employees, and the union. The parties were then forced to choose
whether to reinforce or abandon the effort.
Because of the relatively modest costs of initiating QWL processes,
we have concluded they can serve as useful starting points for building
trust and exposing employees, supervisors, managers, and union leaders
to participative methods of interaction and joint decisionmaking.
However, it is increasingly clear that they cannot remain in this narrowly-
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focused, adjunct mode. Where the parties have recognized this, what
started out as a narrowly-focused QWL process became a catalyst for
participative problemsolving methods in a wide variety of areas involving
work organization, the introduction of new technology, strategic plan
ning, and planning for new facilities.
This transition is politically difficult, however, since the broader the
scope of issues addressed in a participative mode, the more likely the
process is to touch on issues covered in the collective bargaining con
tract or other areas of management decisionmaking usually designated
as off-limits to the QWL process. It is not surprising, therefore, that
many QWL processes never make this transition. Yet, standing alone,
the narrow forms of QWL are not likely to make a sufficient contribu
tion to the competitive strategies and objectives of the firm, or to the
economic and social interests of workers and the union, to sustain
widespread support.
The key determinant of whether or not the transition to larger aspects
of the relationship is made successfully appears to be the willingness
of top-level management and union leaders to assert their commitment
to the principles of problemsolving and participation in the face of new,
potentially contentious situations. By doing so, they can transform what
was an incremental program for diffusing QWL teams into a set of prin
ciples to be applied to a range of crises or opportunities that might benefit
by problemsolving processes.
Work Organization Reforms
During the first half of this decade many employers pressed hard to
increase flexibility in work rules and in the organization of work. In
a broader survey, Cappelli and McKersie (1987) note that in the majori
ty of cases, management pressed for work rule changes primarily so
as to reduce costs by shedding labor. In some cases, however, the goal
was also to introduce new concepts of work organization. This was
especially true where (1) the economic and technological environments
facing the parties have changed in significant ways; (2) an alternative
model of work organization was available to the parties to draw on (often
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from elsewhere within the firm); and (3) new employment security pro
visions were used to gain acceptance of the changes.
Employer interest in new forms of work organization arose out of
a desire to tap the motivational advantages usually associated with broad
task designs (Hackman and Oldham 1980) and the need to overcome
the rigidities and high costs associated with traditional work structures
and rules. In addition, new technology that promises increased flex
ibility in production requires, for its optimal performance, equally flex
ible human resource management systems and work organization ar
rangements (Shimada and MacDuffie 1987). Thus a concept that first
gained favor among behavioral scientists as a means for increasing
motivation and job satisfaction through broader job designs (Hulin and
Blood 1968; Turner and Lawrence 1965; Walton 1980) has now gain
ed the support of many line managers because of its strategic impor
tance in lowering costs, increasing quality, enhancing adaptability, and
achieving full utilization of new technology.
In our panel, we observed all nine firms either implementing changes
in work rules and new work organization design principles, or plan
ning or attempting to implement these concepts for selected operations.
Two firms (GM and Xerox) used these concepts in designing new
facilities; four firms (Xerox, Boeing, Western, and Boise Cascade)
negotiated work rule changes in collective bargaining; four firms (Alcoa,
Cummins, GM, and Xerox) used problemsolving principles and pro
cesses to introduce these concepts into selected work units within ex
isting facilities; and two firms (Boeing and Budd) were in the process
of discussing the introduction of flexible work systems on a selected
basis at the time our case studies ended.
New Facilities
By far, the most successful introduction of flexible work organiza
tion concepts has been in new or "greenfield" worksites. This is hard
ly surprising, since at a new site a new workforce can often be selected
based on the ability and desire to work within flexible or teamwork
systems. In the 1970s, most of the plants that opened on this basis were
(and still are) nonunion. More recently we have seen a number of new
or completely refurbished unionized plants using flexible work systems.
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Several examples from our panel sites illustrate the use of these con
cepts in the unionized worksites.
GM. Consider the way self-selection, even in a unionized setting,
contributed to the different experiences of GM's Pontiac Fiero and
Lake Orion plants. Both were new or completely remodeled and
retooled facilities, and the human resource management strategy
for each was based on the team concept, or, as GM calls it, the
"operating team" concept. Workers from both plants came largely
from a Fisher Body GM plant that had been closed and was later
refurbished (retooled) to form the Fiero assembly plant. The
workers were told prior to choosing to stay at the Fiero site that
the plant was designed around a teamwork concept and that anyone
who requested to stay at the plant should be prepared to work under
this type of system. This undoubtedly created a self-selection pro
cess among those who requested to stay at the Fiero plant, rather
than work at the nearby Lake Orion plant. The union leaders who
chose to go to Orion initially sought to fully replace what they
saw as a pre-set socio-technical plant design, while the managers
and union leaders at Fiero were engaged in a deeper, joint-design
process from the outset.
The greenfleld sites opened on a nonunion basis in the 1970s relied
on human resource management professionals to provide the input into
the design of the new work systems. In contrast, the cases hi our panel
that were most successful in introducing these new concepts involved
workers and union leaders in early stages of the design and planning
processes.
Xerox, in 1983, the company decided it needed to build a new
toner supply plant. Rumors leaked to the union that the company
planned to build the plant in the South because of lower utility,
tax, and labor costs. The union leaders questioned management
about its plans and proposed to work with management to see if
the plant could be built and operated competitively in the Webster
manufacturing complex. The company agreed, and a set of workers
and union representatives were designated to work with manage-
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ment representatives to examine and test new work and machine
design concepts while union and company representatives began
negotiations with the local public utility and local government to
lower energy and tax costs for the new facility. The plant design
and equipment selected together promised significant productivi
ty gains and the negotiations with the local government and utili
ty representatives were successful. The result was that the plant
was built in the Webster complex at costs and projected produc
tivity levels equal to or better than the levels forecast for the plant
if it was relocated in the South.
GM.The most widely publicized joint union-management plant
design in the GM system involves the new Saturn Division. After
the company's engineering and financial planners decided in the
early 1980s that it was unprofitable to try to build a small car in
the U.S., GM signed import agreements with two Japanese firms.
In 1983 GM addressed the issue again, but this time invited the
UAW to participate in the planning process. The result was an
agreement to build small cars under a new division of GM (Saturn).
The design principles included in the new agreement provide for:
(1) operating teams of workers on the shop floor in a single job
classification; (2) consensus decisionmaking principles throughout
all levels of the organization; (3) UAW representatives facilitating
the operating teams and being represented in the management struc
ture at all levels of the organization from the shop floor to the
plant management administrative staff, to the "Strategic Advisory
Committee" which provides the link between the Saturn Division
and the executives of GM.
While Saturn is the most visible example of new flexible work systems
in General Motors, the corporation has sought to introduce these con
cepts in most of its new or newly refurbished plants. To date, over a
half dozen such facilities are operating effectively. Still, GM's new plants
have not all been equally successful, or at least have not followed the
same paths in introducing the new team concepts.
Again, the comparison of the Fiero and Orion plants is instructive.
General Motors management designed the technology and manufacturing
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plans for the Orion plant around the use of flexible work systems. For
a variety of reasons, the union was not actively involved in this pro
cess. Under the national contract, however, management had the right
to design the plant and start it up with the new work system. After one
year, management was then responsible for negotiating an initial con
tract with the local union, in which the job classifications and related
work system arrangements were negotiable. After a protracted period
of negotiations and considerable conflict between local union leaders
and plant managers, a distinctive local agreement was negotiated that
allowed workers to choose between working under the pay-forknowledge compensation plan and flexible work systems, or under a
traditional pay system (though still with the requirement of knowing
a minimum of two jobs in a given area). Thus, instead of a jointly
developed system, the parties in effect split the difference.
In contrast, local union representatives worked with management to
design the work system for the Fiero plant. This experience also
facilitated the development of a broader role for the union in the manage
ment of the plant. This was all agreed to at Fiero prior to the start-up
of production, and no deep conflicts between the parties occurred in
subsequent negotiations or in the administration of the initial agreement.
The differences between the Fiero and Lake Orion cases suggest that
failure to develop a joint commitment to the design principles prior to
their implementation will increase the likelihood of conflict and resistance
to these new forms of work organization and compensation. This is
especially the case with workers and/or union representatives whose
prior experiences are limited to the traditional system. Once the new
system is implemented, however, it represents enough of a structural
change and it often begins to attract enough supporters that the burden
of change then falls on those seeking to return to the traditional system.
Retrofitting Existing Facilities
Our cases suggest it is much more difficult to retrofit existing facilities
with new work systems. Indeed, throughout the U.S. and Canada, there
are very few cases where the work organization or work rules cover
ing a complete facility and the complete workforce have been changed
by way of a cooperative union-management problemsolving process.
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The only case in our panel where a complete shift from a traditional
work system to a more flexible system occurred was a case where
management took a long strike and imposed the new system as part of
the strike settlement.
Boise Cascade. In 1984, after management had made several
unsuccessful attempts to reach informal agreements with union
leaders to eliminate what management viewed as an overly rigid
set of job classifications and work rules, a nine-week strike over
a new contract occurred in the company's DeRidder mill. This
was a relatively new mill (opened in 1967) and represented a
massive billion dollar investment; but it had a poor productivity
and profitability record. The major issue in the strike was manage
ment's demand to eliminate the large number of past practices that
had built up over the years, and to collapse the work organization
structure down into a small number of job classifications. After
nine weeks the union accepted management's terms largely in
response to threats from this high-wage employer that it would
hire a replacement workforce. The settlement provided for a nolayoff guarantee, and a guarantee that no worker would face a pay
reduction. In fact, a majority of workers received large pay in
creases as they were transferred to the new pay structure. A year
and one-half after the end of the strike, the workers voted to con
tinue the new system. Still, the leadership of the union is in flux
and plant performance has not shown dramatic improvements.
Thus, it remains to be seen whether this avenue for innovation
will be effective and whether it can be sustained.
This case illustrates that it is very difficult to use a problemsolving
approach to achieve an immediate and complete change within an ex
isting facility. The changes that management wanted were just too vast
for the union to discuss until it had no other choice. It may be that only
a hard bargaining strategy by management, with a high probability of
a strike, can achieve wholesale change all at once. Even then, as part
of the new arrangements, the employment and income security interests
of the incumbent workforce need to be addressed and the ultimate out
come remains uncertain.
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Because it is difficult to change the work organization of an entire
plant all at once, the more typical strategy observed in the panel was
an incremental process in which natural "opportunities" (threat of job
loss, prospect of obtaining new investments, etc.) provided the stimulus
to change. What, then, has been the experience with the incremental
retrofitting of existing facilities? Here our cases provide much evidence.
Xerox. In 1982, after management announced its intent to con
tract out wiring harness production, the union persuaded manage
ment to place the decision on hold and to establish a special study
team to explore changes in the organization and management of
the wiring harness unit that would make it cost competitive. The
team's recommendation cut the costs of production by an estimated
28 percent, and thereby saved the work. However, these recom
mendations required changes in the managerial formulas for
calculating overhead, revising supervisory ratios, and other deci
sions that had to be made by top management. The changes also
involved a number of modifications to seniority, job classifica
tion, transfers, and temporary work. Thus, the task force's recom
mendations had to be referred to the union and company bargain
ing committees for approval. Approval was granted as part of the
1983 contract. In fact the negotiators went an important step fur
ther by agreeing to use the wiring harness study team concept as
a model for dealing with uncompetitive operations in the future.
As noted earlier, employment and income security guarantees for
incumbent workers were included as part of the agreement. Since
this agreement, five other study teams have been formed, four
of which have kept work in-house leading to a range of modifica
tions in work organization in different areas.
Cummins. Innovation occurred here in response to a management
announcement that a line responsible for a particular engine was to
be shut down and moved from the unionized Columbus, Indiana
plant to the company's newer nonunion plant (one of the most
highly publicized nonunion team-concept plants opened in the
1970s) in Jamestown, New York. The Diesel Workers Union asked
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to have an opportunity to save the work. Both parties ultimately
agreed to a reorganization of the work into fewer job classifica
tions and other flexible arrangements. This line now operates with
these new arrangements inside a plant governed by traditional con
cepts and work rules.
A similar development occurred at the Indianapolis parts center,
a distribution operation that was scheduled to close. The company
agreed to keep this work under the jurisdiction of the DWU if
costs could be brought down to a level competitive with non
union options. The union agreed to eliminate the multiple job
classification system and replace it with a single pay grade and
flexible movement of workers across tasks. These workers earn
more than do comparable workers in another unionized parts center
that is organized in a traditional fashion. However, the Indianapolis
employees also have more duties assigned to them than the
employees working under the traditional system.
It should be noted that this pay and progression plan had been in
troduced by management at Cummins in several successive rounds
of negotiations dating back to 1979. However, each time rankand file opposition kept the union from agreeing to it. Thus this
case illustrates again how the threat of job loss has been used by
employers to achieve changes in work rules and work organiza
tion for specific groups especially in the face of predictable
general opposition by the workforce.
Just as the threat of job loss has been used to induce changes in work
organization, so too has the potential for gaining new work or new in
vestments been used as a lever to introduce changes. In the Xerox toner
plant example it was the union that took the initiative in getting manage
ment to consider locating the new plant in Rochester. At Fiero, workers
knew that if they were not able to assemble the new Fiero sports car
at low costs, the plant was likely to be permanently closed, as the site
was too small for other operations. In other cases in our panel, manage
ment initiated discussions with the union over the possibility of locating
work in an existing site, or allocating new investments to bargaining
unit personnel, in return for adopting flexible work organization con
cepts. We expect this to happen with increasing frequency in the future.
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Introduction of New Technology
The introduction of new technology represents one of the oldest
avenues for changing industrial relations, since nearly all changes in
technology have effects on the number, mix, and content of jobs. The
advances in micro electronics that fuel the current wave of technological
innovation have these traditional effects. There is a growing consensus
among technology and work specialists, however, that the specific ef
fects of these new technologies vary depending on the objectives driv
ing their use, the means by which new technology is implemented, and
the links forged between the technology and the human resource/in
dustrial relations practices of the parties (Walton 1983; Pava 1985;
Shimada 1986).
The introduction of new technology clearly serves as a major oppor
tunity for unfreezing existing industrial relations practices and tradi
tions. We also see it as an extremely powerful avenue for stimulating
and institutionalizing innovations. At the same time, technological change
can serve as a major source of conflict, resistance, and struggle for power
between the parties, since it strikes so deeply and directly at the vital
interests of the firm, the workforce, and the union.
All of the propositions or principles we suggested involving chang
ing work organization arrangements apply equally to the introduction
of new technology. However, two additional propositions are suggested
by our work in progress with panel members involved in major
technological innovations. First, when management makes massive in
vestments in new technologies without consciously and successfully using
the new investments in order to introduce innovations in industrial rela
tions practices, it faces a longer learning period for making the
technology work, greater resistance by employees to the fullest utiliza
tion of the technology, and less capacity for continuous learning and
improvement in the performance of the new technology and work system.
Second, technology strategies that fully integrate human resource con
siderations require fundamental and lasting changes in the roles of union
leaders, workers, and managers, in their relationships, and in the design
of the organization. Major technological change will inevitably have
implications for the social side of the organization. If these are not
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addressed directly there will inevitably surface important questions about
organizational structure and the orientation of employment relations.
We will draw on work under way at two panel firms to illustrate these
points: GM and Boeing.
The joint venture between GM and Toyota at New United Motors
Manufacturing Incorporated (NUMMI) in Fremont, California provides
a good deal of evidence regarding how effective integration of technology
and human resource management and organization design principles
can improve industrial relations and organization performance. The
NUMMI experiment also illustrates how the concept of technology must
itself be broadened to encompass the total array of organization design
and human resource management principles and practices. The NUM
MI plant relies on principles of high worker motivation, organizational
learning, flexible job and work organization, advanced inventory and
quality control, and employment security, many of which were first
introduced in Europe by socio-technical design theorists (Trist 1982)
and now are being adopted in varying degrees by an increasing number
of American firms and unions (Shimada and MacDuffie 1987).
NUMMI. The central feature of the production system used at
NUMMI is its deep dependence on achieving effective performance
via the human resource management system. It cannot work unless
workers have the proper skills, training, and motivation. Thus,
Shimada and MacDuffie argue that achieving and sustaining these
human resource outcomes is a necessary condition in order for
the just-in-time inventory system, the introduction of quality con
trol into production jobs, the flexible system of work organiza
tion, and the related organization design and hardware features of
this production system to produce high quality goods at low costs.
While there has been no comprehensive quantitative comparison
of the performance of this plant with other auto plants in the U.S.,
there are enough preliminary quantitative and qualitative data to
suggest that it is performing well on quality and cost criteria. It
has continued to be evaluated favorably by the workers, union
leaders, and managers involved. One study shows, for example,
that the plant's productivity and quality performance exceeds the
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performance levels of a traditionally structured plant with a tradi
tional union-management relationship, and is generally comparable
to the quality and productivity levels found in Toyota's major pro
duction facility in Japan (Krafcik 1986). Moreover, UAW and GM
management both continue to stress the importance of learning
from the NUMMI experiment when introducing new technology
and changing work organization practices in other facilities.
Boeing. In 1983 Boeing and the IAM included a New Technology
clause in their collective bargaining agreement, which provided
for periodic management briefings about plans for new technology
and established a Joint Training Advisory Committee (JTAC) to
oversee training and retraining of employees affected by new
technology. In the 1986 contract negotiations, the parties took
another step toward a joint approach to planning for and manag
ing the introduction of technological change by establishing a Pilot
Project on New Technology Committee (PPC). This joint com
mittee is charged with the responsibility of designing, implement
ing and evaluating experimental projects involving new technology
and new work organization arrangements. It represents another
example of the use of collective bargaining process to endorse and
sanction problemsolving and joint planning principles on a projectby-project basis where opportunities for new approaches arise.
While it is too early to evaluate this new agreement, it does pro
vide the protective language and the joint commitment needed not
only for the initial experiments to be conducted but for the parties
to learn from these experiments and to diffuse the experience and
knowledge gained from them to other parts of the organization.
The NUMMI experience is made especially significant when com
pared to the approach to introducing new technology typically follow
ed by American firms. Technology is usually seen as a deterministic
factor to be purchased or developed and implemented by management
and technical engineering experts. Even companies that emphasize par
ticipative principles on a wide range of other issues often fall back into
the traditional stance of viewing technology as fixed and relegate
organizational and human resource issues to a secondary status
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(Goodman et al. 1986). At Boeing, even though considerable progress
has been made in giving the union access to information on technology
at the strategic level, to date the implementation process at the workplace
has followed a fairly traditional form. Labor-management deliberations
have focused primarily on the consequences of new technology and not
on issues of design. The new technology language introduced in the
1986 labor agreements at Boeing represent the parties' determination
to break out of this traditional pattern.

Union Participation in Strategic Management Decisions
In the examples discussed so far in this report we have focused on
changes initiated at either the workplace or the collective bargaining
levels of the labor-management relationship. We have followed the ex
tent to which the changes have broadened and deepened the union's
role in areas of decisionmaking that have traditionally been reserved
to management. We have also seen how the union's role can be even
further circumscribed by unilateral management decisions. One of our
central propositions is that broader and deeper union roles at the strategic
level of management decisionmaking are necessary if the innovations
in employee participation, work reorganization, and introduction of new
technologies and work systems are to be sustained over time.
At the same time, we have found that participation at the strategic
level must not only help produce tangible economic benefits for the
employees and the firm, but must be accompanied by active communica
tions, education, and participation efforts at the workplace level. This
is because workers will not support representation or participation in
managerial decisionmaking as a right or a matter of principle. Instead,
the majority of workers show little interest in representation at this level
of decisionmaking unless and until they see the links between decisions
made at this level and their own long-term economic welfare and securi
ty, as well as with their everyday work experiences. When these links
are made, however, worker interest may well increase, and the prob
ability that support for this type of representation and involvement
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will be sustained over time may also increase. Our case study at Western
Airlines (Wever 1987) illustrates these points.
Western. In collective bargaining in 1983 and again in 1984, the
four major unions representing employees at Western Airlines made
wage and work rule concessions, and in return were granted
(1) four seats on the company's board of directors, (2) a profitsharing plan, and (3) an employee stock ownership plan. These
concessions and the quid pro quos were in effect when Western
reached an agreement to merge with Delta Airlines in September,
1986. As a result of the merger, Western employees were to be
absorbed into the Delta workforce. Since only the pilots at Delta
are unionized (and are part of the Airline Pilots Association, as
are the Western pilots), all other employees would lose their union
representation unless their unions won a representation election
involving all of the Delta and Western employees in their respec
tive bargaining units.
Survey data collected from Western employees about one year prior
to the merger demonstrated quite clearly that these employees
evaluated board representation (and other quid pro quos) primarily
on the basis of their economic effects. Employees were asked to
indicate which of the quid pro quos they valued most: (1) board
membership, (2) stock ownership, (3) profit sharing, or
(4) employee involvement at the workplace. The clearest survey
result was that employees valued board membership the least of
all these options. Employee involvement at the workplace was given
a higher priority than board membership. Profit sharing and stock
ownership were valued even higher than employee involvement,
suggesting that employees were most interested in using these new
compensation arrangements to recover the wage concessions.
The merger with Delta does appear to enhance the security of the
jobs of Western employees. In addition, our calculations of the
effects of the profit sharing and the stock ownership provisions
suggests that the average Western employee would recoup bet
ween 75 percent and 90 percent of the wage concessions made
in 1983 and 1984. At the same time, our case study evidence
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suggests that the union representatives on the board had little signif
icant influence over the merger negotiations or the terms of the
merger agreement, or over other basic strategic business decisions
of Western. Thus, this case produced mixed results. The existence
of profit sharing and stock ownership did help employees recoup
a substantial portion of their economic concessions, while the
merger bolstered their employment security. However, all but one
of the unions would lose their representational status in the merger
and that all employees would lose representation in strategic
management decisionmaking. Thus, in this case involvement in
strategic decisionmaking was only a short-run quid pro quo that
was not sustained through the change in ownership.
Board representation is only the most visible and formal type of par
ticipation in strategic decisionmaking found in our panel. More frequent
forms of such participation are ones that evolve incrementally as
workplace participation processes expand and top union-management
steering committees are established, or as part of work organization
reforms, or when decisions to make major new investments or
technological changes require agreements between top-level union and
management leaders. These opportunities for innovations make it
necessary for union and management decisionmakers to choose between
expanding the scope of participation and joint decisionmaking, and
thereby sustaining the innovation process, or limiting its scope and often
its momentum. Several examples from the panel illustrate this point.
Examples of involvement in strategic decisionmaking that evolve in
crementally, as expansions of innovations begun at lower levels of the
bargaining relationship, include the participation of UAW representatives
on the plant manager's steering committee at GM's Fiero plant, and
the participation of ACTWU representatives on Xerox's human resource
strategic planning teams and in the design of the work system and cost
analysis of the new toner plant. These and other examples noted earlier
suggest that the "bottom-up" incremental expansions of participation
are more likely than formal provisions for board representation to achieve
the types of linkages among workplace, collective bargaining, and
strategic interactions that we believe are essential in sustaining strategic
level participation.
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Strategic participation represents a fundamental departure from tradi
tional U.S. industrial relations policy and practice, however. It requires
that management accept the union in the organization, and that both
parties (and ultimately policy makers) agree on the broader roles of the
union. Unless management is prepared to strengthen the role and status
of the union, and unless union leaders are prepared to break from their
traditional stance of leaving the task of managing to management,
strategic participation is unlikely to be initiated or sustained. Because
of the important conditions necessary for management and union leaders
to accept this innovation, we do not see this type of innovation diffus
ing to a broad range of settings unless major changes in public policy
reinforce changes in the values and strategies of both management and
labor. We also believe a broader and deeper role for worker represen
tation at this level is absolutely needed to sustain, diffuse, and even
tually institutionalize the other innovations discussed in this paper.
Institutionalization of Innovations Within the Panel Sites
The diversity of situations faced by the parties in the sites studied
in this research preclude simple comparisons. Yet we can use the com
parative experiences of the cases to summarize a number of the key
lessons they offer about the conditions that facilitate institutionalization of changes within bargaining relationships that have initiated in
novations. We must also be careful, however, to avoid over-generalizing
from the select and limited sample upon which we have drawn these
observations. Therefore, the following summary statements might bet
ter be interpeted as hypotheses worth testing in future research or against
the personal experiences of labor and management leaders engaged in
similar activities.
While we have discussed participation, work reorganization,
technological change, and union participation in strategic management
decisionmaking as discreet starting points for industrial relations innova
tions, it is clear that none of these can survive over time independent
of others. Instead, when combined in ways suited to particular settings,
they offer a higher probability of being institutionalized in on-
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going practices. Indeed,when the full range of innovations discussed
here are integrated in a single bargaining relationship, they produce
a system of industrial relations that is fundamentally different from the
traditional New Deal model.
For example, a more complete transformation of practice has occur
red at Xerox and Fiero than at the other sites in the panel because the
parties in th£se two cases have introduced innovations at all levels of
industrial relations that reinforce and help sustain each other. At Xerox,
participation and problemsolving are used not only at the workplace
as part of an ongoing QWL process, but to adapt work organization
practices, to plan for how to use new technology, to explore oppor
tunities for enhancing employment security, to design a gain-sharing
system, and for union-management consultation over longer-term plans
and business prospects. At Fiero, the principles of participation and
flexibility have been integral parts of the overall design and day-to-day
management of the facility from the start. Thus, because of the in
terdependence among these innovations, we believe these parties have
gone farther toward a transformation of the overall system of industrial
relations governing their relationships and have a higher probability of
institutionalizing these innovations as ongoing industrial relations
practices.
We only see a continuous commitment to grappling with these issues
in a handful of cases. Instead, we mostly observe significant changes
in a limited subset of activities. In some cases, such as Boeing, Budd,
Goodyear, and Alcoa, the parties appear to be searching for strategies
to continue the momentum established to date. They are broadening
the scope of their innovations in ways needed to reinforce and sustain
those already initiated. At Boise Cascade, the changes were introduc
ed as a one-time event, incorporated into the labor contract, and have
remained in place. At Cummins there has been a reversal of some of
the initial changes as a result of conflict that occurred between manage
ment and the unions over recent layoffs, recent shifts in business strategy,
and changes in top management personnel. Thus, a wide spectrum ex
ists within our panel sites with respect to the degree to which these in
novations have been institutionalized and their prospects for further
transformation of traditional practices.
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Strategies for Diffusion
A key conclusion that can be drawn from the cases reviewed above
is that the institutionalization process involves incrementally overcom
ing or coping with the various internal contradictions that block innova
tion at all three levels of the labor-management relationship. Only a
subset of the population of current bargaining relationships across the
United States fits this description, however. Innovation is still concen
trated in relationships where the parties have experienced sufficient
economic pressures to adapt, and where management lacks viable alter
natives to improving its competitive position without working with the
union. Thus, we face a major constraint on the diffusion of these in
novations to broader settings, viz., the fact that in the majority of employ
ment relationships in the U.S., management attempts to avoid unioniza
tion or to limit the scope and influence of their unions.
We now turn to a discussion of the strategies of American manage
ment, union, and government leaders, to identify the factors that will
help decide whether these innovations will diffuse, or whether they will
remain limited to a relatively small subset of bargaining relationships.

Management Strategies and Choices
The diffusion of innovations in industrial relations will be vitally af
fected by the values that govern management policies and by the business
and technology strategies management chooses to remain competitive.
Management Values. In unionized settings, innovation depends on
management's acceptance of a role for unions at the workplace and in
managerial decisionmaking. This is essential if management is to at
tain a shared commitment to improving the organization's com
petitiveness. Yet the opposition to unions and expanded union influence
lies so deep within the value system of the majority of American
managers that it has become a major barrier to the diffusion of industrial
relations innovations.
Efforts to unionize new groups of employees will be highly contested
adversarial processes. If the present trends continue, unions will lose
a majority of these elections and probably become more frustrated wim
the current procedures. This will reinforce the insecurity and hostility
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that has come to characterize the national labor-management climate
in recent years. It will make it more difficult for those union leaders
who promote innovations and cooperation at the workplace to win in
ternal political battles over these innovations. In those cases where unions
do win representation elections, adversarial recognition processes will
become adversarial bargaining relationships that will not be conducive
to the trust, flexibility, and participative union-management relations
required for the institutionalization of innovations.
Thus, American management faces a clear strategic choice. It can
continue to take advantage of its current power and influence, thereby
maintaining its traditional opposition to union representation of its
workforce. This will make innovation problematic with existing unions.
In effect, those managers facing strong, stable unions suffer at the hands
of their associates. Alternately, management can join union represen
tatives so as to negotiate various forms of worker representation that
suit the needs of firms, as well as the needs of unions and the
employees/members.
We do not expect a significant shift in managerial values to take place.
What we do wish to emphasize here is that collectively, American
management has a stake in diffusing innovations. At a macro level,
management has an interest in ensuring that actions by any individual
management representatives at the level of a firm or a single plant do
not chill the environment for innovation in other organizations.
National networks of executives, who have seen the benefits of sus
tained innovation and who have a significant economic stake in the con
tinuity of these innovations, need to be encouraged along these lines.
These executives need to play a visible and active leadership role in
promoting discussions over the role of unions in society and the types
of union-management relationships that are essential to the long-run com
petitiveness of American industry. They need to work to educate their
peers on the costs of union avoidance to the overall national labormanagement climate.
Business Strategies. Not all business strategies are equally compati
ble with creating and sustaining innovations in industrial relations. The
stability provided by collective bargaining under the New Deal industrial
relations model rested on the ability of unions to limit management's
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incentives (or ability) to use labor costs as a major source of competitive?
advantage. Since collective bargaining is no longer able to "take wages
out of competition" in many industries, managers must now compete
in settings where labor costs vary. Yet, we believe that attempting to
compete through low labor costs is, in the end, not a viable option foir
much of American industry. This path certainly limits the trust, flex
ibility, and adaptability of workers that are all needed to sustain the
innovations discussed in this paper.
American management must recognize that in order to sustain and
diffuse innovations over the long run, it will need to follow competitive
strategies that meet the income and employment security expectations
of the American workforce. Business and investment strategies that seek
to move work in response to short-run variations in labor costs or
employment standards are only the most visible of a variety of strategies
that are incompatible with sustaining innovation. There will always be
environments within or outside the U.S. that offer lower wages and
employment standards. This business strategy will forever leave the
American workers insecure, and therefore inflexible. Such a short-run
strategy will also direct management's attention away from the need
to develop the comparative advantage American firms can sustain in
the world market, viz., an advantage built on high technology, skilled
labor, and flexible production.
Other business strategies that limit trust and flexibility also need to
be challenged if innovations are to be diffused. The short-run buying
and selling of productive assets as mere financial instruments applied
irrespective of employment consequences, has the same chilling effect
on trust and flexibility. Thus, corporate take-overs or other investment
strategies that have short or limited time horizons have profound dysfunc
tional human resource and industrial relations consequences.
Technology Strategies. One of the central lessons American manage
ment is learning from NUMMI and other Japanese-managed firms in
the U.S. concerns the technology strategies these companies are using.
Our discussion of NUMMI relied heavily on Shimada's and MacDuffie's model of the production system in use in that plant and in many
other Japanese manufacturing firms. The lesson, however, is
generalizable to applications of new technology outside of manufactur-
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ing as well. That is, technology strategies that rely on effective use of
employee motivation, skill, and flexibility are more compatible with
innovations in industrial relations than are those that try to embody all
the controls and labor saving features within the hardware itself. These
technologies also help to institutionalize the associated industrial rela
tions innovations discussed here.
Strategies and Choices for Union Leaders
A companion paper from our research (McKersie, CutcherGershenfeld, and Wever 1987) provides a detailed analysis of how the
strategies and roles of union leaders at the local and national levels change
in bargaining relationships that institutionalize these innovations. We
therefore need only summarize the key roles of top-level union leaders
in diffusing these innovations.
There are deep divisions of opinion within the leadership ranks of
the labor movement over whether to support, oppose or remain neutral
about many of the innovations discussed here. The American labor move
ment will very likely experience a prolonged period of internal political
debate and conflict over these issues. Unless leaders of national unions
and other top-level leaders in the labor movement adopt innovations
of this kind as part of their basic strategies for organizing and represent
ing workers, union leaders at lower levels who support these innova
tions will lose political battles within their unions. Consequently, the
diffusion and institutionalization of these innovations will be blocked.
A leadership posture of neutrality or passive acceptance is not enough.
This approach would only sustain uncertainty and prolong internal con
flict. Moreover, it would leave employers wondering about how sup
portive future union leaders would be of such changes. Finally, simple
passive acceptance would limit labor leaders' ability to shape and in
fluence the course of innovations and would limit the ability of unions
to use their support for these ideas in recruiting new union members.
Strategies for Government Officials
We believe that the broad diffusion of these innovations will require
strong and sustained leadership on the part of national political leaders:
first, to encourage a positive dialogue between labor and management,
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and then, to adopt the principles embodied in these innovations as a
conscious and explicit national policy. Such a national policy would
require comprehensive review and updating of both the specific labor
laws that govern union-management relations and the array of economic,
trade, regulatory, and employment and training policies that influence
employment relationship.
Some positive steps in this direction are already being taken at the
national and state levels of government and within a variety of public
and private groups that are studying ways to enhance the competitiveness
of the American economy. For example, the Labor Department recently
issued a discussion paper asking for further analysis of the fit between
current labor law and the objective of promoting greater cooperation
(Schlossberg and Fetter 1986). This coincides with a growing consen
sus within the academic community that serious flaws exist inthe con
tent and administration of the National Labor Relations Act that im
pede workers from exercising their rights in union organizing drives
and discourage labor and management from adopting many of the in
novations discussed in this report (Getman, Goldberg, and Herman 1976;
Dickens 1983; Freeman and Medoff 1984; Weiler 1984; Cooke 1985;
Koch an, Katz, and McKersie 1986; Morris 1987). This dialogue must
continue and be translated into concrete proposals for updating labor
law to fit the contemporary environment.
The efforts of the Labor Department's Bureau of Labor Management
Relations and Cooperative Programs to promote research and disseminate
information on innovations in industrial relations have also helped to
bring the changes hi industrial relations practices to a broad range of
practitioners. The network established through the Labor Department's
support of this research has served a diffusing role as the parties in
teracted and learned from each other's experiences. The development
of more and larger networks such as these should continue to pay
dividends for the Labor Department and the economy.
Updating labor policy will also require greater integration of labormanagement relations with other dimensions of our national human
resource and economic policies. In this paper, we have emphasized the
importance of cooperation, flexibility in human resource management,
compensation and employment security, and long-run business strategies
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within individual firms. The same need exists for coordination and in
tegration of public policies affecting these activities and outcomes, the
1987 report of the Secretary of Labor's Task Force on Economic Ad
justment and Worker Dislocation is a good example of a tripartite ef
fort to reach a consensus on a national policy for helping workers and
firms adjust to economic and technological changes. The involvement
of labor, business, and government representatives in the development
of this policy not only helped to build a stronger link between public
policy and private practice but it also served as a model for making
progress on a controversial labor policy issue by involving the parties
hi intensive negotiations and consensus building.
There is also an opportunity to take advantage of the growing con
sensus among public officials, business and labor leaders, and academic
experts on the need to develop a long-run strategy for improving the
competitiveness of American firms in world markets and reducing our
trade deficits. We believe that diffusing and institutionalizing the in
dustrial relations innovations discussed here will be critical to the suc
cess of these efforts and should, therefore, be integrated into these
strategy discussions.
We can make this final point by way of a historical analogy. Collec
tive bargaining only diffused and became institutionalized as a stable
institution in American society after the private experiments of unions
and employers in the clothing, skilled trades, railroad, and other in
dustries were adopted as the basic public policy of this country in the
Railway Labor Act and the Wagner Act. The diffusion of collective
bargaining was then bolstered with the support of the National Labor
Relations Board and the War Labor Board. Macroeconomic policies
that linked economic expansion and improved standards of living fur
ther assured the centrality of collective bargaining. Public policy will
need to play a similar institutionalizing role if the innovative practices
that management and labor have experimented with in selected private
settings during the first half of the 1980s are to be sustained and diffus
ed to broader settings in the years ahead.
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Exhibit 1
Overview of Research Sites

GM-UAW (Fiero &
Lake Orion plants
both MI)

Xerox-ACTWU
(Rochester, NY
manufacturing
complex)

Workplace
level
Elements of the team
system, less supervision,
heightened emphasis on
quality control, fewer
inventories

Collective bargaining
level
Departures from past
practice to allow greater
flexibility in work design &
wages, Lake Orion agree
ment allowing for employees
to choose single or multiple
classification pay and work
organization

Strategic
level
Joint discussion of new
technology, human resource
planning, and some
aspects of investment at
Fiero, formal top-level joint
roles in Fiero

Highly evolved employee
involvement groups, some
autonomous work groups,
less supervision, statistical
process control, areas of
complete work redesign,
just-in-time delivery,
reduced inventories

No-layoff guarantee,
language guaranteeing joint
decisions on outsourcing,
experimental gain-sharing
program, problemsolving
approach to bargaining,
shift in pay to take some
increases out of base wage,
shelter agreements to allow
for flexible work
organization

Joint decisionmaking on
subcontracting, horizon
teams for long-term joint
human resource planning,
regular union access to
CEO, joint plant design,
joint new product develop
ment, new relations with
subcontractors

Western-ALPA,
ffiT, ATE, AFA (Los
Angeles main hub)

Limited employee
involvement

Deep concessions in wages
and work rules

Union seats on the board of
directors, minority employee
stock ownership

Boeing-IBT (Seattle,
WA manufacturing
complex)

Quality circle program

New technology language
covering training, informa
tion sharing, and pilot
programs and experiments

Joint union-management
pilot technology programs
and experiments

Budd-UAW (Detroit,
MI and Kitchener,
Ontario manufactur
ing plants)

Employee involvement
groups, statistical process
control, just-in-time delivery
being established, Joint
Die Transfer Committee

Substantial wage and benefit
concessions, history of
wild-cat strikes and other
concerted activity

Establishment of joint, toplevel steering committee

Cummins-DWU, OCU
(Columbus, OH)

Work redesign, extensive
employee involvement
program, statistical process
control

Some wage concessions,
limited job security

Unanticipated corporatewide layoff

Exhibit 1 (continued)
Workplace
level

Collective bargaining
level

Alcoa-ABGWU
(Lebanon, PA
rolling mill)

Employee involvement and
communications programs,
selected areas with work
redesign and autonomous
work group, statistical
process control

Substantial wage and benefit
concessions, inability to
depart from national agree
ment on gain sharing

Boise Cascade-PWU
(DeRidder, LA
paper mill)

Sudden shift to highly
flexible work organiza
tion with only four job
classifications

Complete replacement of
traditional contract with
team-based system of work
organization, lengthy strike
prior to the change

Goodyear-URW
(Lincoln, NE manu
facturing plant)

Employee involvement and
communications programs,
statistical process control

Problemsolving negotiations
process

Strategic
level
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Organized Labor's Political Agenda
An Economist's Evaluation
George E. Johnson
The University of Michigan

This paper is a critical analysis of organized labor's political agenda
in the United States. What do they want, why do they want it, and,
from the point of view of economic analysis, what would happen if they
got it?
There are three reasons why I consider this an interesting and relatively
important topic to consider at the present time (late 1987).
(1) A great deal of organized labor's ability to wield influence in col
lective bargaining is derived from public policy, especially the legal
environment. At times in U.S. history, unionism has been discourag
ed; for a brief period (1935 to 1948), it was encouraged as a positive
force for both economic recovery and social justice. For the past 40
years, it has been more or less tolerated (more during some years and
less in others, for example now). If organized labor is to reverse its
historic slide (from representation of about 33 percent of nonagricultural
employment in 1955 to approximately 17 percent in 1986), public policy
will have to switch back to the encouragement mode of the Depression/WW n years. Indeed, it would have to shift much more even than
organized labor advocates in its public positions, discussed below.
(2) Organized labor still represents the largest special single-interest
bloc in the Democratic Party. If the Democrats regain the White House
in the 1988 election which, unforeseeable scandals aside, depends to
a very large extent on whether or not an economic recession breaks
out by the end of the summer of 1988 a large part of labor's political
agenda will be enacted in one form or another. Even if the Republicans
hold on to the presidency, it is likely that the new president will be
63
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more moderate (a Bush or a Dole rather than a Kemp or a Robertson)
than the Reagan group and value some amount of accommodation with
labor. It is thus likely that "16th Street" (the D.C. euphemism for the
AFL-CIO, referring to the site of their headquarters) will fare much
better in the post-Reagan era than it has thur far in the 1980s.
(3) Organized labor has, despite its diminished political influence,
been taking very clear positions on a number of important economic
and social problems. Its positions are, indeed, rather refreshing in their
forthrightness compared to the tendency of most presidential candidates
(from both parties) to obscure and waffle in order to be as inoffensive
as possible. Labor's positions on what we should do about trade, taxes
and government spending, minimum wages, child care, and a host of
other issues are extremely clear. If nothing else, a discussion of their
agenda is a good excuse to deal with many important problems.
These issues are relatively controversial, and one might well ask about
my underlying biases. (For example, when one picks up a newspaper
in a strange city, it is best to read the editorial page first so that one
is aware of the possible slant of the news stories.) For what it is worth,
I am a political independent who supports Republican, Democratic, and
Independent candidates with about equal frequency; the distinguishing
characteristic of my choices is that they usually lose. I have worked
in Washington on two occasions (once under each party) as a technical
economist dealing with labor market policies. As a rather conventional
economist, I have a built-in conservatism in favor of market outcomes
and a skepticism (reinforced from observation of the government in ac
tion) of political intervention in the economy. On the other hand, I have
an inherent sympathy for the underdog (how could, for example, anyone
not root for the Cubs over the Mets?), and I perceive that there are
many serious problems in the country that simply will not be solved
without intelligent government intervention. Thus, I approach this cri
tique of organized labor's political agenda from the point of view of
an economist from the middle of the U.S. political spectrum. There
are biases, but not the usual kind.
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Background: The Current Economic Situation

Before considering labor's political agenda, it is useful to clarify some
background issues. What is going on with the U.S. economy, and what
are the potential economic effects of unions?
First, the most startling fact about the recent behavior of the U.S.
economy is the fact that we have become almost a stagnant economy.
A consistent feature of the U.S. economy (and all other modern
economies) is that there was consistent per capita economic growth from
the time we started industrialization into the early 1970s. This per capita
growth was reflected in a real wage rate (dollars per hour divided by
an index of the price level) that grew at an average annual rate of be
tween 1.5 and 2.0 percent. This means that a worker in any time period
has between 55 to 80 percent more purchasing power than an equivalent
worker 30 years previously; he/she had to spend only half to two-thirds
as much time at work to buy a pair of shoes or a pound of cheese. ' 'Pro
gress" was inexorable.
During the first 25 years after World War n this pace of improve
ment in the general standard of living continued. Real compensation
per hour (including fringe benefits and employer contributions to social
insurance) grew at an abnormally high rate of 2.64 percent. The average
real nonagricultural wage of nonsupervisory workers (not including
fringes and payroll taxes) grew at a lower but still rather substantial
rate. All this ended after 1973 when both indices of real compensation
declined through the rest of the decade, and they have recovered only
slightly since 1980. What this means is that the average compensation
of the typical employee in 1986 was only 3.0 percent higher than hi
1973. A simple extrapolation of the performance of that variable from
1947 to 1973 would imply that the typical worker would have been 40.3
percent better off in 1986 than in 1973. Similarly, the average real
nonagricultural wage has fallen 10 percent rather than increasing 27
percent as would have been expected on the basis of the 1947-73
experience.
The reasons for this decline in the real wage rate are, I am somewhat
embarrassed to admit, not fully understood by economists. According
ly, it is difficult to tell if we will continue in a condition of stagnation
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or will revert to old style per capita growth in the future. (Without go
ing into the gory details, the fact that the decline coincided with the
first energy crisis provides a hint about what is going on, but the ex
planations are not sufficiently comprehensive.) What is relevant for this
paper is the implication of the stagnation for social policy. In the pre-1973
period, if group A received an increase in living standards, there was
always a "growth dividend" so that group A's gain was not ostensibly
at the expense of groups B, C, and D. If, however, the pie per capita
(or per worker) is essentially fixed, A can gain only at the expense of
some combination of the other groups.
A second important development in the postwar period has been the
increasing interdependence of the world economy. In 1965 the ratio
of exports to GNP was .061 and the ratio of imports to GNP was .047.
By 1986, these figures rose to .089 and .114; in other words, imports
became about two-and-a-half times as important during this period. Of
greater relevance for the present topic, the ratio of nonagricultural mer
chandise exports (primarily manufactured goods) to GNP rose from .038
in 1965 to .045 in 1985, but the ratio of nonpetroleum merchandise
imports (again primarily manufacturing) to GNP rose from .028 in 1965
to .072 in 1985. These developments, as will be pointed out below and
as has been noted in detail by the AFL-CIO, have had a profound ef
fect on the composition of employment in the U.S.
In addition, the markets for both physical and financial capital have
become extremely interdependent among the developed, non-communist
economies. This means that factories tend to be built where costs are
lowest, and, with the enormous improvement of methods of communica
tion and transportation, the principal variable cost is the price of labor.
To anticipate, one of the major functions of unionism is to drive up
the price of labor, and the AFL-CIO has not been very happy about,
the "opening up" of the U.S. economy. Another implication of this
interdependence among nations is that an individual country (even the
biggest one) does not have very much control over the level of its in
terest rates; the prices of U.S. securities are determined in London,
Tokyo, Milan, etc., as well as New York. This renders the use of fiscal
policy to stimulate the economy, a tool in which the majority of U.S.
economists had much confidence as late as 1968, at best problematical.
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What is the function of unions? I think there is fairly broad agree
ment that the goal of most unions in the U.S. is to improve the wages and
working conditions of the workers they represent. Unions in some coun
tries (and some unions in the U.S. a century ago) view their organizations
as vehicles for the mobilization of the working class into revolutionary
cadres, but U.S. unions are conservative in the sense that they accept
the distinction between ownership and employment and work within
the capitalist system. Granted, a few unions (there are some current
U.S. examples) have a subsidiary goal of the enrichment of the leader
ship, but the typical union is run more or less representatively (in about
the same degree as, say, Congress) in the interests of its membership.
One important aspect of what unions do some, including me, would
argue that this is their most important function is to provide a voice
to individual members. If a worker feels that she has been treated un
fairly in terms of work assignment, discipline, dismissal, or whatever,
she can appeal to her shop steward who will see that the matter is handled
equitably. Unionism in the worlds of Sumner Slichter, provides a system
of "industrial jurisprudence" as an alternative to unilateral decisions
by representatives of management. Most reasonable observers would
agree, I think, that this is a good thing; workers have as much right
to equitable treatment by their supervisors as, say, professors do from
their dean (for which purpose, in large part, academic tenure was
invented).
A second function of unions is to raise the wages (I take the word
"wages" to include nonwage compensation) of their members above
what they would be in the absence of unionism. What are the efficien
cy and distributional effects of union success in this regard? It is useful
to start from the fact that the sum of payments to all factors of produc
tion must equal real GNP (Y). A useful disaggregation of "factors of
production" includes unionized employment (the value of which is Nu),
nonunion nonsupervisory employment (Nn), other "nonunionizable"
labor (No, including most managers and many professional, technical,
and lower level supervisory workers), and inputs of capital and other
nonlabor factors (K). It then follows that
Y=Wu*Nu+Wn*Nn+Wo*No+R*K,
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where Wu is the average union real wage rate, Wn the wage of non
union nonsupervisory wage, Wo the wage of relatively skilled labor,
and R the real return on the ownership of a nonlabor input.
In the absence of unionism, the wage for the Nu jobs would be (more
or less) equal to those for the Nn jobs through the force of labor market
competition, or Wu=Wn. Under unionism, however, Wu is raised
through collective bargaining to some level above Wn. The traditional
story of the economic effects of this is as follows, (i) The higher wage
level faced by employers of union labor causes them to cut back employ
ment, and the displaced workers are forced to accept nonunion wages
at the lower wage Wn. This causes an aggregate "inefficiency" that
is reflected in a slight decline in Y. (ii) The loss in wages of those Nu
workers who are forced to accept the lower wage Wn is equal to the
decline in Y. (iii) The higher value of Wu means that those unionized
workers who are sufficiently fortunate to retain their union jobs will
gain, (iv) The increased supply of workers for nonunion jobs caused
by the reduction in Nu following the increase in Wu means that Wn
will decline below its initial level, and consequently, nonunionized
relatively low skilled workers will lose due to the introduction of
unionism, (v) Relatively skilled workers will incur a slight reduction
in income due to the inefficiency caused by the introduction of unionism,
and its value is roughly proportional to the reduction in Y under (i)
above. This loss, however, will be small compared to the loss incurred
by the incumbent Nu's, for the displaced union workers cannot generally
compete for relatively high skilled jobs, (vi) The owners of nonlabor
inputs will incur a loss through the reduction in R that is comparable
in proportionate terms to that of the No's.
The preceding suggests that whatever union members gain in terms
of increased compensation, item (iii) in the preceding paragraph, is equal
to the losses of workers who are similar but nonunionized, (iv), plus
the losses of both relatively skilled workers and the owners of nonlabor
inputs, (v) and (vi). Investigation of this question in formal economic
models (e.g., Johnson and Mieszkowski) suggests that most of the gains
come from losses incurred by nonunion nonsupervisory labor, i.e., the
value of (iii) is only slightly greater than the negative of (iv). By this
view of the economic effects of unionism, therefore, the gains by union
members arise primarily at the expense of similar but nonunionized
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labor. Estimation of the size of this transfer is a fairly complicated matter,
but I would conjecture that as of 1987 it is between 30 and 60 billion
dollars.
From a macroeconomic viewpoint an extremely important aspect of
the ability of individual unions to obtain economic gains for their
members is the mitigation of competition from lower-wage, nonunion
competition. If, for example, a union organizes a few firms in an in
dustry characterized by the free entry of other firms, the unionized firms
will face a severe cost disadvantage relative to firms that have been
able to resist unions, and, in the long run, the unionized firms may be
so unprofitable that their owners decide not to replace depreciated plants
and leave the industry. Consequently, unionism generally has been suc
cessful in the U.S. in industries in which (a) they are able to organize
a large majority of the workers in particular occupations, and (b) there
are only a few large firms and entry by new firms is very difficult. In
the absence of these conditions, a union faces the prospect that at least
a very large proportion of its membership will lose their jobs if the wages
of its members are negotiated at a level above the industry norm.
The point will be made and stressed below that much of organized
labor's political agenda can be understood in terms of their obvious and
understandable desire to mitigate competition from nonunion labor.

Labor's Political Agenda
I now turn to a consideration of labor's specific political agenda with
respect to economic policy issues. The discussion will be organized in
to four groups of issues: (a) policy toward the labor market and the
environment of collective bargaining; (b) international trade policy;
(c) monetary and fiscal policy; and (d) women in the labor market. I
put major emphasis on the current attitudes of labor toward various ques
tions, but where it is especially relevant I consider the historical develop
ment of labor's attitude.
The sources of my impression of labor's attitudes consist principally
of the following: (i) various issues of the AFL-CIO News, a weekly
publication that reports and interprets political and economic
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developments from the point of view of that organization; (ii) a series
of position papers entitled AFL-CIO Reviews the Issues, which go into
some detail on a wide range of policy issues of the mid-1980s; and
(iii) the annual reports of the AFL-CIO to the Congress, in which the
AFL-CIO Department of Legislation sets out what the Executive Council
of the organization feels the U.S. government ought to be doing.
Domestic Labor Market Issues
There are, of course, literally hundreds of political issues that con
cern the day-to-day operation of unions: worker safety, pension manage
ment, union reporting requirements, the management of the National
Labor Relations Board, and so on. I will focus on a few such issues
that seem to me to illuminate labor's position with respect to the domestic
labor market.
Davis-Bacon Act (DB). The purpose of this law, which was pass
ed in 1931, was to keep wage rates in construction from falling
precipitously during the first phase of the Great Depression. It requires
any construction project that is financed by federal funds to pay the
"prevailing wage" for construction workers in the area. This level is
usually interpreted as the negotiated union rate, so DB means essen
tially that nonunionized construction firms cannot employ their cost ad
vantage (due to a 10-25 percent lower wage level) in bidding on
federally-financed projects. It was pointed out above that unions have
a difficult time operating in industries that are characterized by a high
degree of product competition and the relatively free entry of (non
union) firms. It is clear that a law like DB is very popular to unions
in the construction industry, for it assures them access to a large share
of the market.
DB is anathema to conservatives who see it as an unwarranted, inef
ficient governmental intervention in the market. It has also not been
popular in the postwar period with liberals who have seen DB as a
mechanism for denying black construction workers access to lucrative
jobs in construction. It is, in fact, very difficult to defend a law of this
sort, unless one puts inordinate weight on the well-being of unionized
construction craftsmen. It is an example of a few benefiting at the ex
pense of the many with, as seen in the above analysis of the distribu-
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tional effects of union wage gains, the largest cost being incurred by
individuals at a lower economic stratum than the beneficiaries.
The retention of DB, however, has been a consistent component of
labor's political agenda for decades, and they spend a lot of energy in
defeating proposals to weaken it. For example, in 1982 there was an
amendment to a bill to provide federal funds to help rebuild infrastruc
ture that would have limited the application of DB to initial highway
construction and excluded repair work. This was defeated by a vote
of 191-194, no doubt with a bit of lobbying by the relevant unions.
Minimum Wages. A second "workers' rights" law that gets a lot of
attention from the AFL-CIO is the minimum wage provision of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938. The minimum wage has been the subject
of periodic battles between conservatives and liberals over the 50 years
of its existence. Its value has usually been reset at about 50 percent
of the average wage in manufacturing, and over the following few years
its value falls relative to other wages and to the price level.
The last increase in the value of the federal minimum wage was in
1981 to $3.35, its current value. The average manufacturing wage at
the time of the last increase was about $7.63, so the minimum/manufac
turing ratio was .44. Since then, however, the average manufacturing
wage has risen to about $10.20 (as of November 1987), so the ratio
has fallen to .33. From another perspective, prices have risen about
18 percent since the beginning of 1981, so the real value of the minimum
wage has fallen by about 15 percent. Indeed, in large parts of the coun
try the going wage for the relevant lowest skilled jobs (teenagers working
as fast food hands and such) is well above $3.35, so that the federal
minimum wage is as irrelevant as if it were set at its 1938 level (25 cents).
The AFL-CIO strongly supports the current Kennedy-Hawkins bill
that would raise the minimum to $3.85 in 1988 and by steps to half
the manufacturing wage in 1991. If the minimum were currently equal
to half the manufacturing wage, it would be $5.50 rather than $3.35
and would be a decidedly not irrelevant level in most labor markets
in the country. It should be pointed out that the Reagan administration
continues in its opposition to an increase in the minimum, calling in
stead for a youth sub-minimum differential. I understand that there is
general resignation by Republicans to an eventual increase, but its value
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will probably be smaller than the Kennedy-Hawkins proposal. (A similar
proposal for indexing the minimum to the manufacturing wage, strongly
supported by labor, was opposed by the Carter administration and
defeated in 1977.)
Most unionists in the U.S. earn a great deal more than $5.50 per hour,
so why is the raising of the minimum wage so important to the AFLCIO? Part of the reason is their concept of how low-wage labor markets
operate. To quote from AFL-CIO Reviews the Issues. Report No. 13,
July 1987:
Many wages are not set in free and perfectly competitive labor
markets. The lowest paid workers in society often suffer from
their lack of bargaining power. They are easy targets for ex
ploitation by business, especially when there is a large pool
of unemployed seeking work, . . . Some non-market institu
tion or arrangement is often needed, therefore, to prevent
such exploitation. Indeed, the notion that the structure of
wages should adhere to some underlying standard of fairness
is one reason for having a minimum wage in the first place,
and for keeping it in line with the general structure of wages.
This is, of course, a very difficult line of argument for a conven
tional economist to follow. What kind of exploitation? What is a "stan
dard of fairness?" The standard economic analysis of the labor market
effects of minimum wages is similar to that of the distributional effects
of unionism. If the minimum were raised to $5.50, some low wage
workers would gain (by keeping their higher wage fast food jobs) but
others would lose (by having to babysit or cut grass or not work at all).
What right does the government have, more conservative economists
would go on to argue, to deny employment opportunities to people who
are willing to work for $4.00?
One problem with the standard economic argument is that the em
pirical evidence about the employment effects of minimum wages is
that they are rather small (see Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen 1982). The
reason for this may be due to the likelihood that, in periods in which
the minimum wage is significant (i.e., nontrivially in excess of the
market-clearing wage), there is large noncompliance with the law. A
firm that is found in violation of the law for the first time is liable to
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pay back wages to its employees, if these employees can be found. That
is like establishing a fine for owners of automobiles in parking places
with expired meters equal to the price for one hour of parking; people
wouldn't bother putting quarters in the meters because the expected value
of doing so would be negative. It is interesting to note tht the AFLCIO has backed legislation that would establish penalties on firms for
noncompliance.
A second, probably more important, reason that the AFL-CIO sup
ports a minimum wage legislation is that some of its member unions,
e.g., the International Ladies Garment Workers and the Restaurant
Workers, are in low-wage industries and are very affected by low-wage
competition. A high, well-enforced minimum wage would serve the pur
pose for these unions as does the Davis-Bacon Act for the construction
trades. It would establish a wage floor so that these unions could bargain
for higher wages and better working conditions without the fear of be
ing undercut by nonunionized firms in relatively competitive product
markets. From the viewpoint of equity, it is difficult to fault this motiva
tion; for example, the wages of textile workers currently average only
about $7 per hour. However, the competitive labor they are trying to
price out of their market earns hourly wages of $4 to $6 per hour, so
the equity case is not clear cut.
Occupational Disease Notification. A current example of organiz
ed labor's political activity is its strong support of a bill that would re
quire the identification, notification, and medical counseling of workers
exposed to a high risk of cancer or other diseases on a current or previous
job. Pending legislation would provide federal monitoring of the pro
gram at a cost of about $25 million. The bill is supported by some trade
associations and firms (e.g., the Chemical Manufacturers Association
and General Electric) but is opposed by other representatives of industry
(e.g., the National Association of Manufacturers) and by the Reagan
administration.
The position of the Reagan administration on this proposal is in
teresting. On the one hand, they maintain, the bill is duplicative of ex
isting OSHA regulations and therefore unnecessary; on the other hand,
it would create a great deal of unproductive litigation by being a boon
doggle for liability attorneys. Further, says the administration, policies
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of this sort should be decided in the course of normal collective bargain
ing. The AFL-CIO says that because of careless and ignorant past prac
tices by many industries there is going to be a lot of future occupa
tional disease and that this legislation would prevent or minimize the
disease.
This is an interesting and subtle problem. Why should the govern
ment become involved in a program that could in principle, be negotiated
between unions and firms? The answer is that many firms are not unioniz
ed and their workers, especially former employees, have no way to com
pel the firms to provide the relevant, costly information. Assuming that
the notification procedures are cost-effective from a social point of view
(which may or may not be true, I don't have enough information to
tell), it is correct for the government to require participation by all rele
vant firms and not simply depend on unions and managements to work
it out. Nonunion firms would generally not engage in the notification
process, and unionized firms that did would be subject to a competitive
disadvantage.
Other legislation of this sort that is recent passed or currently under
consideration in Congress includes provision of (unpaid) leave time for
new parents, mandatory provision by firms of catastrophic health in
surance, the prohibition of polygraph tests by employers, and required
advance notice by firms of plant closures or significant employment
reductions. The Reagan administration has said of all of them "leave
it to the collective bargaining process." The reason that labor wants
these sorts of provisions codified is that they will apply to all firms,
union and nonunion alike and thus will eliminate a competitive disad
vantage of unionized firms who agree to them in collective bargaining.
An economist would predict that a nonunion firm mandated to pay some
benefit that costs x cents per hour will lower its wage offer (sooner
or later) by that x cents. Thus, the competitive disadvantage of a unioniz
ed firm that has negotiated the benefit at a cost of x cents will not in
fact change. The support of these proposals by the AFL-CIO, however,
indicates that they are not believers in the economist's conclusion (or
maybe they value the sooner more than the later).
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International Trade Policy
In the past few years, the issue about which labor has been the most
strident is the flow of imports into the U.S. The headlines of the front
page stories in the AFL-CIO News document the horror of lost jobs and
wages caused by the increasingly larger importation of shoes, vehicles,
steel, military equipment, and all manner of goods.
It was not always like that. In 1958, for example, the AFL-CIO sup
ported the Eisenhower administration's request for an extension of the
Reciprocal Trade Agreement and scolded the "protectionists" who did
not want lower tariffs. They lauded the Trade Expansion Act of 1962
that gave the President authority to cut tariffs in return for equivalent
treatment in other countries. (This was the period in which the Euro
pean Economic Community was being formed.) They also provided a
hint of things to come, however: "The AFL-CIO gave strong support
to the Kennedy trade program but warned that support could turn to
opposition unless strong measures were taken to help workers who might
lose their jobs and to help industries that might be injured by increased
imports."
By 1970, the support had indeed turned to opposition, and the op
position has become much stronger since 1984 when the merchandise
trade deficit began its sharp increase to present levels. Their present
position can be summarized as follows: (a) the free movement of goods
across countries was beneficial to the U.S. when we produced most
of what we consumed at home; (b) now, however, many U.S. manufac
turing companies are multinational concerns that export American
technology and capital to wherever they can yield the highest profit,
thus resulting in a severe loss of U.S. jobs; (c) the irresponsible,
unregulated behavior of multinationals, along with the irresponsible fiscal
policy of the Reagan administration (to be discussed below), has also
been a major cause of the disappearance of real wage growth and of
the reduction of the "middle class" in the U.S.; and (d) extremely
strong, European-style policies are needed in the U.S. to preserve our
industrial base.
During 1987, the AFL-CIO has strongly supported the Trade and In
ternational Economic Policy Reform Act. The major provision of this
bill is that any country whose (nonpetroleum) merchandise trade surplus
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with the U.S. exceeds 1.75 times its imports from the U.S. must reduce
that surplus by 10 percent per year until either the ratio falls to or below
1.75 or until the U.S. trade deficit falls below 1.5 percent of GNP (it
was 4.1 percent of GNP in 1986). The bill also provides for severe
penalties to be placed on the importation of goods from countries whose
price advantage is derived from, in the AFL-CIO's words, "the denial
of the right to freedom of association (in other words, bust unions),
the refusal to insure a safe working environment, the exploitation of
child labor and other reprehensible practices." The bill (usually refer
red to as "Gephardt," after its leading sponsor in the House) would
also provide specific relief to certain industries such as steel and telecom
munications. Another bill, the Textile and Apparel Trade Act of 1987,
would increase restrictions on the importation of clothing and shoes.
In addition, labor has been a proponent of similar proposals such as
domestic content legislation for the auto industry and an opponent of
measures such as the Reagan administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative
that was an effort to spur economic development in that region by en
couraging imports from these nations into the U.S.
Why has organized labor shifted its position on trade so radically over
the past 25 years, from putting down opponents of lower tariffs in the
U.S. as "protectionists" in the 1950s to denouncing proponents of low
tariffs as "slaves to outmoded economic theories" in the 1980s? To
understand this question, one has to understand that each worker, whether
a union member or not, has the role of a consumer of goods as well
as a supplier of services. As a consumer, each worker is clearly better
off by being able to purchase foreign goods at lower prices. Any policies
like those mentioned above that would raise the price of shoes, autos,
VCRs and the like, simply lower the purchasing power of a given value
of each person's income. To give a commonly cited example, if some
country decides that it wants to sell steel to the U.S. at a price below
its domestic cost and make up the losses by taxing its citizens, American
consumers gain by roughly the amount of the subsidy provided its steel
industry by the foreign government. If, as was the case before the re
cent nationwide labor strife, wage rates in Korea are 10 to 15 percent
of those in the U.S., the American consumer clearly gains from the
importation of labor-intensive, low technology goods (like shoes) from
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Korea. If the vintners in the Bordeaux region of France are more skill
ed than their counterparts in the Napa Valley region of California, Yup
pies are clearly hurt by an increase in the tariff on Chateau Lafitte
Rothschild.
On the other hand, each worker is also a supplier of labor services.
Some workers produce goods that are import-sensitive (e.g., autos and
shoes). A reduction in the price of imported goods (for whatever reason:
increase in the efficiency of foreign suppliers, the granting of govern
ment subsidies to export industries in foreign countries, or an increase
in the real value of the dollar) lowers the return to the owners of capital
(both physical and human) in import-sensitive industries. Thus, although
they pay lower prices than they would otherwise for the goods they
buy, they receive lower incomes, and, for this subset of Americans,
the negative effect of lower incomes outweighs the beneficial effect of
lower prices. These people, both the workers in and the owners of shoe
factories, would clearly gain by the imposition of tariffs or other trade
restrictions on the importation of goods.
A second group of workers is employed in industries whose output
is both consumed domestically and exported (e.g., airplanes and wheat).
A fall in the price of imports, everything else equal, makes them better
off as consumers, but it also increases their incomes by weakening the
dollar and increasing the demand for exports. The interest of these
workers and that of the owners of firms in export industries is in keep
ing both U.S. trade restrictions and those in foreign countries as low
as possible. For example, if, in response to a domestic content law that
said that a certain fraction of each imported automobile had to be pro
duced in the U.S., Japan did the same for the 747s it purchases for Japan
Air, Boeing workers hi Seattle would be worse off; they would have
to pay more for their Toyotas (if they were still available) and would
earn lower wages (if they still had them).
A third group of workers is employed in the "nontradable" goods
sector (e.g., service and insurance); their interest is ostensibly in lower
consumer prices and they are thus hostile to trade restrictions. This is
a little tricky, for, as Deardorff and Stern (1979) point out, every worker
is also a member of a community. The demand for "nontradables" in
an area that is dominated by either an import or an export industry

78

Organized Labor's Political Agenda

will be accordingly affected by trade developments. For example, a pro
ducer of nontradables in Michigan would probably be helped by the
imposition of domestic content legislation; a similar person in Seattle
would probably be hurt.
If the potential gains and losses associated with any trade policy are
added up for all three groups, aggregate welfare is clearly greatest when
trade restrictions are minimized. For example, the value of cheap shoes
from Korea outweighs the losses incurred by American shoeworkers.
However, this conclusion, a sacred paradigm in economics that goes
back to Adam Smith, is based on the explicit assumption that everyone
counts the same. In the language of modern benefit-cost analysis, there
exists a set of distributional weights that will yield the opposite conclu
sion, i.e., that free trade is a bad thing. If, for example, one were a
45-year-old shoeworker without skills that were transferable to any other
industry, the argument that the sum of the welfare of the rest of the
citizenry is increased due to the availability of imported shoes (for $10
when you can make them for $40) by more than you lose (the difference
between $18,000 in the shoe factory and $7500 at the Burger King)
is irrelevant. The standard economic argument is also obviously irrele
vant to the union that represents the shoeworker (and to those unions
that represent workers in the steel, auto, textile and like industries).
Not all unions benefit from protectionism, and, accordingly, not all
unions advocate it. A study by Steven Magee (adapted by Deardorff
and Stern 1979) examined the testimony of both labor and management
organizations in congressional hearings on trade policy in 1972. There
was a tendency for both labor and management groups that represented
industries with large positive trade balances in 1967 (e.g., machinery,
soybeans, and trucks) to favor freer trade and for those that represented
industries with large negative trade balances (e.g., textiles, steel, and
cars) to favor a more protectionist policy. If the merchandise trade deficit
were approximately zero, the antis and pros would more or less balance
out, and representatives of "the public" would tilt the scales toward
freer trade. The problem is that in recent years the trade deficit has
been very large, and the antis far outweigh the pros. The reason for
the increase in the trade deficit is the huge federal government deficits
that followed the large tax cuts in 1982, a topic to be discussed in the
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following subsection. This had the effect of driving up the dollar and
rendering U.S. manufatunng largely noncompetitive in world markets.
Whatever its cause, however, the symptom, a flood of inexpensive
foreign merchandise, has raised the hackles of American labor.
As an example of how trade unions have been affected by the events
of the past 15 years, I calculated the percentage of nonsupervisory
workers that were represented by unions in the private nonagricultural
sector in 1970 (using two-digit industry categories for manufacturing
and one-digit categories for other industries and the Freeman-Medoff
collective bargaining coverage numbers). This proportion was .41 in
1970. If the extent of collective bargaining had remained the same in
each industry to 1986, this ratio would have fallen to .34. In other words,
organized labor would have lost about a sixth of its relative influence
in the private, nonagricultural sector due to the shifts in the industrial
composition of employment, much of it associated with import penetra
tion. That this has happened does not mean that the U.S. should adopt
a more protectionist set of policies, but it does help to understand why
the AFL-CIO has become so vehemently opposed to free trade.
In principle, since there are more gainers than losers as a result of
free trade, the gamers should be able to buy off the losers from trade
so that the whole society is better off. In practice, however, it has pro
ved very difficult to do this. The various programs for trade adjust
ment assistance have not been very effective, and this has magnified
labor's opposition to free trade. The administrative problem stems from
an economic problem. If, for example, several GM plants go out of
business because of a combination of high wages and incompetent
management, surely much of their output would be replaced by the im
portation of Toyotas and the like. A case could be made that the af
fected workers are victims of import penetration, but, obviously, that
position is arguable. Do we want to put the government in the role of
bailing out all companies that fail? What kind of automatic mechanism
would provide an efficient and equitable determination of who should
or should not receive trade assistance? What do we do about the 45-yearold displaced shoeworker?
These are tough questions, and the AFL-CIO has provided answers
to all of them. There are, of course, other points of view. However, it
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is clear that the problem is not going to go away in the near future.
The U.S. is still a very high wage nation, and the exodus of physical
capital and the adoption of much of our technology by other economies
will continue. It would, in my opinion, be a serious mistake to follow
the route of increased protectionism as have many countries; this would
cause a further significant decline in our living standard. The solution
lies in (i) solving the problem of the provision of trade adjustment
assistance, and (ii) coming to grips with our internal fiscal problem that
is the root cause of the trade crisis.
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
During the 1970s, the AFL-CIO, like most professional economists,
turned from unabashed Keynesianism to a much more eclectic stance
concerning monetary and fiscal policy. Gone are the days when sensi
ble people feel that the government can "control" the economy through
the use of fiscal policy, and the statements of organized labor, in their
reports to Congress, their issue papers, and in the AFL-CIO News, reflect
this change of opinion.
A clear statement of their view about monetary policy is contained
in the June 1983 Report on the 97th Congress. Here (pp. 25-27), they
complain about the shift in monetary policy from the control of interest
rates toward an "automaticity" in the rate of growth of the money sup
ply. Their solution to the problem of high interest rates (yields on AAA
bonds had been in the double-digit range since 1980) was the imposi
tion of credit controls so that the money market would yield a lower
interest rate. The problem with this proposal is that, with the increas
ing mobility of financial capital across international borders, the U.S.
has little capacity to control the nominal interest rate in the economy,
which tends to equal the world real interest rate plus the rate of infla
tion in the U.S. If we run huge government deficits, we will also run
large trade deficits, and this requires a large influx of foreign capital
into the country in order to finance these deficits. If the government
attempts to set the nominal interest rate such that our real interest rate
is below the world level, wealth-holders in Tokyo, Hong Kong, and
elsewhere will turn to other investments and refuse to purchase the U.S.
government bonds that are necessary to finance the federal government
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deficit. Without severe controls on the export of U.S. financial capital
(i.e.,making it illegal to ship dollars out of the country, buy foreign
financial instruments, etc.), capital markets in the U.S. would break
down in the sense that there would be little "money" for mortgages,
consumer credit, farm crop loans, etc. Short of nationalizing the bank
ing system and running it at a huge loss, the country would be in a real
mess. Thus, the AFL-CIO proposal for artificially driving down the
rate of interest is either ill-informed or irresponsible.
The preceding paragraph also brings out the root of the trade prob
lem facing American labor. The Reagan administration decided in 1983
to cut tax rates very significantly without corresponding cuts in govern
ment expenditures. These tax cuts were supposed to induce individuals
to work longer and harder and consumers to save more (thus adding
to the capital stock) so that the tax base would increase sufficiently for
tax revenues to fall by very little or, perhaps, increase. This was, of
course, nonsense, for the question of the incentive effects of after-tax
wages and rates of return on labor supply and investment had been very
thoroughly researched and we knew that the tax cuts would reduce
revenues more or less proportionately. Thus, the government deficit
increased to the $150-200 billion range on a permanent (or "structural")
basis. In an economy with open trading of financial assets, this had to
be accompanied by a decline in net exports on roughly a one-to-one
basis. Our government deficits were financed by selling assets (govern
ment bonds, common stocks, Waikiki Beach, and so on) to foreigners.
Further, the fall in net exports means that exports decline and imports
increase with the subsequent strengthening of the dollar relative to foreign
currencies. This is the background to the foreign trade problem that
was discussed in detail in the preceding subsection.
So what are we going to do about it? Clearly a restrictive trade policy
(like the Gephardt bill discussed above) only attacks a symptom of the
problem, not the cause. (It would ultimately strengthen the dollar more
and reduce both exports and imports by roughly equal amounts.) To
solve the trade problem we must bring about a significant reduction
in the government deficit through some combination of increases in taxes
or decreases in government spending. The Democrats and the AFLCIO favor the former; the Reagan administration favors the latter. The
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reasons for labor's support of higher taxes rather than cuts in govern
ment spending are spelled out in their report "Infrastructure: Backbone
of the Economy" (November 1986). Here they take a very long-sighted
and, in my view, reasonable approach. Investment in infrastructure (air
ports, highways, bridges, urban transit, railroads, water resources,
recreational facilities, wastewater treatment, and the like) has serious
ly declined as a fraction of GNP (from 3.1 percent in 1968 to 2.4 in
1985). To a large extent, this is a federal responsibility, for the benefits
of many of these facilities cross the boundaries of state and municipal
governments so that without federal direction there will be consistent
underinvestment in them. Thus, a policy of cutting taxes significantly
and of removing the federal government from the nondefense sphere
of the economy (the Reagan administration policy of the 1980s) is, to
say the least, suboptimal. In the AFL-CIO's words, "Skimping on in
frastructure to cut the federal deficit is a short-run expediency that will
constrain growth and living standards in the future. The far wiser course
is to raise the necessary revenue and develop appropriate spending
priorities that will assure sufficient resources for public investment and
help overcome the economic stagnation and high unemployment that
have plagued the United States for many years." (If one put a period
after "public investment," no reasonable person could argue with this
statement. The probable implications of the rest of that sentence [DavisBacon wages, targeting to areas of high unemployment, etc.] are sub
ject to controversy.)
At present, the federal tax system for individual income is characteriz
ed by a 15 percent rate up to about $40,000 of taxable income and a
marginal rate of 28 percent thereafter. Eight years ago the maximum
marginal tax rate was 50 percent, and at some times during the postwar
period it was as high as 70 percent. The corporate profits tax rate is
now 34 percent, as contrasted to the pre-1982 rate of 50 percent. It
is unlikely that there will be a drastic overhaul of the tax system during
the next decade, for Congress just completed that (painful) process in
1986. Thus, additional revenues probably must be raised by adjusting
the parameters of the present system. One way would be to raise the
existing rates by a constant proportion (for example, the lower rate by
a third to 20 percent and the higher rate to 40 percent, the profits rate
to 45 percent). A second way would be to raise the lower rate and leave

Organized Labor's Political Agenda

83

the upper rate and the profits rate unchanged, which would mean that
all new tax revenues are generated from the less well-off segment of
the population. The AFL-CIO, somewhat predictably, favors the third
possibility (leaving the 15 percent rate constant but increasing both the
higher rate on personal income and the profits rate to 38.5 percent).
On an issue like this there is no right way or no wrong way to raise
tax rates. Resolution of this issue rests on a value judgment (i.e., it
is a political decision). Where one comes out generally depends on where
one is in the income distribution, although factors such as altruism also
come to play. It is interesting to note that the typical union member
is above the middle of the income distribution and, under the current
tax system, would be in the higher marginal bracket. It is not entirely
self interest, therefore, that motivates labor with respect to tax policy.
The notion of "equity" obviously plays a significant role. This is in
contrast to the tax policy of the Reagan administration, which was design
ed mainly to cut the taxes of the upper third of the income distribution
on the (obviously bogus) grounds that this would so increase incentives
that tax collections would rise.
A final aspect of monetary and fiscal policy that was very important
to the AFL-CIO in the 1970s is compliance with the Humphrey-Hawkins
Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978. This legislation,
which was enacted largely because of the strong support of the AFLCIO, made achievement of the goal of a 4 percent unemployment rate
(by 1985) the law of the land. This goal is (the present tense is used
because the Humphrey-Hawkins Act is still the law) to be achieved
without increasing inflation or upsetting the U.S. trade balance, and
this is to be accomplished by certain "structural measures" such as
the government provision of job training and public service jobs. The
original legislation called for expansion of public employment (at
"prevailing wages") until the unemployment rate reached 4 percent,
but in the final version the only mandated activity was for the Presi
dent to reveal how the goals of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act were go
ing to be achieved. (The last time I saw compliance with the law was
in the 1983 Economic Report of the President, which called for the
establishment of a youth subminimum wage and for reductions in
unemployment insurance so as to reduce the "natural rate" of
unemployment.)
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This law was passed by Congress and signed by President Carter as
a symbolic act to appeal to labor (and to blacks, who suffer most from
unemployment); there is no way that any set of structural policies could
achieve its objectives. It is interesting, however, because it indicates
the underlying view of the AFL-CIO toward macroeconomic issues.
Further, if the conditions for a renaissance of labor political influence
emerge in 1989, more will be heard of the provisions of the HumphreyHawkins Act.
Women in the Labor Market
An interesting aspect of organized labor's political agenda is its stance
toward issues that affect women's role in the labor market. A thorough
discussion of this is set out in the AFL-CIO pamphlet "Work and Family:
Essentials of a Decent Life (What is Really 'Pro-Family'?)," which
was published in February 1986. This statement, which covers a wide
range of topics, might be considered labor's reply to the right wing "profamily" point of view, although it does not address the standard items
of the right wing agenda (prohibition of abortion, prayer in public
schools, etc.). Instead, it argues for a series of measures that would,
in labor's view, make the U.S. a better place for families in general
and women workers in particular.
The first set of policies advocated by the AFL-CIO to promote the
quality of family life are the standard ones, some of which have been
discussed above in other contexts. These include the achievement of
full employment under Humphrey-Hawkins, an increase in the minimum
wage, a mandatory reduction in the standard workweek (by requiring
employers to begin paying overtime wages at 35 rather than 40 hours),
increasing the federal government role in guaranteeing safety on the
job (by increasing funding of the Occupational Health and Safety Ad
ministration), and increases in payments to the unemployed.
Recognizing the ever-increasing importance of women in the U.S.
labor force (and in unions), they also advocate a number of other policies
designed to be beneficial to women in the labor market. One major policy
proposal is increased government funding of child care centers. Noting
that the cost of caring for children during working hours makes par
ticipation in the labor market an unprofitable option for many women,
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it is taken as obvious that society would benefit from subsidization of
child care. From an economic point of view, however, it is not obvious
that the social benefits of such a subsidy would outweigh the costs. The
outcome of a formal analysis of this question would rest on the ques
tion of the degree to which there are "increasing returns to scale" in
the child care process. That we should allocate x billions of dollars of
public resources to the provision of child care, however, is certainly
a clearly stated point of view.
Another interesting proposal discussed in this position paper concerns
the earnings of women relative to men. One of the more severe social
problems facing the U.S. is the fact that, on average, the hourly wage
rate of employed women is 35 percent less than that of men. (Average
earnings per year are about 40 percent lower, but this is because women,
on average, work fewer hours.) To some extent this is explained by
the fact that the average woman in the labor force has less work ex
perience and job tenure than the average man, a phenomenon attributable
in large part to career interruptions associated with child birth and rear
ing. To some other extent, however, the gap between men's and women's
wages is explained by the fact that the wage rates associated with
"women's jobs" (secretaries, nurses, librarians, etc.) are lower than
the wage rates associated with "men's jobs" (truckdrivers, doctors,
engineers, etc.) even after adjusting for other attributes. Under current
federal law, it is illegal for most employers to pay different wages to
men and women with similar productivity on the same job (under the
Equal Pay Act of 1962). It is also illegal, under Title VH of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, to discriminate against women in hiring and pro
motion. It is not illegal to compensate workers in different jobs at dif
ferent schedules; it is, for example, O.K. for X Incorporated to start
its secretaries at $12,000 moving up to $16,000 per year while paying
wages of $20,000 to $26,000 to its truckdrivers, so long as women
truckdrivers are compensated according to the same schedule as are
men in that job and women applicants for the truckdriving jobs are given
an equal opportunity to receive them.
A legislative proposal that will probably receive serious considera
tion in the early 1990s is designed to eliminate sexual wage disparities
arising from differences in wage scales between jobs held predominantly

86

Organized Labor's Political Agenda

by men and women. This thrust, alternatively termed "pay equity" or
"comparable worth," which has already received support from the AFLCIO, would require X Incorporated in the above example to justify its
wage structure across occupations by the use of job evaluation pro
cedures. By this technique, each of the jobs in the company would be
assigned points for various characteristics: intellectual requirements,
responsibility, physical demands, and working conditions. The points
in the evaluation for each job would be summed (using some set of
weights for each characteristic) and the wage structure of the firm read
justed so that average wages were proportional to each job's score. The
presumption of proponents of comparable worth is that the resultant
wage structure would be purged of sexist biases that yield much higher
pay for men's than for women's jobs. (Interestingly, men in predominant
ly women's jobs do worse relative to men in predominantly men's jobs
than do women; see Johnson and Solon 1986.) Accordingly, a signifi
cant portion of the male/female wage differential would be eliminated.
Thus far comparable worth legislation has been introduced into a few
states and local governments (e.g., Minnesota and San Jose, Califor
nia), but it has not been found (in the courts) to apply to the private
sector, and no X Incorporates have come forward to offer their com
panies as laboratories to see how it would work. Its biggest proponent
in the labor movement has been AFSCME, a union that has much to
gain from it. Without going so far as to label the concept as "looney
tunes" or "cockamamie" (the latter applied to it by President Reagan),
there are some serious flaws in comparable worth. Ignoring the litiga
tion costs (which would be enormous), its most serious flaw is that it
would in practice apply only to a fraction of employers (at most only
about 40 percent) in the economy, all levels of government and the large
private corporations. Many or most of these employers would find it
profitable to contract out for the services of their now "overpriced"
women employees, for the temporary employment companies (e.g., Kel
ly Girl) would be effectively immune to comparable worth because they
would make sure they did not have any high-wage male jobs by which
women's jobs could be evaluated. This would mean employment ef
fects in which some of the previous holders of women's jobs in the
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covered sector would be forced to take wages in the now depressed
uncovered sector.
Thus, some holders of women's jobs would gain from the imposi
tion of comparable worth, but others would lose. As with the analysis
of the effect of unionism on the average wage rate in the economy, it
is not clear whether comparable worth would on balance be a good or
a bad thing for the group it is supposed to help.

Conclusions
I have examined the political positions of organized labor in the U.S.
on a number of current issues concerning the economy. Two principal
themes appear to emerge.
First, a large number of the AFL-CIO's positions can be explained
in terms of the obvious self-interest of blocks of its member unions.
The Davis-Bacon Act is designed to help construction unions at the ex
pense of virtually everyone else; minimum wage legislation is (arguably)
a device to lower competition to relatively low-wage unions; the turn
about of the union movement with respect to international trade coin
cided with the shift of the U.S. from a merchandise exporter to im
porter; and so on. However, this hardly distinguishes labor unions from
other special interest groups such as the American Medical Associa
tion, the National Turkey Federation (of Reston, VA), or even the
American Association of University Professors. The AFL-CIO and its
member unions are a fairly small slice of the total forces lobbying for
particular treatment in Washington. It is also not unusual that their posi
tions would be stated rather strongly. People fiercely engaged in a bat
tle for some cause or other tend over time to believe their rhetoric. (For
example, I suspect that, when arguing against all evidence for the 1982
tax cuts, Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan actually believed that
what they were doing was good for the long-term interests of the coun
try as well as for "the typical guy who earns $100,000 a year.")
On the other hand, many of the positions of the AFL-CIO do not
arise from pure self-interest. I have mentioned their strong stand in favor
nof a relatively progressive tax hike. Further, they have been very strong
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on civil rights issues, even before it was not too unpopular to do so.
Passage of comparable worth, although of obvious potential benefit to
a few member unions like AFSCME, would harm many other unions
representing predominantly male blue-collar workers. I am not privy
to the decision process that accompanied support of the proposal, but
it is at least possible that their support of the idea is motivated by a
sincere concern for the plight of low-paid women workers.
A second theme that has emerged in this investigation of organized
labor's political agenda is a growing preference for government interven
tion in the economy at a micro level. This is most clearly reflected in
their position on international trade, but it is also apparent in their posi
tions concerning the federal government role in union-management rela
tions, employer notification concerning plant closings and exposure to
toxic substances, immigration, and many other issues. This may reflect
a reaction during the 1980s to the Reagan administration's policy of
attempting to get the federal government out of virtually every
nondefense function of government. It may be a reaction to the buf
feting that the majority of unions have taken from the economy since
the early 1970s but especially in the 1980s. Whatever the cause, there
appears to be a diminished desire by the AFL-CIO to trust the dictates
and desires of the market place as opposed to more equitable and secure
government solutions. The problem with this approach, in my view,
is that their concept of equity often means using the government to get
something for their members at the expense of others who are not as
well off.
But that is what politics is all about. We have no universally accepted
standard of what is fair. The AFL-CIO continues to articulate a consis
tent set of policies very clearly. I suspect that their positions will soon
gain in importance.
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The Promise of Profit Sharing
Martin L. Weitzman
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
I want to talk about the nature and significance of some recent trends
toward making part of the pay of a firm's workers more automatically
responsive to the economic well-being of the firm. These trends have
received some attention for a variety of reasons, not least because they
may perhaps help to reduce unemployment or improve productivity.
Lately there has been a significant interest throughout many coun
tries of the world in gain sharing labor payment arrangements, which
tie some part of a worker's pay to a measure of how well his or her
company is doing. Profit sharing is perhaps the most familiar form.
Profit sharing itself is an old idea with, I think, a venerable history.
There are surely a number of reasons for the rekindled interest of late
in profit sharing. A major direct spur is undoubtedly coming from the
fierce pressure for containing costs, or at least making them somewhat
more responsive to performance, that many industries, which were
previously quasi protected, are now subjected to in a deregulated, in
ternationally competitive environment. Another rationale stems from the
more general idea that a properly instituted gain sharing plan can motivate
workers to cooperate more fully with management in raising produc
tivity and increasing profitability by giving them a direct stake in the
outcome. And there is the idea that if society as a whole were to move
toward profit sharing, it would help to soften the wicked unemploymentinflation tradeoff, which, especially in some European countries, bedevils
current attempts of traditional macroeconomic policy to reconcile
reasonably low unemployment with reasonably low inflation. It is this
macroeconomic promise of profit sharing on which I will concentrate
here by attempting to set forth the general case briefly and informally.
I will present the case for profit sharing as an open advocate, not as
a dispassionate observer. In that sense, this is an "essay in persuasion.''
I want to begin by emphasizing one centrally important fact. Even
leaving aside the important moral and social consequences, unemploy91
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ment is extraordinarily expensive. Every percentage point of extra
employment translates into about a 2 percent increase in national in
come. Any scheme that would result in a meaningful reduction of
unemployment would translate into very large increases in the value
of goods and services being produced.
Let me digress for a few moments to talk about the Japanese ex
perience. By any reckoning, Japan possesses a singularly outstanding
employment record. Even after correcting for the inevitable interna
tional differences in official reporting methods, Japanese unemployment
rates are regularly the lowest among the major capitalist economies.
This achievement is all the more remarkable considering that the Japanese
have suffered as much as any other nation, and probably more so, from
the effects of economic shocks beyond their control, including the two
oil crises of the 1970s and the current depressed demand for exports
caused by the rapid appreciation of the yen. While the debilitated Euro
pean economies allowed serious long-term unemployment to develop
and have remained mired in rates that would have been considered
astronomical by standards of little more than a decade ago, Japan's
unemployment rate has never exceeded 3 percent.
How do the Japanese keep unemployment so low? Are there lessons
here for other countries?
To find answers, it is instructive to examine how Japan is now cop
ing with its latest economic crisis. During the past couple of years, the
yen has soared 50 percent above the trade-weighted value of the cur
rencies of Japan's major partners. That represents a catastrophe for
Japan's vaunted export industries, including such mighty pillars of na
tional pride as steel, electronics, and automobiles. For these manufac
turing industries, it is as if their products were subjected to a 50 per
cent export tariff. In any other country that would be a sure recipe for
mass layoffs and the beginning of a wicked snowball effect on the rest
of the economy as the loss of purchasing power from unemployed
workers feeds back into further layoffs. A key ingredient in the Japanese
success story is that they seem able to contain the unemployment damage
initially, when it first threatens, before it explodes and then becomes
entrenched. The European experience teaches a clear alternative lesson
about how much more difficult it is to eradicate unemployment after
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it settles in. Japan has the will, backed by an appropriate microeconomic
structure, to deal vigorously, pragmatically, and automatically with the
unemployment problems on the level of the firm, right from the begin
ning. An ounce of microeconomic prevention is worth a pound of
macroeconomic cure.
Japan's first line of defense against layoffs is the world's most flexi
ble labor payment system. Fully one-fourth of an average Japanese
worker's total pay comes in the form of a semiannual bonus with strong
profit-sharing overtones. Studies show that bonus payments are
significantly correlated with profits. The bonus represents an automatic
shock absorbing cushion that helps save jobs during times of severe
economic stress. Last year's reaction has been especially notable. For
the first time since the 1950s, bonuses were cut from the previous year's
level by all major auto makers. The total of summer and winter bonuses
at Nissan, for example, was down by 2.6 percent from the previous
year's amount and further reductions are probably coming. Manufac
turing as a whole endured the only absolute decline of bonus payments
in the postwar period. The automatic ability of Japanese companies to
cut labor costs rapidly in the face of severe economic adversity comes
across very clearly during times of stress like now and during the oil
crises of the 1970s. Its job-saving potential is the envy of policymakers
throughout the rigid European economies, whose unresponsive pay
systems have ultimately proved their undoing in the face of contrac
tionary shocks that have left a nasty residue of enduring European
unemployment.
If the bonus system facilitates a Japanese company's retaining workers
when times are bad, what does the company do with the extra workers
when there is weak demand for its products? Herein lies Japan's sec
ond, and complementary, line of defense against layoffs: a strong ac
ceptance of intrafirm work mobility based on the principle of flexible
job assignments. Instead of being laid off outright, automobile produc
tion workers have been shifted to the sales arm of their company, or
to a dealership to help clear inventories, or to repair jobs within the
plant such as painting and renovation.
Although about 40 percent of factories in Japan are reportedly plan
ning "labor force adjustments," this is not merely a euphemism for
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layoffs, as it would be in most other countries. Japanese "adjustments"
mostly take the form of a reduction in bonuses and overtime, the en
couragement of early retirements, and the shifting of workers to alter
native tasks. Companies feel obligated to find other jobs for their idle
workers, if not within the firm then among subsidiaries and affiliated
companies. Although workers sometimes have to accept a different job,
and only after considerable retraining, this is viewed as a welcome
tradeoff during a time of economy wide contraction. Indeed, the famed
Japanese "lifetime employment system" is contingent upon a high degree
of pay flexibility and a discretionary right by the firm to alter job
assignments. Some outright layoffs do occur, but only as a last resort,
and principally among "temporary" workers not covered by the lifetime
employment commitment. Even during very hard economic times, the
total number of layoffs is sufficiently limited to keep the national
unemployment rate from rising above 3 percent.
Are there lessons here for the rest of the world? I think so. The bat
tle for full employment can be won. But success will likely require a
more flexible labor payment system and a less rigid attitude toward work
rules than are present in most Western countries today. I do not think
it is just a coincidence that Japan, Korea, and Taiwan all have signifi
cant bonus systems with strong profit-sharing overtones.
Let me restate that last comment about lack of coincidence somewhat
more carefully. As was noted, Japan has an unusual labor payment
system, where about one-fourth of an average worker's total compen
sation comes in the form of a twice-yearly bonus supplement added onto
base wages. It has by now been pretty firmly established that the Japanese
bonus system can be viewed as a form of profit sharing, even though
only about 15 percent of Japanese firms explicitly link the bonus to pro
fitability via a prescribed formula. What I mean by saying that Japanese
bonuses can be viewed as a form of profit sharing is simply the statistical
statement that the ratio of bonus payments to base wages varies positively
with business condition indicators, including profitability per employee.
Japan has enjoyed the lowest average unemployment rate among the
major industrialized capitalist economies over the last quarter century
or so. This comparatively outstanding employment record survives cor
rections for discouraged workers, relatively flexible hours, definitional
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differences, and so forth. Does the existence of a profit-sharing com
ponent of pay help in any way to account for the comparatively low,
stable unemployment rate in Japan?
This is an easy question to ask but a very hard one to answer. The
whole Japanese system seems to be employment promoting, so it is not
possible to isolate cleanly the pure role of the bonus system. I think
it is a fair statement to say that it would be more difficult for Japanese
firms to maintain the full employment commitment without the automatic
cushion that the bonus system provides. The Japanese experience is
definitely suggestive or supportive of the proposition that a profit-sharing
system can be used to help promote full employment, although it would
be naive to try to go far beyond such a statement at this stage.
Turning now to other countries, I want to inquire briefly why
unemployment has moved up so persistently to such stubbornly high
levels, especially in Europe. This is a subject of dispute. Some say real
wages are too high, others that there is insufficient aggregate demand.
Some blame what they see as an overly generous welfare and unemploy
ment system. And some focus on European wage rigidities and malfunc
tioning labor markets, especially the high costs of hiring and firing
workers. Perhaps there is some truth in all of these views.
Let me start my own analysis by asking a general question. General
ly speaking, what causes unemployment or slack labor markets? There
is really only one basic answer, but, like a coin, the answer has two
sides. Side one is that unemployment is caused when firms face insuf
ficient demand for their products relative to their marginal costs of pro
duction. Side two is that unemployment is caused when firms have toohigh marginal costs of production relative to the demand for their prod
ucts. Sometimes it is useful to stress one side of the coin; sometimes
the other. But it is always the same coin.
In either case, the key to noninflationary full employment is an
economic expansion that holds down the marginal cost to the firm of
acquiring more labor. Macroeconomic policy alone, the purposeful
manipulation of financial aggregates, can be very powerful in achiev
ing full employment or price stability, but cannot be depended upon
to reconcile both simultaneously. Why? Because of the two-headed
monster stagflation. Illusions of being able to fine tune aside, we know
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how to get unemployment down and output up by the usual expansionary
monetary and fiscal measures. We also know how to break inflation
by policy-induced recessions. What we do not know and this is the
central economic dilemma of our time is how simultaneously to recon
cile reasonably full employment with reasonable price stability. Expan
sionary policies dissipate themselves, to an excessive degree, in toolarge wage and price increases rather than expanded employment and
output.
I think it is important to realize the following point. There is a sense
in which the major macroeconomic problems of our day trace back,
ultimately, to the wage system of paying labor. We try to award every
employed worker a predetermined piece of the income pie before it is
out of the oven, before the size of the pie is even known. Our "social
contract" promises workers a fixed wage independent of the health of
their company, while the company chooses the employment level. This
stabilizes the money income of whomever is hired, but only at the con
siderable cost of loading unemployment on low-seniority workers and
inflation on everybody, a socially inferior risk-sharing arrangement that
both diminishes and makes more variable the real income of workers
as a whole. An inflexible money wage system throws the entire burden
of economic adjustment on employment and the price level. Then
macroeconomic policy is called upon to do the impossible reconcile
full employment with low inflation.
A profit-sharing system, where some part of a worker's pay is tied
to the firm's profitability per employee, puts in place exactly the right
incentives to resist unemployment and inflation. If workers were to allow
some part of their pay to be more flexible by sharing profits with their
company, that would improve macroeconomic performance by direct
ly attacking the economy's central structural rigidity. The superiority
of a profit-sharing system is that it has enough built-in flexibility to main
tain full employment even when the economy is out of balance from
some shock to the system. When part of a worker's pay is a share of
profits, the company has an automatic inducement to take on more
employees in good times and, what is probably more significant, to lay
off fewer workers during bad times. A profit-sharing system is not antilabor and does not rely for its beneficial effects on lowering workers'
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pay. The key thing is not to get total worker pay down it could even
go up within reason but to lower the base wage component relative
to the profit-sharing component. The marginal cost of labor is approx
imately the base wage, more or less independent of the profit-sharing
component.
Here is how the British Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson
stated the case for profit sharing in his 1986 annual budget speech before
the House of Commons:
The problem we face in this country is not just the level of
pay in relation to productivity, but also the rigidity of the
pay system. . . . This constitutes the Achilles heel of the
British economy. . . . If the only element of flexibility is in
the numbers of people employed, then redundancies are in
evitably more likely to occur. One way out of this might be
to move to a system in which a significant proportion of an
employee's remuneration depends directly on the company's
profitability per person employed. This would not only give
the workforce a more direct personal interest in their com
pany's success, as existing employee share schemes do. It
would also mean that, when business is slack, companies
would be under less pressure to lay men off; and by the same
token they would in general be keener to take them on.
Chancellor Lawson in his 1987 budget speech proposed granting fairly
substantial tax concessions to profit-related pay, and challenged British
business to take up the offer in the hopes that this might help to im
prove national economic performance on the employment and output
side. These proposals were enacted into law in August of 1987. Fully
one-half of a British worker's profit-related pay is now tax exempt up
to three thousand pounds or 20 percent of total pay, whichever is smaller.
It will be interesting to follow the British experience for the empirical
insights it should give us.
The case for widespread profit sharing is like the case for widespread
free trade. It is not true that free trade benefits every individual. It is
not even true, in a realistic world of increasing returns to scale and im
perfect competition, that free trade must benefit the community as a
whole. Yet, when all is said and done, when the possible costs and
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benefits of alternative trade policies have been calculated, weighted by
the relevant probabilities, and added up, most economists agree that
free trade is the best policy. The argument for profit sharing is of this
same form. It is possible to dream up unlikely counterexamples and
to interpret the existing evidence perversely. But the bulk of economic
theory, empirical evidence, and common sense argue that widespread
profit sharing will help to improve macroeconomic performance. The
bottom line is that it is easy to envision situations where profit sharing
helps economic performance while it is difficult to imgine scenarios
where profit sharing damages an economy, which is as much as can
be claimed for any economic idea.
It is no mystery why profit sharing makes the employer view things
fundamentally differently. In a profit-sharing system, the young school
graduate looking for work comes with an implicit message to the
employer saying: "Hire me. I am reasonable. Your only absolute com
mitment is to pay me the base wage. That is my marginal cost to you.
The profit-sharing bonus is like a variable cost, depending to some ex
tent on how well the company is doing. So you have a built-in cushion
or shock absorber if something should go wrong. You won't be under
such pressure to lay off me or other workers during downswings." By
contrast, the young British or French school-leaver looking for work
hi a wage system now comes to a potential employer with the implicit
message: "Think very carefully before you hire me. I am expensive
and inflexible. You will have to pay me a fixed wage independent of
whether your company is doing well or poorly." Is it difficult to deduce
in which situation companies might be expected to more eagerly recruit
new hires and to retain them, and in which situation new hiring com
mitments are likely to be avoided when possible? What is killing Euro
pean employment is the extreme wage rigidity compared with the U.S.
or Japan, the extreme independence of workers' pay from how well
or poorly their company is doing.
The essence of the case for profit sharing is the basic idea that on
the margin the profit-sharing firm is more willing than the wage firm
to hire new workers during good times and, more importantly, to lay
off fewer workers during bad times. From a social point of view, a
wage system is poorly designed because it is inherently so rigid. There
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has to be a precise relation between the wage level and the level of ag
gregate demand to just exactly hit the full employment target without
causing inflation. By contrast, a profit-sharing system is inherently much
more forgiving. Full employment will be maintained even if base wages
and profit-sharing parameters are somewhat "too high" relative to ag
gregate demand or, equivalently, aggregate demand is "too low" relative
to pay parameters.
Let me state the basic idea why a profit-sharing economy is likely
to have a better employment record than a wage economy as a kind
of parable. Suppose there are two kingdoms, Old Lakeland and New
Lakeland, which are physically identical in every way. The economies
of both identical twin kingdoms consist exclusively of fishing from the
numerous privately-owned lakes and exporting all of the fish at given
world prices.
In Old Lakeland, the monarch has decreed that the money wages to
be paid throughout the year at each lake are to be posted on January
1 of that year and cannot be altered until January 1 of the next year.
In New Lakeland, the monarch has decreed that payment at each lake
shall consist of a share of the value of the fish caught per worker; the
share fraction applying throughout the year is to be posted on January
1 of that year and cannot be altered until January 1 of the next year.
In both economies, once the pay parameters (wages or share fractions)
are posted, workers are free to migrate to that highest-paying lake which
will employ them.
Suppose that the world price of fish has been steady for as long as
anyone cares to remember. Then Old Lakeland and New Lakeland will
settle into a (long-run) competitive equilibrium that is exactly identical
in every respect except that pay is called "wages" in Old Lakeland
and "shares" in New Lakeland.
Suppose next that, suddenly and without warning, in the middle of
one year the world price offish drops. By royal decree, pay parameters
cannot be changed to reflect the new situation until January 1. What
happens in this (short-run) disequilibrium? Lake owners in Old Lakeland
will choose to lay off workers, but New Lakeland will remain at full
employment. Lake owners in New Lakeland will have no desire to lay
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off workers because it would diminish the total size of their fixed share
of the fish catch.
This basic parable can be amended in various ways, including alter
native labor supply assumptions, without destroying its essential message.
A share economy will have a tendency to remain at full employment
after contractionary shocks, because employers want to retain workers,
while a wage economy will likely exhibit unemployment, because firms
wish to shed labor.
Let me turn to the issue of how a share economy might affect the
so-called "nonmflationary rate of unemployment," or NAIRU. In a
highly idealized frictionless world of perfect information, long-run
equilibrium is the same under wage and share systems. In an idealized
long run, Old Lakeland and New Lakeland are isomorphic and both
have zero rates of unemployment. But what about somewhat more
realistic situations. Is the "share natural rate" of unemployment lower
than the "wage natural rate?" The formal analysis of unemployment
comparisons between Old Lakeland and New Lakeland in my story was
based on short-run disequilibrium considerations, when pay parameters
are quasi-fixed. But might widespread sharing also lower the natural
rate under a more realistic concept of long-run equilibrium than was
treated in the Lakeland example?
The answer is: yes, it presumably would. Furthermore, the shortrun and long-run unemployment problems are probably related.
In order to talk meaningfully about the effects of profit sharing on
the natural rate of unemployment, one has first to have some idea about
what is causing a positive natural rate in the first place. There are several
theories. Some are more persuasive than others, and they are not mutual
ly exclusive.
A leading theory contends that long-term unemployment is largely
inertial or hysteresis-like. Whatever initial disequilibrium caused the
increased unemployment in the first place, once unemployment con
tinues long enough it almost gets built into the system perhaps because
the long-term unemployed outsiders cannot or do not act effectively as a
disciplining force in wage setting, perhaps because working skills atrophy
without work, perhaps because the plight of the long-term unemployed
gets forgotten by the electorate, perhaps for other reasons. In this view
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the rate of change of unemployment typically has a more powerful ef
fect on wage settlements than the absolute level of unemployment.
If this kind of inertial effect lies behind the too-high natural rate, then
presumably widespread profit sharing would lower or eliminate it. The
long-term unemployment would have difficulty developing in the first
place out of an initial contractionary shock because profit-sharing firms
are reluctant to let go of workers. Taking as given this kind of natural
rate unemployment, leaving aside how it got started in the past, the in
grained expansionary bias of a profit-sharing system should act as a
built-in counterforce to help absorb the unemployed. The absorption
process could of course be speeded by traditional expansionary
macroeconomic policies which, under profit sharing, presumably pose
less danger of causing prices to accelerate because the employmentinflation tradeoff has been improved. So any way you look at it, profit
sharing looks as if it ought to help diminish long-term inertial
unemployment.
Another theory of why the natural rate is so high is that labor has
too much bargaining power. Whether a switch from a wage system to
profit sharing would lower this kind of NAIRU depends on what it is
that labor and management bargain over. If they bargain over pay
parameters, but management contrails the employment decision, a switch
to profit sharing would lower the NAIRU. If labor and management
bargain over both pay parameters and employment levels, the NAIRU
would be the same under either system. In-between bargaining would
yield in-between results, with the NAIRU then being somewhat lower
under profit sharing than under a wage system.
A third class of theories, based on the so-called "efficiency wage
hypothesis," holds that long-term unemployment is caused by companies
themselves choosing to pay above market-clearing wages because other
wise workers would shirk too much on the job. Within this kind of model
the natural rate would be the same under a wage or profit-sharing system.
To the extent that too-high unemployment in some economies is aid
ed by "overly generous" unemployment and welfare benefits, which
creates some voluntary unemployment, presumably the labor payment
mechanism per se makes little or no difference. So "the revenge of
the welfare state" kind of unemployment should not be affected by a
switch to profit sharing.
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Finally, there is the longstanding identification of the "natural rate"
with semipermanent frictional or structural unemployment, due to con
tinuously occurring microeconomic changes. This kind of unemploy
ment, it is usually said, cannot be reduced by pure macroeconomic
policies except temporarily and at the cost of increasing inflation. As
with inertial unemployment, however, the wage system is heavily im
plicated in frictional or structural concepts of the NAIRU. After all,
both wage and profit-sharing systems respond to shifts in relative
demands by sending a signal that eventually transfers workers out of
a losing firm or sector and over to a winner. With a wage system, the
signal to workers that their firm is a loser in the game of capitalist roulette
and that it is time to look for a new job with a winning firm is the boot
the worker is laid off and must suffer through an unemployment spell
of some duration while searching for the new job. Under a profit-sharing
system, the firm does not voluntarily let go of a worker because of weak
demand. Instead it is the worker who chooses to leave because pay is
too low relative to what is available elsewhere at relatively more suc
cessful firms.
Summing up, in none of the standard scenarios does a profit-sharing
system cause a higher NAIRU than a wage system, and in most of the
more reasonable descriptions a profit-sharing system generates a lower
NAIRU than a wage system. In addition, of course, the profit-sharing
system has better disequilibrium properties when pay parameters are
sticky in the neighborhood of the NAIRU unemployment rate.
It should be noted that not all forms of share systems bring about
equally desirable macroeconomic benefits. For example, such widely
disparate systems as employee ownership, or piece-rate formulas, or
Swedish style economywide workers' fund schemes, unlike profit sharing
do not necessarily alter the employer's attitude about hiring or laying
off workers.
I do not have nearly enough time here to deal fully with objections
that are traditionally raised against profit sharing. Some of these ob
jections raise legitimate issues. But some seem to me a bit wide of the
mark. Many of them involve a fallacy of composition a fallacious
generalization from what is ostensibly good for the tenured high-seniority
insider worker, who already has job security, to the level of what is good
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for the community of all would-be workers, which is quite a different
matter. Perhaps the most egregious example of this kind of fallacious
compositional reasoning is the argument that profit sharing allegedly
exposes workers to unnecessary risk.
This risk argument, so widely parroted and seemingly so plausible,
embodies, at least in its crude form, a classical fallacy of composition.
What is a correct statement for the individual high-seniority worker who
already has job tenure is patently false for the aggregate of all wouldbe workers. The problem of unemployment is in fact the largest in
come risk that labor as a whole, as opposed to the median tenured
worker, faces, and it is concentrated entirely on the marginal or out
sider worker. If more variable pay for the individual helps to preserve
full employment for the group, while fixed pay for the individual tends
to contribute to unemployment, it is not the least bit clear why overall
welfare is improved by having the median worker paid a fixed wage.
Actually, the correct presumption runs the other way around.
What is true for the individual tenured worker is not true for labor
as a whole. When a more complete analysis is performed, which con
siders the situation not as seen by a tenured, high-seniority worker who
already has job security, but by a neutral observer representing the en
tire population, it becomes abundantly clear that the welfare advantages
of a profit-sharing system (which tends to deliver full employment) are
enormously greater than a wage system (which permits unemployment).
The basic reason is not difficult to understand. A wage system allows
huge first-order losses of output and welfare to open up when a signifi
cant slice of the national income pie evaporates with unemployment.
A profit-sharing system helps to stabilize aggregate output at the full
employment level, creating the biggest possible national income pie,
while permitting only small second-order losses to arise because of
relatively limited random redistributions from a worker in one firm to
a worker in another. It is extremely difficult to cook up an empirical
real-world scenario, with reasonable numbers and specifications, where
a profit-sharing system with a moderate amount of profit sharing (say
20 percent of a worker's total pay) does not deliver significantly greater
social welfare than a wage system.
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Any economy is full of uncertainty. There are no absolute guarantees,
and if the uncertainty does not come out in one place, it will show up
in another. I am saying that it is much better, much healthier, if everyone
shares just a little bit of that uncertainty right at the beginning rather
than letting it all fall on an unfortunate minority of unemployed workers
who are drafted to serve as unpaid soldiers in the war against inflation.
It is much fairer if people will agree that only 80 percent of their pay
is going to be tied directly to the funny looking green pieces of paper
(which are themselves an illusion, although a very useful illusion) and
20 percent will be tied to company profits per employee. Then the
economy can be much more easily controlled to have full employment
and stable prices. Society will be producing, and hence consuming, at
its full potential. If people will face up to the uncertainty, and if everyone
accepts some small part of it, then society as a whole will end up with
higher income and less uncertainty overall.
Another fallacy of composition is often involved when opponents of
profit sharing argue that additional hired workers dilute the profits per
worker which the previously hired workers receive, thereby possibly
causing resentment by the already existing labor force against newly
hired workers which, in extreme cases, might lead to restrictions against
new hires. The fallacy of composition here lies in failing to account
for the fact that under widespread profit sharing and relatively free hir
ing there would also be a tight labor market, and hence an employer
cannot so easily pick up jobless people off the streets, because they are
just not there.
Incidentally, this kind of profit-dilution argument may be a bit of a
red herring on other grounds as well. Even a one-sided, worst-case
scenario where profit sharing "merely" dampens economic downturns
by encouraging employers to lay off fewer workers during recessions
still represents an economic benefit to the community of potentially enor
mous magnitude. In periods of recession and other kinds of squeeze,
the "insiders" risk becoming "outsiders" and they may well be glad
of a system which, without painful renegotiations, will enable an
automatic adjustment hi pay to be made to preserve jobs, which would
be self-reversing in recovery. Remember, also, that even in periods
of normal growth there will always be firms under pressure to reduce
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employment and anything which lessens that pressure will help overall
employment. To ratchet an economy toward a tight labor market and
improve the employment-inflation tradeoff so that macroeconomic
policies can be used more effectively requires only that, on the margin,
during downswings a few less old workers are laid off and during up
swings no fewer new workers are hired.
So far as internal labor relations are concerned, in comparing alter
native payment mechanisms let us not forget that the-wage system is
hardly a bed of roses. Younger, untenured workers are pitted against
older high-seniority workers in the jobs vs. wages decision. Featherbedding is widespread. Workers resist the introduction of new labor-saving
technology, resist job reassignments, and, more generally, take relatively
little interest in the fortunes of the company because they do not have
any direct stake in its profitability. Worker alienation is widespread in
an environment where the employer is essentially indifferent on the
margin to whether the worker stays or goes.
Arguments about profit sharing causing underinvestment strike me
as basically wrong, in theory and in practice. The critics have in mind
a situation where pay parameters are more or less permanently frozen.
In that case, profit sharing would, indeed, cause underinvestment for
the well-publicized reason that any incremental profits would have to
be shared with labor. (Incidentally, this should make workers proinvestment, so the critics cannot have it both ways in any case.) But over
the longer time horizon relevant to decisions about durable capital in
vestments, where either base wages or profit-sharing coefficients (or
both) respond to the invisible hand of the market and the visible hand
of collective bargaining, both wage and profit-sharing systems stimulate
equal efforts toward output-increasing improvements to the point where
the marginal value of capital equals the interest rate. Even if this
theoretical isomorphism between investment in wage and share systems,
which is well understood in modern economic theory, did not exist,
the cost of capital is only one side of the picture, and probably the less
important side. The more dominant consideration is the demand side.
If profit sharing results in a macroeconomic environment where output
is being stabilized at or near the full-employment, full-capacity level,
while a wage economy results in erratic, fluctuation-prone output and
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capacity utilization levels, there is bound to be more investment in a
profit-sharing economy. And, as if these two arguments were not enough,
interest rates, investment tax credits, and the like could be used to in
fluence investment decisions in any system. The really important distinc
tion concerns the average level of unemployed resources.
I have concentrated mostly on the favorable macroeconomic effects
of profit sharing. But the microeconomic properties, the effects on
motivation and productivity, may also be significant. This is of special
interest in a world where international competitiveness is so crucially
important. The two biggest economic tasks of our time are to resolve
the unemployment-inflation dilemma and to increase productivity
growth. It is just possible that a well-designed profit-sharing economy
has a big advantage in both of these important areas.
The few formal studies that have been done tend to show that greater
profit sharing in firms is positively related to increased productivity.
One of the problems in interpreting this result is that it is not clear
whether the profit sharing is causing the higher productivity or whether
some hidden third factor, call it superior management, tends to cause
the more progressive firms to have both profit sharing and high
productivity.
Most economists would say that there are no grounds for subsidizing
profit sharing on its possible productivity-enhancing merits because these
are strictly internal to the firm. Firms do not need to be subsidized to
take other productivity-enhancing measures, so why should they be
especially subsidized for profit sharing? I mostly agree with this inter
pretation, but I am not entirely sure because in practice a labor pay
ment mechanism may have large demonstration effects.
As for the employment stabilizing effects of profit sharing on the level
of the individual firm, these have only just begun to be studied in a
formal way. There are some preliminary indications that profit-sharing
firms are more resistant to layoffs during downswings. My distinct im
pression from talking with representatives from a fair number of profitsharing firms is that the built-in profit-sharing shock absorber protects
jobs during bad times and that both labor and management understand
this feature quite well, to the point of regarding it as self-evident.
Let me address the following question, which economists are naturally
fond of asking. If profit sharing represents such a good idea for operating
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a market economy, why don't we see more examples of it arising
spontaneously?
First of all, as was previously indicated, there are some significant
examples of profit sharing. In Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, it can be
argued, steps have been taken in this direction. The performance of
these economies hardly supports the view that widespread profit shar
ing is likely to prove harmful to economic health. In the U.S. economy,
about 15 percent to 20 percent of firms have what they call profit-sharing
plans. Although the issue has not been carefully studied in a rigorous
way, it is clear that many of these profit-sharing firms are among the
most progressive, advanced companies in the economy. As just one in
formal indication, in a well-known book called The 100 Best Companies
to Work for in America, over half of the cited companies have profitsharing plans of some kind.
The reason profit sharing is not more widespread despite its benefits
involves an externality or market failure of possibly enormous
magnitude. In choosing a particular contract form, the firm and its
workers only calculate the effects on themselves. They take no account
whatsoever of the possible effects on the rest of the economy. When
a firm and its workers select a labor contract with a strong profit-sharing
component, they are contributing to an atmosphere of full employment
and brisk aggregate demand without inflation because the firm is then
more willing to hire new "outsider" workers and to expand output by
riding down its demand curve, lowering its price. But these
macroeconomic advantages to the outsiders do not properly accrue to
those insiders who make the decision. Like clean air, the benefits are
spread throughout the community. The wage firm and its workers do
not have the proper incentives to cease polluting the macroeconomic
environment by converting to a share contract. The essence of the public
good aspect of the problem is that, in choosing between contract forms,
the firm and its workers do not take into account the employment ef
fects on the labor market as a whole and the consequent spending im
plications for aggregate demand. The macroeconomic externality of a
tight labor market is helped by a share contract and hurt by a wage con
tract, but the difference is uncompensated. In such situations there can
be no presumption that the economy is optimally organized and society-
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wide reform may be needed to nudge firms and workers towards in
creased profit sharing.
Perhaps it is appropriate to end by commenting on one important dif
ference between how someone with an economist's perspective is like
ly to view labor payment systems and how someone coming from a
pure industrial relations background is likely to see things. The economist
tends to regard narrowly defined industrial relations as essentially con
cerned with the interests of two parties at the workplace: management,
and the already employed, in-place, existing core labor force, or "in
sider" workers in the economist's jargon. Relatively little attention is
paid to third party "outsiders," the unemployed and those who, when
they have jobs, constitute the low-seniority, untenured, last-hired and
first-fired. Yet industrial relations generally, and pay policies in par
ticular, have profound effects on unemployment and inflation. And
unemployment is extraordinarily expensive, not to mention immoral.
Surely it is possible to craft an industrial relations system that preserves
most of the traditional desiderata which insiders value but builds in
stronger incentives to employ more outsiders and to keep them employed
through thick and thin.
The industrial relations side of what I am proposing is far from trivial.
There are genuine, legitimate, tough issues involved in reconciling the
many, already inherently conflictual, goals of traditional industrial rela
tions with the additional burden of creating incentives to retain more
workers during bad times and to take on more of them during good
times. Any industrial relations system is a complicated package, of which
pay is only one element. Trust between management and labor is an
important part of most successful profit-sharing schemes. I do not pre
tend to know exactly how to design a socially optimal industrial rela
tions pay system under the real world constraints that are out there.
What I am saying is that we should be placing much more emphasis
on the employment consequences of industrial relations than we are now
doing, and that it seems to me that anything resembling a socially op
timal solution is very likely to involve some form of profit related pay
to help stabilize employment at higher levels.
Let me conclude with a final message in this attempted persuasion.
Government encouragement of widespread profit sharing, through moral
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suasion and tax incentives for profit-sharing income, represents a decen
tralized, market-oriented way of improving national economic perfor
mance which is well worth pursuing.
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Around the world? The whole world? The title obviously promises
more than I will deliver, particularly for the 1980s when unionism is
changing differently across countries: losing ground in the United States,
Japan, and some European countries; seeking to revamp industrial rela
tions practices in Australia; maintaining high levels of representation
in Sweden, Belgium, and Denmark after substantial growth in the 1970s;
achieving free and independent status in Spain and Korea and briefly
in Communist Poland as part of demoralization; organizing mass pro
tests in South Africa and Namibia; and showing glimmers of playing
a greater role in Communist countries. As I have neither the space nor
competence to cover the world in its entirety, I will concentrate on
emerging patterns in countries about which I have firsthand knowledge
and limit myself to brief speculative comments on changes elsewhere.
Three questions guide my investigation.
Is the deunionization that characterizes the United States a "necessary"
feature of advanced postindustrial capitalism?
What forms of unionism have fared best in the postoil shock economic
environment?
Where are the most significant changes in unionism likely to occur
in the next decade or so?
My answers to these questions are based on the following findings
of fact and observations.
(1) There is a growing divergence in the rates of unionization among
developed OECD economies, with union density falling sharply in some
111
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places while reaching unprecedented peaks in others. If the trends of
the 1980s continue, the Western world will be divided between coun
tries with strong trade union movements that participate in national
economic policymaking, as in Scandinavia, and countries with "ghet
to unionism," where organization is limited to a small segment of
workers, as in the United States.
(2) The divergence results in large part from the degree to which coun
try differences in the legal and institutional features of industrial rela
tions give employers the incentive and opportunity to oppose unioniza
tion of their workers, not to "inexorable" economic changes.
(3) Increased competition due to foreign trade, capital mobility, and
deregulation of markets has reduced the ability of unions to raise wages
in manufacturing, shifting the locus of unionism in some countries to
public sector or white-collar workers, and creating a situation in which
unions do best in neo-corporatist settings where they participate with
management and government in determining national economic policy.
(4) A major barrier to reforming communist economies are old-line
managers and party functionaries, whose skills and experience make
them more adept at dealing with a command economy than with market
institutions, and whose stake in the command system impels them to
throttle efforts to free markets. As workers are the only group with the
potential to challenge these bureaucrats at the enterprise level, unions,
either reformed official unions or new independent unions, have a poten
tially important role to play in "perestroika."
On the basis of these facts and observations I conclude that:
there is nothing about advanced capitalism that necessitates United
States-style declines in unionism;
unions do better where they take a macroeconomic national
perspective in neo-corporatist-type settings;
unions will become increasingly important in the Communist
world.
The remainder of this paper presents the evidence and arguments for
these claims and lays out the major lesson I draw for understanding
industrial relations around the world.
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Divergence of Union Density
The first and seemingly simplest claim to document is the differen
tial change in union representation of workers among developed coun
tries. Unionism means something different in different settings. It in
volves collective bargaining with written contracts in the United States;
national wage-setting in Scandinavia; representation at the company level
and the Shunto offensive in Japan; many unions at the same workplace
in France, Belgium, and Italy; and so on. It includes the unemployed
in some countries (Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden, where unions ad
minister unemployment insurance benefits) but not in others; and
membership estimates come from diverse sources (labor force surveys,
reports by unions, employer surveys, union financial records). The seem
ingly simple is fraught with problems, however. Even the most careful
estimates of density provide only crude indicators of union strength and
must be informed by direct knowledge of institutions so as not to be
misleading.
This said, Exhibit I records readily available figures from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics and other sources on the union proportion of
nonagricultural wage and salary workers in OECD countries. As ex
amples of the problems in cross-country comparisons, note the follow
ing: in Australia, unions enlist half of the workforce but represent vir
tually all workers before the industrial tribunals that formally set wages;
in France and Germany, legal extension of agreements between represen
tative employers and unions gives unions a larger role in wage-setting
than density figures indicate in France, for example, in the 1980s, 80
percent of wage workers were covered by legally extended industry
agreements while only 24 percent had plant-level agreements; 1 in Italy
and France, membership is vaguer than in many countries and a bit
of a trade secret among competing organizations, leading me to put ques
tion marks next to their data. The available measures of density are
better suited to analyze trends over time, but still are hardly problemfree. The United Kingdom figures understate the decline in density in
the 1980s as some unions exaggerated membership to maintain high
representation in the Trade Union Congress and Labor Party. The
American data mix two conflicting trends: the disastrous drop in private
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sector unionism and the relatively late development of public sector
unionism. The Italian data may exaggerate the downward trend due to
omission of members of establishment-level unions outside the stan
dard organizations.
Measurement issues notwithstanding, Exhibit I shows a wide range
of variation in unionization levels and trends that are unlikely to change
with better data. From 1970 to 1979, density increased in most coun
tries, rising 10 or so points in several, but fell in the United States,
Japan, and Austria. From 1979 to 1985/86, density stabilized in most
countries but fell in the United States, Japan, United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, and Italy. Two decades of decline make the United States
and Japan the centers of deunionization.
The differential trends produced the substantial divergence in unionism
noted at the outset. Formally, the coefficient of variation of density in
Exhibit I increased from .31 in 1970 to .39 in 1985/86; the difference
in the average density between countries in the top and bottom thirds
of the density distribution rose from 34 percentage points to 49 points
over the same period; and the share of union members of the countries
exhibited in the United States and Japan fell from 42 percent in 1970
to 34 percent in 1985/86 at the same time that the share of wage and
salary workers in the two countries rose from 50 percent to 54 percent. 2
Note, finally, the differential changes in density between pairs of coun
tries with similar industrial relations: the United States and Canada;
the Netherlands and Belgium; the United Kingdom and Ireland. These
patterns show that diverging trends represent more than disparate
development of different forms of unionism.
Strike Days Lost
It is important to recognize that cross-country differences in union
density do not imply similar patterns of differences in labor-management
conflict, as reflected, say, in strike days lost per year. To the contrary,
the degree of labor-management conflict is essentially unrelated to union
density across countries (see Exhibit n). High-density Sweden, for in
stance, has one of the lowest strike rates in the OECD while moderatedensity Italy has a high rate and low-density United States has a moderate
strike rate. Spearman rank order correlations of countries by density
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and strike days lost are effectively zero. 3 As for trends, in contrast to
the divergence in densities shown in Exhibit I, Exhibit n reveals a modest
convergence in strike days lost among countries in the 1980s. The reason
for the differing patterns is simple: strikes reflect the state of labormanagement relations in a country, not the degree of unionization, and
countries with high or low levels of unionization can have adversarial
or cooperative relations.
Accounting for the Divergence
To determine the causes of the divergence of union density across
developed countries, I analyze next the leading case of deunionization,
the United States; I consider the relevance of my explanation to the
United Kingdom and Japan; and I explore some of the causes of union
growth in Western Europe, particularly Scandinavia and Belgium.
Two types of explanations have been advanced to account for the fall
in density in the United States: "nonconflictual" explanations that at
tribute the fall to structural changes in advanced capitalist economies;
and "conflictual" explanations that stress management antiunion cam
paigns in an institutional setting where employers influence decisively
the outcome of organizing drives.
My reading of the cross-country and within-country evidence leads
me to reject the nonconflictual explanation of the decline in unioniza
tion in the United States and elsewhere in favor of the conflictual
explanation.
Nonconflictual Explanations
The principal factors suggested here are shifts in the composition of
employment toward traditionally nonunion jobs and types of workers,
a worsened public image of unions, increased government protective
labor regulations that provide an alternative to unionism, and declining
worker desire for unions as a result of high wages and good working
conditions, i.e., "positive industrial relations" in many companies.
The hypothesis that shifts in the composition of employment toward
white-collar and service-sector jobs and female and more educated
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workers is the prime reason for the decline in density in the United States
runs counter to the basic fact that workforces throughout the
developed world have experienced similar compositional changes without
deunionizing. 4 As a case in point take Canada, where many of the same
firms and unions operate in a similar industrial relations system as in
the United States and which had comparable changes in the composi
tion of employment as the United States but where union density has
grown rather than fallen. As can be seen in Exhibit in, the difference
between the United States and Canada lies within sectors: density in
creased in most one-digit industries in Canada while dropping in onedigit industries in the United States. Measures of density by industry
for Japan also show substantial changes within sectors. Finally, collec
tive bargaining coverage figures for the United Kingdom show falls in
coverage for almost all sectors from 1973 to 1985 (Pelletier and Freeman
1988). In these countries and in the United States the fundamental reason
for falling density appears to be union failure to organize new plants
and industries. 5
Two pieces of international comparative data contravene Lipset's
public image explanation of changes in union density: opinion polls of
attitudes toward unions in some Western European countries that reveal
as poor a public image of unions as in the United States without any
decline in density; and 1980s opinion polls for the United Kingdom that
show attitudes toward unionism becoming more favorable during the
1980s drop in density! Time series data for the United States also gain
say the public image argument, showing no drop in public approval
of unions between 1972 and 1985, when density fell sharply. 6
The argument that unionism is declining because governmental regula
tions substitute for union protection of workers at workplaces (Neumann
and Rissman 1984) is inconsistent with cross-country evidence that
unionism has remained strong in Scandinavia and other European coun
tries with highly regulated markets. It also runs counter to: the ac
celerated decline in density in the United States during the Reagan ad
ministration, which eased labor regulations; the turnaround in density
in the United Kingdom under the Thatcher government; the great desire
for unions by black Americans, who receive special legal protection
against discrimination; and the success of unions in states with the
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greatest legal protection of workers (Freeman 1987; Block, Mahoney,
and Corbit 1987. The argument that unionism and government regula
tion are substitutes is flawed because it fails to recognize that "enact
ing a law and securing the realization of the purpose the law is aimed
to secure are two vastly different matters" (Gompers 1965, p. 54). To
benefit from legal regulation, workers need a union or union-like agency
to monitor compliance at the shop floor.
The claim that increasing numbers of workers in the United States
reject unions because they enjoy improved wages and working condi
tions is inconsistent with survey data showing that the proportion of
nonunion workers wanting to be represented by a union remained roughly
constant at one-third between 1973 (Quality of Employment Survey)
and 1985 (Harris Survey). 7 Over the same period that density fell in
the private sector, moreover, it increased in the public sector, highly
unlikely if workers in general had freely decided that unionism was not
in their interest. And the 1970s and 1980s were hardly a bellwether
period of rapid growth of real wages and living standards.
In sum, the nonconflictual explanations for the decline in unionism
in the United States and other countries is inconsistent with interna
tional comparisons and detailed within-country evidence.
Conflictual Explanations
My analysis and that of others (Farber 1987; Dickens and Leonard
1985; Goldfield 1987) suggests that the major single cause for the deunionization of the private sector of the United States is to be found
on the other side of the ledger: in the behavior of management operating
in an institutional setting that allows virulent campaigns against union
organizing drives. In the 1980s, the vast majority of firms that faced
a National Labor Relations Board representation election (the
government-run secret ballot process by which American workers can
chose to unionize) sought to forestall unionization in various ways; by
aggressive lawful efforts to persuade /pressure workers to reject unions;
by committing unfair labor practices that include firing union activists;
and by adopting "positive labor relations" that use the carrot of
company-created union work conditions, such as seniority and grievance
procedures, to deter unionization of their employees. Indicative of the
pervasiveness of the corporate antiunion campaign, 45 percent of the
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relatively progressive companies in the Conference Board's Personnel
Forum declared in 1983 that their main labor goal was to operate ' 'unionfree" (Kochan, McKersie, and Chalykoff 1986), a far cry from the 1950s
and 1960s when most large firms accepted unions at the workplace.
With the exception of one study whose results were reversed in a
reanalysis, every investigation with which I am familiar shows manage
ment opposition to be a decisive factor in NLRB election outcomes
(Freeman 1988). My analyses suggest, moreover, that management op
position is the single most important factor in the downward trend in
unionization (Freeman 1986, 1988).
Why has American management declared war on unions? One reason
is the increased cost of unionization to firms due to the growth of the
union wage premium in the 1970s and greater product market com
petition due to trade, deregulation and other factors. A second reason
is the growth of a market-oriented ideology in which managers view
unions solely as an impediment to flexibility and believe that "anything
goes" in stopping them. A third reason is that labor laws allow exten
sive management campaigning against unionization and impose only
minimal penalties for illegal antiunion practices. In Canada, where labor
law severely limits the opportunity for management to fight unions, in
some provinces by certifying unions after card checks rather than after
adversarial elections (Weiler 1983), union density has gone from below
the levels in the United States to nearly twice the American levels.
Legal and institutional factors also appear to be important in changes
in density in the United Kingdom. In the 1970s, density rose with the
favorable legislation of the Labor party. In the 1980s, it fell with the
unfavorable legislation of the Thatcher government. By contrast, in the
closest comparison country, Ireland, laws governing industrial relations
did not change and union density trended modestly upward in the 1970s
and 1980s (Pelletier 1988).
Countries with Increasing Density
What about countries where union density reached unprecedented
peaks in the period under study? Why did unions in Scandinavia and
Belgium, in particular, grow so much in the 1970s and maintain high
representation in the 1980s?
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The conflictual analysis suggests that hi those settings management
opposition to unionism must be significantly muted and/or that labor
laws and institutions limit management's role in determining union status.
The prime factor that mutes management opposition is centralization
of wage negotiations. Countries in which unions and management engage
in centralized bargaining, so-called neo-corporatist systems, had the
greatest increases in density even though they were already highly
organized in 1970 (Exhibit IV). In these settings, managements form
employers' federations that not only accept unions but often pressure
nonunion firms to recognize them also, presumably to assure comparable
wages in the labor market. Indicative of management's stance in these
countries, none of the Danish businessmen and representatives of the
employer federations whom I interviewed in summer 1987, including
spokesmen for small businesses, expressed opposition to unions and
collective bargaining. The notion that business should engage in a jihad
for a union-free environment as in the United States was anathema to
the Danes, as it is to management in Sweden, Belgium, and most of
Western Europe.
In addition to factors that take management out of the organizing pro
cess other institutional forces contributed to the increased union densi
ty in the countries at the top of Exhibit I. For historical reasons, Belgian,
Swedish, and Danish unions distribute government-funded unemploy
ment benefits. In the high unemployment 1980s workers who lost jobs
maintained union membership, stabilizing the numerator but not the
denominator in the density statistic. The role of unions in delivering
unemployment insurance is a key factor in the differing trend in unioniza
tion between Belgium and neighboring Netherlands, where unions do
not play such a role.
Regression Analysis
To evaluate the quantitative impact of the above factors on changes
in union density, I estimated a cross-country time series regression model
linking compound annual changes in density to corporatist industrial
relations, to union delivery of unemployment benefits interacted with
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the unemployment rate, and to three macro variables that are often view
ed as affecting unionization: the unemployment rate, inflation, and the
growth of gross national product. Because density is bounded between
0 and 1 the calculations use a log odds ratio form as well as a simple
linear form:
Dp or Dln(p/l-p)=a+b INF+c DUNE+d UI*DUNE+e CORP+d
Z+u, where
D
= change in variable
p
= union density
INF =ln change in prices
UNE =rate of unemployment
UI
= dummy variable if unions deliver unemployment benefits
CORP=dummy variable if country has "corporatist" industrial
relations
Z
= set of control variables that includes growth of employment
and growth of GNP per capita, and the time period covered.
The analysis treats annual changes from 1973 to 1985 in a single pooled
sample, with dummy variables for individual years to allow for time
effects.
The basic regression estimates, summarized in Exhibit V, show that
with other factors held fixed, density grew more in countries with cor
poratist industrial relations; in countries with rising unemployment when
unions deliver unemployment benefits; and where inflation was rapid.
By contrast, neither unemployment nor growth of GNP had any discer
nible impact on density.
The results of Exhibits I-V provide support for the claim that the
institutions that govern labor relations rather than broad-based economic
forces determine the changing cross-country pattern of unionism. Where
management has a profit incentive to oppose unions and plays a key
role in organizing, as in the United States, density fell. Where manage
ment has less incentive to oppose unions, as in corporatist-style
economies, or where management is restricted in its ability to influence
organizing, as in Canada, density increased or stabilized.
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Unions and Union Leadership
"But where is Hamlet? Aren't unions and their leaders at
least partially responsible for declining union densities?"
At first sight there is much to criticize in the 1970s and 1980s per
formance of unions in the rapidly deunionizing United States. Organizing
activity did not keep pace with the growth of the workforce; unions
contested fewer NLRB elections annually than in the 1960s; most drives
were in existing areas of union strength rather than in growing sectors
of the economy (Voos 1983); and the major AFL-CIO effort to enroll
new workers, the 1980s Houston Project bombed abysmally. Looked
at from the perspective of standard marginal analysis, however, union
failure to invest in organizing looks very much like rational optimizing
behavior in response to increases in the cost of winning new members.
In an environment where management opposition can readily defeat
organizing drives, it simply does not pay unions to risk members' dues
on expensive representation campaigns, save for close competitors to
currently organized firms. And once density starts dropping, the cost
to existing members of unionizing an additional percent of the workforce
rises. Finally, while some might blame American unions for the 1970s
wage increases that put competitive pressure on employers and stimulated
management opposition, American unions were among the first to give
wage concessions and stress job security once the employment conse
quences of the 1970s wage gains became clear.
Still, one aspect of the behavior of unions and their leaders in the
period cannot be defended: this is the slow, even sluggish, recognition
of the reality and importance of declining density and consequent delayed
search for remedies to the problem. In the 1970s many top leaders
downplayed falling density on the grounds that absolute membership
was stable and that all would be well if only the economy started to
boom. Not until the 1985 report, "The Changing Situation of Workers
and their Unions" did the top AFL-CIO leadership address seriously
the moribund state of the union movement in the private sector. Since
then, national unions have been slow to adopt the "evolutionary
blueprint" laid out in the Report. While many have signed for union
Mastercards with their attractively low rates of interest (McDonald
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1987), none has actively pursued the key recommendation to create new
forms of membership outside the collective bargaining structure.
The contrast with unions in other countries is striking. In Australia,
the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) sought to transform
Australian industrial relations from its historic confrontational Britishstyle system to a Scandinavian corporatist system, in part to preempt
growing antiunion management sentiment that might fuel United States
or United Kingdom type problems. The secretary-treasurer of the AC
TU was doing his best in the mid-1980s to convince constituent unions
to accept a national wages accord that required lower settlements than
some unions could get. The difference between the American and
Australian union responses was forcefully brought home to me at a 1988
Harvard Trade Union Program seminar where Australian unionists
mocked as ridiculously inadequate the changes proposed, though often
not implemented, by American unions. "Never work, mate." "It's like
your beer, piss-poor." were representative comments.
While not as striking as the Australian union effort, the 1987
reorganization of Japanese trade union federations also goes beyond
what American unions have initiated at this writing. In Japan, the private
sector unions formed a new federation to take the lead in the union move
ment from the more politicized public sector unions.
Even in the United Kingdom, where the past seems to restrict union
thinking and behavior to a greater extent than elsewhere, there have
been substantially greater changes than in the United States: the split
of the Miners Union; the development of cooperative single plant/single
union bargaining strategies by the Electricians and Engineering unions;
new efforts to enlist part-time workers by the Boilermakers, among
others. And, at this writing, there is talk of the potential break-up of
the Trade Union Congress.
Finally, in Scandinavia and Belgium unions have been in the forefront
of economic debate on broad macroeconomic issues that unions in the
United States rarely address, such as the exchange rate of national cur
rency. American unions lacked the expertise and credibility to be an
effective voice against the 1980s overvalued dollar that was a more im
portant determinant of the well-being of members in many industries
than any collective bargaining agreement.
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What explains the slow and inadequate American union response to
the crisis of declining density?
A major factor in my view is the otherwise admirable decentralized
structure of the American union movement. In the United States, organiz
ed labor consists of some 90 or so independent national unions in the
AFL-CIO and others outside the federation. Each national has its own
problems and agenda. Each contains hundreds of independent locals
with their own concerns. Such a structure concentrates union efforts
on local or sectoral rather than national issues, guaranteeing slow reaction
to problems that affect unionism in its entirety, and making implemen
tation of reforms suggested by the AFL-CIO leadership problematic
at best. Without the career option of moving into government, as in
countries with labor parties, American union leadership may turn over
too slowly and appears to be more risk averse than suits a crisis period.
New Behavior in a New Environment
The cross-country evidence that economic changes are compatible
with high or increasing union density does not mean that unions can
operate in the economic environment of the 1980s as they have in the
past. To the contrary, the shifts in employment to traditionally less
unionized groups, intense product market competition, and continued
high unemployment in much of Europe require unions to alter tradi
tional modes of operating in various ways.
The shifts of the workforce requires adjustment in bargaining goals.
White-collar workers are often more interested in having a say at the
workplace, in job flexibility, fairness in promotions, and the like (the
* 'collective voice'' aspects of unionism of What Do Unions Do ?), than
in establishing contractual rules that limit management arbitrariness and
abuse of power. Part-time workers want different fringe benefits from
full-time workers. Women workers are concerned with pay equity, day
care facilities, maternity leave, and obtaining compensation packages
that complement those their husbands receive. All this means that unions
have to modify traditional demands, as they are doing throughout the
West, with varying degrees of success.
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Increases in product market competition due to world trade, deregula
tion, privatization, and international mobility of capital require more
significant changes in union behavior. Increased competition raises the
elasticity of demand for labor, weakening the ability of unions to bargain
for high wages and improved working conditions without loss of jobs.
In manufacturing, the growth of world competition means that even
100 percent organization of domestic employers no longer "takes wages
out of competition" as it once did in many countries. To improve wages,
unions must help create margins for gains either by raising productivi
ty and competitiveness through, say, improved effort at workplaces,
bargaining over investment decisions, or innovative wage payments such
as profit sharing, or by coordinated bargaining across national lines.
In the service sector, by contrast, union strength still depends on organiz
ing domestic workers, so that unions can pursue traditional forms of
bargaining and behavior. As a result, the locus of strength within the
union movement has begun to shift toward unions in the public sector
and services in several countries including the United States, Canada,
and United Kingdom while in Sweden and Denmark the white-collar
service sector unions have shown an increasing willingness to develop
their own economic agenda rather than to follow the lead of blue-collar
manufacturing unions.
The persistently high unemployment rates that developed in much
of Europe hi the 1980s present unions with a different challenge. As
expansionary policies risk unsustainable trade imbalances/capital flows
when initiated by single countries, and as the central bankers and finan
ciers who dominate economic summits and international policymaking
are more concerned with inflation than unemployment, the coordinated
expansion needed to attain full employment will require unions in several
countries to pressure governments to expand in concert. The develop
ment of the Common Market and the American-Canadian free trade
agreement increases the necessity for union coordination across national
lines.
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Unions in Perestroika
"Transmission belt from the Communist Party to the masses
or ... ?"
Unions have long created conceptual and practical problems for com
munist societies. In 1921 when the Tenth Soviet Communist Party Con
gress debated the status of unions, the Worker's Opposition faction
argued that unions should be independent of the Community Party and
should manage parts of the economy while Trotsky and Bukharin argued
that unions should be subordinate to the Party and state. During the
New Economic Policy of the 1920s, unions had considerable in
dependence. But after 1929, Stalin purged the leadership and destroyed
any semblance of autonomy. The accession of Communist regimes in
Eastern Europe suppressed free unionism in those countries as well,
though to differing degress depending on national contexts. In all cases
the authorities selected union leaders, guaranteeing loyalty to the state
rather than to workers, used unions to deliver social services such as
low-cost vacations, restricted the ability of unions to protect workers
on the job by forbidding strikes de facto if not de jure, and treated unions
largely as aids to management in spurring production and controlling
labor. Only during rare periods, such as the Prague Spring of 1968 or
the Polish protests of 1980, did unions develop that represented workers
first and foremost.
Will unions in Communist economies remain subordinate institutions
in an era of political and economic reforms or will "glasnost" and
"perestroika" lead to a new union role? Was the free and independent
operation of Solidarity in 1980/81 an aberration or a harbinger of future
labor relations under communism?
My speculative answer to these questions, based in part on limited
firsthand knowledge of the Polish situation from a 1987 World Bank
mission, is that unions or related worker organizations will achieve in
creasing independence and play a major role in reforming Communist
economies. Solidarity may not be a realistic model for the future of
unionism under most Communist regimes, but neither is the "transmis
sion belt" union of the command economy.
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I expect increasingly independent unionism to go hand-in-hand with
economic reform of Communist economies for three reasons. First,
because implementation of reforms requires an enterprise level counterforce to the command economy managers and party functionaries who
dominate Communist economies that only autonomous unions can pro
vide. As beneficiaries of a command economy, these managers and of
ficials, Milovan Djilas' "New Class," have much to lose and little to
gain from market reforms and will accordingly do all they can to stifle
reforms. Even the highest level leaders such as Gorbachev will need
allies at the enterprise level to force these officials to change behavior
or to change jobs pressure that can only come from organized workers,
either through revitalized official unions or through newly formed in
dependent unions like Solidarnosc that favor economic reform as the
only way to improve living standards. Suppressing free unionism, as
the Jaruzelski regime did in Poland, will turn even nominally signifi
cant market reforms into dead letters, give the bureaucrats and managers
a free hand to demand limitations on labor mobility, as they have in
Poland and Hungary, and lead the rest of society to dismiss the reforms
as sham. Strange as it may seem to conservative economists who regard
unions as the archtypical antimarket force, free and independent unions
are a prerequisite for more market-oriented behavior in command
economies.
The second reason for expecting greater independent activity by
workers and unions is that reform communism legitimizes unions car
rying out their classical defensive function of protecting workers from
increasingly independent management (including management in private
enterprises) and creates a new role for them to lobby for workers' in
terests in a more pluralistic society. Here, the historical record shows
that reformist communist regimes accept such worker and union ac
tivity, at least within some bounds; in 1987 thousands of Yugoslav
workers struck to protest national wages policy without producing police
repression (New York Times, March 21, 1987); in Poland the official
unions have denounced government plans to increase the price of food
and fuel and carried out protest strikes, while the outlawed Solidarnosc
continues to defend workers at local workplaces and speak up in na
tional debate; in Hungary unions have at times lobbied the central
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government for economic policies more favorable to workers, including
wage increases and a greater allocation of national product to consump
tion (Noti, Pravda and Ruble); in the Soviet Union, as noted earlier,
unions acted as relatively autonomous organizations during the NEP
years. In part, reform communist governments permit official unions
some autonomy to give them legitimacy among workers and to forestall
truly free and independent unions; in part the governments permit worker
protests because they recognize the failure of their command economies
and the consequent need to allow some outlet for worker frustrations
and anger. Still, whatever the cause, the movement of unions from the
transmission belt institutuion is clear.
The third reason for expecting freer unionism to develop under reform
communism is the possibility that such organizations can help spark
the individual work effort that is necessary for these economies to ad
vance. My argument here is based on Hirschman's exit-voice analysis,
which contrasts two mechanisms for dealing with social problems: the
voice mechanism, by which individuals express their desires through
political channels; and the exit mechanism, by which they express their
desires through market mobility. In the labor market, unions are the
institution of voice and quitting is the normal form of exit (Freeman
and Medoff 1984). From the perspective of the dichotomy, traditional
command economies deprive workers of voice by suppressing free unions
and deprive them of exit by restricting employment to state-run enter
prises and often by limiting and penalizing mobility among those enter
prises. The result is that workers have only one way to express discon
tent with wages and work relations by "exiting" the workplace through
reductions of effort. While neither the "socialism with a human face"
experiment in Czechoslovakia nor free and independent Solidarnosc
unionism in Poland lasted long enough to test whether autonomous unions
and freer markets can break the "they pretend to pay us, we pretend
to work" ethos of labor markets under communism, those experiences
seem to offer the greatest promise for creating a productive workforce.
In sum, my speculative analysis is that reform of Communist
economies, */it is to proceed successfully, will advance hand-in-hand
with growing union activity. How independent and free unions will
become and with what feedback effects on the societies is likely to dif-
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fer among countries. In some cases, Communist leaders may backtrack
and suppress unions as a threat to their power, effectively killing reforms,
as in Poland. In other cases, the dynamics of reform may be cumulative,
as appeared to be occurring in Czechoslovakia prior to the 1968 inva
sion. At any rate, expect to see increasingly interesting developments
on the union front in Communist states in the next decade or so.
Concluding Comments
In their 1964 analysis of labor relations in industrial society, In
dustrialism and Industrial Man, Clark Kerr, John Dunlop, Frederick
Harbison, and Charles Meyers argued that the logic of industrialism
was producing a convergence in labor relations among countries, while
allowing for pluralistic industrialism along some dimensions: "the more
we look . . . the more impressed we become with the power of the forces
for uniformity." If there is a broad generalization that emerges from
the review of the changing patterns of unionism in the world in this
essay, it is the opposite: that at the level of labor market institutions
examined here labor relations is not converging toward a single institu
tional mode across countries, nor necessarily toward a stable pattern
within countries. In a world of economic and social flux, structuring
labor relations should not be viewed as a once-and-for-all process of
setting up procedures and institutions. Rather, it is more properly viewed
as a process that must be undertaken time and again as changes occur
in the balance of power between workers and management and in their
conflicting and coinciding interests. There is no rest in the practice or
study of industrial relations.
NOTES
1. These figures are from Ministere du Travail, De L'Emploi et de la Formation
Professionelle, Tableaux Statistiques (Paris: 1986). The data further show that only 9.9
percent of establishments had plant level agreements while 76.9 percent were covered
by branch/industry level agreements.
2. I calculated the coefficient of variation for 1985/86 using 1979 densities for
Belgium, France, and New Zealand. The average density for the top six countries was
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65 percent in 1970 and 79 percent in 1985/86 while the average density for the bottom
six countries was 31 percent in 1970 and 30 percent in 1985/86.1 calculated the United
States and Japanese shares of wage and salary employees using the data from the Center
for Labour Economics, OECD Data Set, updated, and with union figures based as much
as possible on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data. The calculation is crude, using
figures for the year closest to 1985 for countries with missing data.
3. For example, the rank correlation between working days lost in 1971-82 and density
in 1979 is a bare 0.10.
4. OECD data show that the shift of employment out of manufacturing, which
adherents to the structural view cite as a key to the decline in United States unionism,
was actually larger in OECD Europe than in the United States. See OECD Historical
Statistics (Paris: 1986).
5. In the United States this shows up hi the precipitous fall hi the number of workers
organized through NLRB elections. For the United Kingdom, data from the Workplace
Industrial Relations Survey show no change hi union representation among the same
establishments between 1980 and 1984, which is consistent with the claim in the text
but there are too few new establishments to provide a clear test (Millward and Stevens
1986). For Japan, the 88.4 percent of new enterprises in 1985 were nonunion, accord
ing to the Japan Institute of Labor.
6. Polls reported by Heckscher (1988, p. 258) show a 33 percent rate of confidence
hi unions in the U.S. compared to 26 percent in the UK, 32 percent in Italy, and 36
percent in France and Germany. The rise in favorable ratings of unions in the UK is
documented in Financial Times. Data on approval of unions in the United States are
given by Lipset (1986).
7. Because these figures are from two separate surveys, they are not strictly
comparable.
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EXHIBIT I
Levels and Changes in Union Membership as a Percent
of Nonagricultural Wage and Salary Employees Across Countries
1970-1986

Countries with sharp
rises hi density
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
Belgium
Countries w/moderate
rises hi density
Italy
Germany
France
Switzerland
Canada
Australia
New Zealand
Ireland
Countries w/stability
or decline in density
Norway
United Kingdom
Austria
Japan
Netherlands
United States

For the years
1985/86 1970-79

1970

1979

1979-86

66
56
79
66

86
84
89
77

95
85
96
-

+20
+28
+ 10
+ 11

+9
+1
+7
-

39
37
22
31
32
52
43
44

51
42
28
34
36
58
46
49

45
43
~
33
36
56

-6
+1
~
-1
0
-1

51

+ 12
+5
+6
+3
+4
+6
+3
+5

59
51
64
35
39
31

60
58
59
32
43
25

61
51
61
28
35
17

+1
+7
-5
-3
+4
-6

+1
_-i

+2

+2
-4
-8
-8

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of Productivity and
Technology, Division of Foreign Labor Statistics and Trade, July 1986; Center for Labour
Economics, OECD Data Set; and respective country statistical abstracts.
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Exhibit II
Working Days Lost Per 1000 Employees
Country
Australia
Austria*
Belgium*
Canada
Denmark*
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Netherlands*
New Zealand
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland*
United Kingdom
United States

1964-70

1971-82

1983-85

286
47
172
704
31
110
140
6
893
1273
112
15
150
12
29
4
207
583

638
10
206
869
294
605
191
45
639
1379
98
35
314
55
134
2
514
18

262
390
~
399
70
88
453
592
10
~
486
34
9
584
119

SOURCE: Beggs and Chapman; Table 2, countries with * from Creigh (1986), Table 2.3 1962-71
for 1964-70 and 1972-81 for 1971-82 for countries with *.

Exhibit m
Changes hi Union Density by Sector: U.S., Canada and Japan

SOURCES::

U.S.-1973/5:
1986:
Canada 1971:
1985:
Japan 1970:
1986:

Japan

Canada

United States

Total
Manufacturing
Construction
Transportation, communication
and utilities
Trade
Service
Mining
Finance, insurance and
real estate
Government

u>
to

1970

1986

3
-4
-3

35
39
25

28
34
18

-7
-5
-7

53
10
36
26

-3
2
21
-30

66
9
24
72

58
9
18
53

-8
0
-6
-19

3
71

2
9

68
71

50
75

-18
4

1971

1985

-13
-16

32
42
51

35
38
48

35
7
6
18

-15
-4
-1
-17

56
8
15
56

3
36

1
12

1
62

1973/5

1986

29
37
38

18
24
22

-11

50
11
7
35
4
24

Richard Freeman and James Medoff, "New Estimates of Private Sector Unionism in the United States" Industrial
and Labor Relations Review, 32:2, January 1979.
from Current Population Survey Tapes.
W.D. Wood and Pradeep Kumar, "The Current Industrial Relations Scene in Canada: 1977 " (Queens University, Kingston,
Canada).
Calura Report, Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Canada.
Basic Survey on Trade Unions, Japan Ministry of Labor.
Foreign Labor Trends, Japan.
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Exhibit IV
Percentage Point Changes hi Union Density, 1970-85/86

11 10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3

-

10.8

1 -

2.0
"Corporatist"

'Noncorporatist"

SOURCE: Corporatist countries taken from Crouch (1985). (They include: Austria, Denmark,
Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and West Germany.)
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Exhibit V
Impact of Corporatism, Inflation, and Changing Employment
on Annual Growth of Percent Unionized
1973-85
Dependent variables
Explanatory variables
(mean in parenthesis)
Corporatism (.48)
Inflation (.079)
Change in
unemployment (.003)
Change in unemployment
if unions give benefits
(.0008)
Growth of GNP (.028)
Time
R-squared
Number of observations

Change hi
Change in log odds
% union
ratio of % union
(/-statistics in parenthesis)
.005
.065

(2.68)
(2.60)

.038
.409

(3.80)
(2.93)

-.027

(0.20)

-.129

(0.17)

.750
-.054
-.001
.22

(3.58)
(1.17)
(5.29)

6.09
-.20
-.004
.24

(5.23)
(.76)
(3.27)

259

259

SOURCE: Calculated from London School of Economics, Center for Labour Economics OECD
Data Set. Countries where unions give benefits: Denmark, Belgium and Sweden. Corporate coun
tries, as in Exhibit IV.
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7
Evidence on U.S. Experiences
with
Dispute Resolution Systems
Orley Ashenfelter
Princeton University
My purpose in this paper is to report the results of recent quantitative
analyses of interest arbitration systems operating in the U.S. Arbitra
tion systems for settling wage disputes ("interest arbitration") in the
public sector have operated in some states since the 1960s. Although
similar, in that they provide binding resolution of wage (and other
employment-related) disputes, the various states have tended to experi
ment by adopting somewhat different systems. This opens up the
possibility of exploring and comparing how the various systems work,
and that is the major purpose of the research on which I report below.
The structure of the paper is as follows. I first set out the broader
context in which interest arbitration has become a feature of public sector
wage determination in the U.S. The purpose of this discussion is to
show how these dispute resolution institutions arose in a U.S. context
which differs, as we shall see, from the Canadian and British settings.
The following two sections of the paper describe analyses of arbitra
tion systems for New Jersey police officers and for Iowa state and local
employees. The purpose of these two sections of the paper is to present
in a nontechnical manner the statistical operating characteristics of two
functioning arbitration systems. I believe even a casual reader will be
struck by the statistical regularities the operating characteristics of these
systems display. I also believe that even a passing understanding of these
operating characteristics will make it clearer just what we can and can
not expect these arbitration systems to accomplish.
In a final section of the paper, I try to extract the general conclusions
that are emerging from the new research on interest arbitration systems.
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Some of these conclusions are virtually conjectures at this point, while
others have a considerable grounding in hard research results.

The Context of Interest Arbitration in the U.S.
I do not intend to survey the detailed evolution of interest arbitration
systems in the U.S., as that has been ably accomplished by my col
league Richard Lester in his recently published Labor Arbitration in
State and Local Government. l My goal is instead to give the general
context for the arbitration legislation that has been established, and to
explain how it tends to operate.
The Right to Strike
For a variety of reasons local and state public sector workers in the
U.S. do not have the right to strike (or even to bargain collectively)
unless they are specifically given these rights by the state governments
in the states in which they negotiate. This situation contrasts sharply
with the rights of private sector workers in the U.S. and the rights of
private and public sector workers in other countries. In Great Britain,
for example, it is taken for granted that both private and public sectors
workers will collectively bargain and, when a dispute is unresolved,
strike their employers. Private sector workers in the U.S. face a varie
ty of labor law regulations, but ultimately these workers may also
organize and strike their employers. As in so many other matters of
public policy, the Canadian situation seems to fall between the U.S.
and British cases. Although private sector workers and many public
sector workers have the right to strike in Canada, arbitration is sometimes
legislated to replace the strike either on an ad hoc or systematic basis
in some of the provinces.
Today the workers in the U.S. public sector do not have the right
to strike. In many places public sector workers do not belong to unions
or engage in collective bargaining either. In these places, workers who
are not willing to accept employer-determined pay scales or working
conditions are expected to quit and look for another position. In many
places, however, public sector workers have been given the right to
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form unions and have formed unions that bargain collectively, although
they do not have the option to strike. In this situation, one may natural
ly ask, whey are public sector employers willing to submit disputes to
arbitration at all?2
Although the varying politics of the various states no doubt plays a
role, it seems likely that public employers have grudgingly acquiesced
in the establishment of arbitration laws in some states largely to reduce
the number of illegal strikes that would otherwise have occurred. In
effect, the state legislators have often cooperated with public sector
unions to design a statute that will settle disputes, rather than allow
disputes to drag on indefinitely hi the face of employer resistance and
the illegality of strikes. Subsequently, employer resistance has often
diminished.
As a general rule, therefore, U.S. public sector trade unions obtain
some leverage in colletive bargaining negotiations when the possibility
of an arbitrated contract lurks in the background. This may be the reason
why interest arbitration of public sector wage disputes is more accep
table to union workers and their leaders in the U.S. than in other
countries.
The Structure of Arbitration
The two most common forms of interest arbitration hi use in the U.S.
are conventional arbitration and final-offer arbitration. Each of these
operates much like an informal judicial system. The parties are often
represented by attorneys and they present their cases to a neutral ar
bitrator. In conventional arbitration, the arbitrator may fashion any award
deemed suitable, while in final-offer arbitration each party must pre
sent an offer and the arbitrator must select one or the other without
compromise.
The ' 'Chilling'' Effect. In the casual discussion of arbitration systems,
it is often claimed that the final-offer arbitration system is more likely
than the conventional arbitration system to lead the parties to present
reasonable offers for the arbitrator's decision. This conclusion is usually
based on a very specific idea of how arbitrators are likely to function
in the conventional arbitration systems. The idea seems to be that
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arbitrators will, for the most part, attempt to fashion awards that fall
precisely in the center of the employer and union offers. 3 If we assume
parties know this will be the the arbitrator's behavior, they will surely
wish to present extreme demands, for the more extreme a party's de
mand, the more the party gains in the compromise. At the extreme,
the parties will present no useful information to the arbitrator on what
concessions they might be willing to make. This is sometimes known
as the "chilling effect" of arbitration.
It is sometimes said that final-offer arbitration is not so likely to pro
duce a chilling effect on bargaining because the parties would be unlikely
to take an extreme position for fear that the arbitrator might select a
more reasonable offer made by the other party. It is easy to see that
this conclusion is also arrived at by assuming that arbitrators behave
in a specific way. In particular, how are we to suppose an arbitrator
determines that one offer is more reasonable than another? The natural
equivalent to assuming that the arbitrator splits the difference in con
ventional arbitration is to assume that the arbitrator flips a fair coin to
choose a final offer. If this were the arbitrator's behavior, however,
it is obvious that, instead of rewarding moderate behavior, the arbitrator
would be rewarding the party making the more extreme demand with
a 50 percent chance of success! Apparently, the alleged superiority of
final-offer arbitration depends on the assumption that arbitrators will
change their behavior when confronted by the final-offer arbitration
procedure.
The Effect ofArbitral Uncertainty. Of course, this discussion of con
ventional and final-offer arbitration depends entirely on the characteriza
tion of arbitrators as simply "splitting the difference" in one way or
another between the parties' offers in determining awards. Many ar
bitrators, and some scholars, have begun to assert that this is not the
way that arbitrators behave in any actual ongoing arbitration system.
Instead, it is argued that arbitrators appear to behave in a similar way
regardless of the type of systems under which they are asked to operate.
In this view the arbitrator first arrives independently at some notion
of a "reasonable" award based on the facts of the individual case.
Although precisely how a reasonable award is fashioned is not com
pletely specified, it seems very likely that, whatever the procedure,
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it will produce awards that differ from place to place and from arbitrator
to arbitrator. It also seems likely that some of these differences in ar
bitrators' preferred awards will remain unpredictable both to the par
ties and to outside observers.
In conventional arbitration, the arbitrator then proceeds to fashion
an award that may, to some extent, take into account both the positions
of the parties and the arbitrator's own determination of a reasonable
award. Under final-offer arbitration, on the other hand, an arbitrator
will choose whichever final offer is the closer to the arbitrator's own
determination of a reasonable award. Given the uncertainty associated
with an arbitrated award, according to this analysis, we can expect a
considerable incentive for the parties to negotiate their own settlement,
regardless of whether the arbitration system is conventional or finaloffer. There is, therefore, no "chilling effect" caused by the existence
of either arbitration system. The chilling effect disappears so long as
arbitrators introduce exogenous information into their decisions in a
way that is to some extent unpredictable by the parties. It is this uncer
tainty about their prospects that gives the parties an incentive to negotiate
their own settlement in order to avoid the gamble an arbitrator's deci
sion represents.
This discussion is a far cry from the simple analysis of the "chilling
effect" of conventional arbitration with which I started. If it is a cor
rect description of the way the arbitration process actually works, then
it is clear that the simpler comparison of conventional and final-offer
arbitration with which I started may be quite misleading. Moreover,
the correct comparison between what may be expected under these two
arbitration institutions will be considerably more complicated, and
perhaps less conclusive. Which of these two analyses of the way ar
bitrators behave are we to accept?
Ad Hoc versus Systematic Arbitration. In my view, both of these
analyses have merit in the situations they were designed to describe.
The confusion arises from failing to specify whether the analysis is to
be applied to (a) an ongoing arbitration system where the parties will
bargain repeatedly in the face of the same fixed, systemwide rules, or
to (b) an ad hoc, one-time arbitration of a single dispute where the
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parties had no prior reason to suspect the dispute would be submitted
to arbitration. It is, of course, very unlikely that situation (b) will oc
cur more than once!
To see how the confusion may arise, consider a situation where the
parties bargain with offer and counteroffer to a stalemate. Suppose that,
contrary to the expectation of the parties, arbitration of the dispute is
imposed by a third party, and that the arbitrator is made aware of the
positions of the parties at the point of stalemate. Since the parties had
no reason to suppose an arbitrator would be brought to the scene, there
is no reason for the arbitrator to suppose that the positions of the par
ties represent a mere bargaining posture. Instead, the arbitrator will
assume that the parties' positions reflect reasonable concessions from
both sides. Under these circumstances, it will be natural for the arbitrator
to propose a settlement that "splits-the-difference" or lies midway bet
ween the positions advanced by the parties at the point of stalemate. 4
It is also clear, however, that this procedure will only work once. In
future bargaining, the parties will expect the arbitrator to proceed the
same way and "split-the-difference" in fashioning an award. This will,
of course, give the parties the incentive to make extreme offers purely
for the sake of impressing the arbitrator at the point of compromise.
This is, of course, the "chilling effect" alleged to result from conven
tional arbitration. Final-offer arbitration is a natural proposal to remedy
this situation, but its effectiveness depends on the assumption that the
arbitrator does not merely flip a fair coin to make a decision. Thus the
advantage of final-offer arbitration is entirely a result of the assump
tion that the arbitrator changes behavior under one system as opposed
to another.
In practice, the arbitration systems used in the U.S. public sector are
not of the ad hoc variety. They are, instead, fully specified systems
within which the parties engage in repeated bargaining. It is natural
in such systems to carry out private negotiations away from any poten
tial arbitrator's presence so that offers and counteroffers will not be
used by one party against the other during any subsequent arbitration
hearing. (Indeed, it might be argued that arbitration statutes should be
designed to further this purpose, so as to avoid any "chilling effect"
of the statute.)5 The result is that arbitrators are aware from the outset
in these systems that the parties' offers, when presented in an arbitra-
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tion proceeding, are designed as bargaining positions. Since arbitrators
cannot determine with certainty that the offers presented by the parties
are realistic attempts at compromise, it follows that the arbitrator will
necessarily be compelled to use external criteria, at least in part, in
fashioning an award. This will be the case, of course, regardless of
whether the arbitrator is operating under a conventional or final-offer
arbitration system. Thus, a continuing arbitration system seems likely
to implicitly require arbitrators to introduce external criteria in fashioning
an arbitration award, regardless of whether there is a conventional or
final-offer arbitration system.
Simulation Evidence on Arbitral Uncertainty. These are, or course,
abstract arguments. As it turns out, there is considerable evidence emerg
ing to support the view that arbitral uncertainty and arbitrator reference
to external criteria are important aspects of the operating characteristics
of U.S. arbitration systems. Moreover, arbitrators do not appear to
change their decisionmaking when operating under different systems.
There is also some evidence that the parties behave as if they unders
tand this to be the case as well. Much of this evidence will emerge below,
and here I only wish to give some indications of this evidence by showing
its consistency with a recent questionnaire study of practicing arbitrators.
This simulation study, by Henry Farber and Max Bazerman,6 reports
the results of presenting 25 different economic scenarios to 64 actual
arbitrators who then fashioned a wage increase award. Arbitrators were
asked to fashion (or select) two awards, one on the assumption they
were operating under a conventional arbitration system and the other
as if they were operating under a final-offer arbitration system. Although
there are important limitations to this approach, the results are quite
revealing in that they are consistent with, but add considerable detail
to, the data available from arbitration systems operating in the field.
A key finding is that when operating under a conventional arbitra
tion system, arbitrators are far more heavily swayed by the facts of the
case (as represented by wage rates of comparable workers, the infla
tion rates and the financial health of the company) than by the last of
fers presented by the parties. When the difference between the last of
fers of the parties is small, Farber and Bazerman find that the facts
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receive about 75 percent of the weight in the arbitrator's decision, but
that this fraction increases the further apart the last offers of the par
ties. A simple interpretation of this result is that arbitrators view the
parties' offers as typically carrying some information about where the
parties might truly be willing to settle, but not much. As noted in the
discussion of one-shot versus continuous arbitration systems, it seems
likely that the weight placed on the parties' offers will be the greater,
the greater the likelihood is that the arbitrator may consider the offers
as having been made without the presumption they were merely a
bargaining ploy. Unfortunately, the setup in Farber and Bazerman's
study does not permit this hypothesis to be tested, and the design of
such a test, while important, may be difficult.
Farber and Bazerman's results are obtained by experimentally vary
ing the economic environments and the final offers that the arbitrators
are instructed to consider. By comparing the arbitrators' awards when
they face different offers in similar environments, Farber and Bazerman can determine the extent to which differences in the offers arbitrators
face influence their awards. Using similar methods, Farber and Bazerman also can determine which parts of the economic environment in
fluence arbitrator decisions. Here they find, as has been reported by
others, that recent wage increases in "comparable settings" receive the
largest weight in arbitrator decisions, although other factors are also
important.
A second important conclusion of Farber and Bazerman's study is
that the arbitrators, in their simulations, behaved as if they had selected
essentially the same external criteria for an award regardless of whether
they were operating under a conventional or final-offer arbitration
system. In the case of conventional arbitration, the arbitrator simply
imposed a reasonable award after due consideration of the facts and
the parties' offers. In the case of final-offer arbitration, the arbitrator
selected the parties' offer that was closest to the award the arbitrator
would otherwise have imposed under conventional arbitration where
the parties' offers were far apart. It follows that the arbitrators were
behaving in a fashion that is consistent across institutional structures.
Finally, Farber and Bazerman find that there is considerable
variability in the awards that different arbitrators fashion in identical
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factual simulations. This suggests, but does not prove, that there may
be considerable arbitral uncertainty facing the bargainers in interest ar
bitration systems. If the bargainers are risk averse, such uncertainty
should naturally produce an incentive for negotiated settlements. To
determine whether such uncertainty exists, however, would require that
two arbitrators be observed to fashion different awards in an actual ar
bitration case, a situation that we will encounter shortly.
How Arbitrators are Selected and Paid
Unlike the U.K. and Canada, U.S. arbitrators' fees are generally borne
by the parties. The fee schedule may be regulated by a state agency
establishing a maximum fee, but its payment is generally split equally
by the parties.
An important feature of U.S. arbitration systems is that the parties
generally play an important role in selecting who shall be the arbitrator
in a particular case. I have come to believe that this procedure has an
important effect on the stability of the operating characteristics of in
terest arbitration systems.
The selection of arbitrators usually proceeds in two stages. In the first
stage, a third (governmental) organization produces a list of potential
arbitrator names that is circulated to the parties. (In the private sector,
this function is often served, for a fee, by the nonprofit American Ar
bitration Association.) In the second step, the parties express their
preferences for the arbitrators whose names are on the proposed list.
Sometimes the proposed list of arbitrators is simply passed back and
forth between the parties, with each party striking one name each time
the list is passed, until one name remains. Alternatively, the parties may
be asked to veto one or more names from the proposed list, and to rank
order the remainder. Subject to an arbitrator's availability, the lowest
sum of ranks then determines the arbitrator selected.
At first blush, it may seem surprising that the parties are asked to
participate in the selection of the arbitrator. After all, if the parties are
in a dispute which they cannot settle, it may seem odd that they are
asked to select the arbitrator who will settle it for them. In fact, it is
this aspect of the process that underscores the ultimately cooperative
nature of arbitration systems.
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It seems clear that so long as the parties play so central a role in ar
bitrator selection, it is likely that arbitrator behavior will contain an
essentially unpredictable component. After all, if the arbitrator's posi
tion is known, then it is likely that one or the other of the parties will
have reason to strike the arbitrator from the proposed list. Apart from
this unpredictable component, it is unclear what other factors are like
ly to determine arbitrator popularity.
In a remarkable study, Bloom and Cavanagh have recently examin
ed the determinants of arbitrator selection using the actual ranking by
disputants of arbitrators selected in disputes involving police officers
in New Jersey. 7 The evidence from their study indicates that both par
ties view the characteristics of individual arbitrators in roughly the same
way. This suggests that the parties may be acting in a moderately
cooperative way in the selection of arbitrators.
Bloom and Cavanagh ask, and answer, two questions. First, do the
parties tend to rank (and hence state their preferences for) the arbitrators
on a given panel in a way that is positively or negatively correlated?
They find that the parties' rankings are weakly positively correlated.
This implies that there is such a thing as "arbitrator popularity." The
question then remains, what determines arbitrator popularity? Bloom
and Cavanagh find, first, that prior win-loss tallies under final-offer
arbitration are uncorrelated with the parties preferences. This suggests
that the parties are not "punishing" arbitrators for previous performance.
Bloom and Cavanagh also find that the main determinant of arbitrator
popularity is the amount of the arbitrator's prior experience. This sug
gests that the arbitrator's "reputation" is a key determinant of the par
ties' preferences.
Although it remains conjecture at this point, it seems likely that there
is a connection between (a) the fact that the parties' preferences are
a key determinant of arbitrator selection, and (b) the statistical regularity
in the operating characteristics of the two arbitration systems describ
ed below. In any event, the cooperative nature of arbitrator selection
may well be an important factor in the acceptability of arbitrator awards
by the parties. At a minimum, it seems clear that this method of ar
bitrator selection is likely to enhance the feelings of the parties that they
will receive a "fair shake" in any arbitration award. It is no doubt such
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"feelings" that determine the acceptability of the entire arbitration
system.

Final-Offer Arbitration in New Jersey8
Unsettled disputes betweenNew Jersey police unions and municipalities
have been subject to binding arbitration since 1977. The arbitration law
is designed to give the parties considerable leeway in designing their
own arbitration mechanisms. When the parties can agree on nothing
else, however, their dispute is resolved by final-offer arbitration on the
package of economic issues. As table 1 indicates, in 1978 about 35 per
cent of bargaining cases in New Jersey were settled by recourse to finaloffer arbitration, although this percentage has dropped each year since.
Table 1
The Results of Final-Offer Arbitration
of New Jersey Police Disputes

Proportion of employer victories
Mean of employer compensation offers
Mean of union compensation offers
Mean of final-offer compensation
awards
Standard deviation of final offer awards
Proportion of bargaining cases going
to final-offer arbitration

1980

1979

1978

.266
5.70%
8.54%

.348
6.51%
8.29%

.317
5.01%
7.14%

8.10%
1.41%

7.57%
1.48%

6.63%
1.19%

.23

.28

.35

The only alternative arbitration mechanism of which the parties have
made much use in New Jersey is conventional arbitration. As table 2
indicates, in 1978 about 14 percent of bargaining cases in New Jersey
were settled by recourse to conventional arbitration, although this per
centage has subsequently stabilized at about 6 to 7 percent.
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It is natural for both employers and unions to inquire as to how they
typically fare under a final-offer statute. The tabulation of "box scores"
or "win-loss" records is inevitable. Even when these tabulations are
not publicly available, it appears that they are the subject of considerable
informed discussion and folklore.
The first row of table 1 contains the box score for the New Jersey
experience. In 1978, arbitrators selected the union offer on total com
pensation in 68 percent of final-offer arbitration cases. In 1979 and 1980
arbitrators selected the union offer on total compensation in 65 and 73
percent of final-offer cases, respectively. In sum, under the New Jersey
statute, union offers have been selected most of the time in final-offer
arbitration cases. There is no sign that this is a transitory phenomenon.
This raises a question for the evaluation of this arbitration statute. Why
have arbitrators most often selected the union offers in the New Jersey
final-offer arbitration cases?
A Simple Model
Presumably, most of us expected to see approximately 50 percent
of the union offers selected under final-offer arbitration. This is why
the considerably higher percentages listed in table 1 seem surprising.
To understand why this might not be a reasonable presumption, it is
necessary to spell out what underlying model of arbitrator behavior and
union and employer behavior we presumed would produce this 50-50
result.
First, it seems reasonable to suppose that a fair arbitrator would be
one who considered the objective considerations in a particular case
and then settled on what, in the arbitrator's mind, seemed a preferred
settlement. As I have observed, little is known about precisely how ar
bitrators determine their preferred awards other than the consensus that
they represent a sort of * 'going rate.'' Given that the arbitrator has deter
mined a preferred award, however, it seems clear that a fair arbitrator
must select whichever offer is closest to it.
We may suppose that the union and employer also understand this
process. Using their best estimates of the arbitrator's preference they
will then shape their own offers. They will understand that a higher
offer by either party will increase the probability that the employer's
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offer will be selected. Similarly, a lower offer by either party may be
assumed to increase the probability that the union's offer will be selected.
As a result, most of us would expect that the union and employer of
fers would tend to fall equally distant from, but on opposite sides of,
the parties' best estimate of the arbitrator's preferred award. If this hap
pens, then, we should naturally expect the union's offer to be selected,
on average, in one-half of the cases.
It follows from this discussion that there are two different types of
reasons why the union offer may not be selected in one-half of the cases.
First, the arbitrators may not follow the decision process set out above.
In particular, arbitrators may systematically give less weight to a
generous employer offer than to a conservative union offer. If this is
the case, then the integrity of the arbitration system is being seriously
undermined. One may even wonder how long it is likely to last.
Second, it may be that, for one reason or another, the parties do not
typically position themselves equally distant from, but on opposite sides
of, the arbitrator's expected award. This could happen for one of two
reasons. On the one hand, unions may have a more conservative view
of what arbitrators will allow than do employers. On the other hand,
unions may be more fearful of taking the risk of losing the arbitrator's
decision than are employers. In either case we may expect that the union
offers will be conservative relative to the award that arbitrators will
typically prefer. Hence, the union offers will be disproportionately
selected by the arbitrators.
It is important to inquire as to whether it is possible to distinguish
empirically between these two alternative explanations for the dispropor
tionate selection of union offers. If final-offer arbitration is operating
alone, it should be obvious that there is no simple way to untangle which
of these explanations is correct. After all, to determine whether the union
offers are conservative relative to the employer offers we must be able
to uncover the central tendency of the arbitrators' preferred awards for
comparison. Since these preferred awards are unobservable when finaloffer arbitration operates by itself, however, there would be no simple
way to do this.
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Data Analysis
In New Jersey, the same pool of arbitrators is used in both final-offer
arbitration and conventional arbitration cases simultaneously. If we may
assume that arbitrators simply assign their preferred awards in the con
ventional arbitration cases, then the numerical central tendency of these
awards can serve as a benchmark for determining whether the union
offers are conservative relative to the employer offers. A comparison
of tables 1 and 2 reveals that this is indeed the case.
In 1980, for example, the mean employer offer was an annual wage
increase of 5.7 percent, while the mean union offer was an annual wage
increase of 8.5 percent. According to table 2, however, the mean con
ventional arbitration award was 8.3 percent. Hence, if we may take
the conventional arbitration awards as broadly indicative of arbitrators'
preferred awards, it is clear that the union and employer offers were
not centered at equal distances from, and on opposite sides of, the ar
bitrators' preferred awards. Instead, the union offers were very con
servative relative to the arbitrators' preferred awards. A comparison
of the mean of the union and employer offers with the mean of the con
ventional arbitration awards in 1978 and 1979 exhibits precisely the
same phenomenon.
Table 2
The Results of Conventional Arbitration
of New Jersey Police Disputes
1980
Mean of conventional compensation awards
Predicted mean of conventional awards using
data on final offer arbitration cases only and
assuming "fair" arbitrators
Standard deviation of conventional awards
Predicted standard deviation of conventional
awards using data on final offer arbitration
cases only and assuming "fair" arbitrators
Proportion of bargaining cases going to
conventional arbitration

1979

1978

8.26% 8.59% 6.55%

8.27% 8.51% 7.41%
2.10% 2.27% 2.21%

1.48% 2.54% 2.70%
.07

.06

.14
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It is possible to test statistically whether it is reasonable to suppose
that the final-offer arbitration decisions in New Jersey were generated
by a set of fair arbitrators who were systematically applying the con
ventional arbitration standards. To do this, assume that arbitrators
selected whichever offer was closest to their preferred award. Examining
the final-offer arbitration data alone, it is then possible to estimate what
central tendency (mean) and measure of variability (standard deviation)
of arbitrator preferences is most likely to have generated the actual finaloffer arbitration decisions observed.9 This part of our analysis could
be constructed even if final-offer arbitration were the only arbitration
mechanism operating.
It is then necessary to compare these estimates from the final-offer
arbitration data against the actual central tendency and measure of
variability for arbitrator preferences revealed by conventional arbitra
tion data. This part of the analysis is only possible under a statute like
New Jersey's. Lines 2, 3, 4 and 5 of table 2 contain the results with
which to make the comparisons.
In 1980, for example, the actual mean of conventional arbitration
awards was 8.26 percent, while the mean predicted as generating the
final-offer arbitration awards if arbitrators were applying the conven
tional arbitration standards was a remarkably close 8.27 percent. The
comparisons for 1979 and 1978 are nearly as close, as can be seen from
table 2. For 1980, the actual standard deviation of conventional arbitra
tion awards was 2.1 percent, while the standard deviation predicted as
generating the final-offer arbitration awards was a very similar 1.5 per
cent. The comparisons for 1979 and 1978 are even closer.
In sum, the comparison of the pattern of the final-offer arbitration
and conventional arbitration awards explains why the union offers were
most often selected by arbitrators. The union offers were very conser
vative relative to the pool of arbitrators' preferred awards. There is no
evidence that arbitrators treat generous employer offers any different
ly than they treat conservative union offers. Instead, the union offers
are most often selected because the frequency of conservative union
offers is considerably greater than the frequency of generous employer
offers.
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This finding does not imply that the New Jersey arbitrators, taken
as a group, may not be more (or less) generous than some outside
observer of the arbitration process in New Jersey would approve. For
example, the analysis implies that the central tendency of arbitrators'
preferred awards in 1980 was around 8.3 percent, regardless of whether
an arbitrator was working in the final-offer arbitration or conventional
arbitration framework. Does this imply that the arbitrators were too
generous in their general outlook?
The framework used here provides no answer to this question, and
no doubt different answers would be given from different perspectives.
The basic point, however, is that this issue cannot be settled by an ap
peal to win-loss tallies under final-offer arbitration either. Only an
analysis of actual awards and an appeal to some external criterion of
fairness can answer the question of whether the arbitrators have behaved
in a more (or less) generous fashion than is desirable.
Final-Offer Arbitration and Conventional Arbitration Compared
The conservative union behavior revealed in tables 1 and 2 results
in a paradox. Unions actually received lower average wage increases
under the final-offer arbitration provisions than under the conventional
arbitration provisions of the New Jersey statute. For example, in 1980
the mean of the actual final-offer arbitration awards was 8.1 percent,
but the mean of the conventional arbitration awards was higher at 8.3
percent. The union offers are accepted in a vast majority of the finaloffer arbitration cases, but average union wage increases are lower under
final-offer arbitration than under conventional arbitration. Although con
servative union offers increase the likelihood of acceptance, this is not
enough to offset the lower wage increase that is won. Appearances are
indeed deceiving!
The result is that the union bargainers have taken a small loss in their
mean wage increases under final-offer arbitration relative to what would
have prevailed under conventional arbitration. It is also clear from a
comparison of tables 1 and 2, however, that the union bargainers have
gained something in return under final-offer arbitration.
In 1980, for example, the standard deviation of conventional arbitra
tion awards was 2.1 percent, but the standard deviation of final-offer
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arbitration actual awards was only 1.4 percent, and the same discrepancy
exists in 1979 and 1978. Thus, what the union bargainers gave up by
way of a decrease in the mean award under final-offer arbitration they
made up by a reduction in its variability. The union bargainers have
bought "insurance" with their conservative offers, albeit at a cost in
their wage settlements. This suggests that union bargainers may be more
risk averse than employer bargainers in New Jersey.

Tri-Offer Arbitration in Iowa10
The data describing the operating characteristics of the New Jersey
arbitration statute are an early indication that arbitration systems are
especially amenable to convincing statistical analyses. Precisely why
this should be the case is not yet known. Nevertheless, it is important
to establish that this is a general characteristic of such systems by ex
amining data from other operating systems to the extent this is possi
ble. Some preliminary work has been done in the analysis of a quite
remarkable statute for interest arbitration that has existed in Iowa since
1976.
The structure of the Iowa statute provides the opportunity to examine
three important questions about the way arbitration systems work. In
the Iowa system, the parties have the option of negotiating a system
of their own choosing, and in some cases this has led to the adoption
of final-offer arbitration. Hence, it is possible to compare the results
of the preceding analysis in New Jersey with some additional data from
Iowa. Second, the system used in Iowa in most cases is designed (sure
ly not intentionally) so that it is possible to observe two independent
neutral arbitrators' observations on the same dispute. This provides an
opportunity to assess the existence and extent of genuine arbitral uncer
tainty that exists in the arbitration system. Finally, the Iowa system has
operated long enough that it is possible to generate several years of timeseries data for the purpose of assessing the way in which arbitration
awards respond to changes in economic circumstances.
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Structure of the Tri-Offer Arbitration System
As noted, the Iowa statute allows the parties considerable leeway in
the design of a system for settling a dispute. If the parties do not agree
to an alternative procedure, however, they are compelled to resolve
their dispute by a two-step, tri-offer system. Under this system, the par
ties are first provided a fact-finder to propose the terms on which the
dispute might be settled. After the parties have seen the fact-finder's
proposal, they may negotiate their own settlement. If they do not agree
on a settlement, the parties are compelled to submit their best offers
to a second arbitrator. The second arbitrator must select the employer's
offer, the union's offer, or, in a novel twist, the arbitrator may select
the earlier fact-finder's proposal. Obviously, the extent to which the
second arbitrator does not concur in the fact-finder's proposal is a
measure of the degree of arbitral uncertainty that exists in the system.
Undoubtedly, the rationale of the two-step procedure is the recogni
tion that disputes may arise because one or the other of the parties is
poorly informed about the likely results of an arbitrated outcome. The
fact-finder's proposal should serve to inform the parties of the likely
outcomes. If this does not resolve the dispute, however, it is ultimately
arbitrated.
The Fact-Finder Proposals
Over the period 1976-83, some 302 cases were submitted to the Iowa
fact-finders. Of these, 181 (or 60 percent) were settled after the factfinder's recommendation was submitted. This suggests that the infor
mation produced for the parties by the fact-finders may be an impor
tant ingredient bringing the parties to a settlement.
Table 3 contains the time-series of data on the average compensation
increase proposed by the fact-finders in Iowa over the period 1976-83.
There is one important conclusion suggested by these data: The typical
fact-finder's proposal does move systematically over this period, rang
ing from a high of 9.4 percent in 1980 to a low of 3.5 percent in 1983.
A casual analysis suggests that fact-finder proposals move in a way quite
similar to wage settlements in the rest of the economy, but perhaps with
a lag. Further analysis of this issue is clearly required. The important
point is that the fact-finders are not suggesting awards that are con-
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tinuously at extremes relative to those generated in other parts of the
economy. It is natural to inquire, therefore, as to the relationship be
tween these fact-finder proposals and the awards that appear under
arbitration.
Table 3
Fact-Finders Recommendation (Percent Wage Increase)
in Iowa Public Sector Wage Disputes
Year

Mean

Standard
deviation

Number
of cases

All years
1976a
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

5.96
6.18
5.22
5.08
6.19
9.44
7.65
5.64
3.51

2.51
1.75
1.75
1.75
1.75
1.75
1.75
1.75
1.75

302
22
29
18
49
37
40
41
66

SOURCE: Tabulations of arbitrator reports, State of Iowa.
a. The results for the years 1976-83 are from a regression that includes a dummy variable. For
each year, the standard deviation reported is for the residuals from this regression and thus is
the same for each year.

Final-Offer Arbitration
In some circumstances, the parties in Iowa negotiate an arrangement
where, by mutual consent, the fact-finding step is eliminated from the
arbitration statute. The system is effectively final-offer arbitration when
this occurs.
Data on the mean union and employer offers in these cases is con
tained in table 4. Also contained in the table are the win-loss records
under final-offer arbitration in these cases. Having observed that the
majority of arbitration decisions in New Jersey are for the union offer,
it may come as some surprise that just the reverse is the case in Iowa.
As the table indicates, over the period 1976-83, employer offers have
been accepted in two-thirds of the final-offer arbitration cases. Does
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this mean that the arbitrators in Iowa had a pro-employer bias? Or was
it the case that, in contrast to New Jersey, the employer offers were
the more reasonable?
Table 4
Cases of Arbitration without Fact-Finding
in Iowa (Percent Wage Increase)
Offers proposed by
unions
Mean

Standard Percent
wins
deviation

Offers proposed by
employer
Mean

Standard Percent Number
wins of cases
deviation

All years

7.54

2.91

34.5

4.89

2.57

65.5

58

1976a
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

10.61
8.26
13.89
9.01
10.89

2.21
2.21
2.21
2.21
2.21

0
27.3
100
0
33.3

5.67
5.52
5.57
6.68
8.95

1.37
1.37
1.37
1.37
1.37

100
72.7
0
100
66.7

6.91
4.84

2.21
2.21

25
57.1

5.14
1.50

1.37
1.37

75
42.9

5
11
3
3
6
0
16
14

SOURCE: Tabulations of arbitrator reports, State of Iowa.
a. The results for the years 1976-83 are from a regression that includes a dummy variable. For
each year, the standard deviation reported is for the residuals from this regression and thus is
the same for each year.

If we may assume that the fact-finders' proposals are a reasonable
benchmark for arbitrator preferences, then this question may be analyzed
in much the same way as it was analyzed in New Jersey. To see how
this is done, consider the mean of the union and employer offers for
1976. As indicated in table 4, the union offers averaged 10.6 percent
and the employer offers averaged 5.7 percent. To see which of these
was the more reasonable we may contrast them against the mean of
the fact-finders' proposals in 1976, which was 6.2 percent. Using the
fact-finders' proposals as a benchmark, therefore, the employer offers
appear considerably more "reasonable" than the union offers. Consis
tent with this comparison, table 4 indicates that the employer offers were
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accepted in all the 1976 cases. Although not so extreme, this same
analysis is consistent with the data in each year until 1983. (The excep
tion is 1978, but this involves only three cases.) Thus, in each of the
years from 1976 through 1982, the mean of the employer offers was
nearer the mean of the fact-finder proposals than was the mean of the
union offers. During this period, the employer offers were accepted
in 73 percent of the cases.
The exception is 1983, when the union and employer bargainers ap
pear to have changed their offers so that the mean of the union offers
was slightly closer to the mean of the fact-finder proposals than was
the mean of the employer offers. Remarkably enough, in 1983 the union
offers were accepted in 57 percent of the cases. Recall, too, that the
fact-finder proposals used to benchmark these results are from entirely
independent cases.
Like the data for New Jersey, these results for Iowa strongly con
firm the hypothesis that the arbitrators, as a group, are behaving in a
manner that is consistent across institutional structures. Thus, the reason
why union offers are more commonly accepted by the arbitrators than
are employer offers in New Jersey, and the reason why employer of
fers are more commonly accepted by the arbitrators than are union of
fers in Iowa, is not because the arbitrators in these two states are behaving
differently. Instead, the win-loss awards under final-offer arbitration
in New Jersey and Iowa are different because the union and employer
bargainers are behaving differently in these two states. The union
bargainers appear to put forward the more reasonable offers in New
Jersey, while the employer bargainers appear to put forward the more
reasonable offers in Iowa. Just why this should be the case is an impor
tant question for further research.
Tri-Offer Arbitration
The data giving win-loss records for the cases ending in tri-offer ar
bitration are contained in table 5. Surprisingly, in nearly one-half of
these cases the union or the employer final offer coincides with the earlier
fact-finder's recommendation. As the table indicates, it was slightly more
often the case that the union's offer, rather than the employer's offer,
coincided with the fact-finder's recommendations.
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TableS
Tri-Offer Arbitration Results in Iowa

Number
of cases

Arrangement
of offers

Employer's Fact-finder's
offer
recommendation Union offer
accepted
accepted
accepted
(% of cases) (% of cases) (% of cases)

63

Three distinct offers

23.8

63.5

12.7

32

Union offer coincides with
fact-finder recommendation

34.4

65.6

65.6

Employer offer coincides with
fact-finder recommendation

61.5

61.5

38.4

26

The data in table 5 provide a very strong test of the hypothesis that
arbitration decisions contain an element of behavior that is truly un
predictable by the parties. After all, in each of the cases contained in
table 5, two independent neutrals examined an identical factual situa
tion. If the arbitrator does not select the fact-finder's recommendation,
it appears that two qualified neutrals have disagreed on the appropriate
award in the idential case. If this is a fairly common situation, it seems
very unlikely that the parties will be able to predict arbitral outcomes
with any precision.
The first row of table 5 indicates that where there were three distinct
offers available for selection, the arbitrator and fact-finder agreed in
about two-thirds of the cases. Remarkably enough, the second and third
rows of table 5 indicate that, even when union or employer offers coin
cide with the fact-finder's recommendation, the arbitrator still selects
the fact-finder's position in only about two-thirds of the cases. In view
of the possibility that arbitrators may be naturally inclined to defer to
the fact-finder's proposal, this seems like strong evidence in support
of the hypothesis that the parties face some true arbitral uncertainty.
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Conclusions
It should be apparent from this brief survey that a great deal has been
learned from the interest arbitration systems operating in the U.S. in
the public sector. For reasons that still remain unclear, simple statistical
analyses continue to confirm a very stable set of operating characteristics
for these systems. The data suggest that the arbitrators base decisions
partly on the facts of the situation and partly on a unique assessment
of what is an appropriate award in a given factual situation. The data
also suggest that the determination of an appropriate award is largely
independent of the type of arbitration system in which the arbitrator
operates. As a result, the variability in the outcomes that exists across
arbitration systems is a product either of constraints placed on arbitrator
decisions by the institutional setup (for example, the selection of one
of two offers under final-offer arbitration) or of differences in the
behavior of the parties in response to different institutional setups.
Precisely why arbitrator decisions may be characterized in this way is
not yet known, but I suspect it is related to the importance of the role
assigned to the parties own preferences in determining which arbitrator
will have their case. In this sense private arbitration systems have a
clear advantage of quasi-judicial or "legal" systems. Although the parties
cannot agree on how to settle their dispute, they apparently do often
share some common views regarding which neutral party should resolve
it for them. It seems very likely that an arbitration system that exploits
this fact will enhance its own acceptability.
In my view, the purpose of arbitration systems is to produce the set
tlement of disputes in a way that is less costly than the alternatives.
Whether interest arbitration will grow in popularity depends on whether
it is a less costly system than the alternatives and on whether the par
ties are able to obtain the information and experience necessary for deter
mining whether it is less costly. This suggests that any experimenta
tion with arbitration systems should be studied with care so that its costs
and benefits can be examined and compared against the alternatives.
If successful, the rewards to such study may be of considerable prac
tical importance in reducing the overall cost of disputes in our society.
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NOTES

1. See Richard A. Lester, Labor Arbitration in State and Local Government, Industrial
Relations Section, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984, a book to which
much of what follows is deeply indebted. For a survey of Canadian systems see Morley
Gunderson, Economic Aspects ofInterest Arbitration, Ontario Economic Council, Toron
to, 1983.
2. This is an important issue, because interest arbitration is an option open to private
sector disputants that is rarely used. Just as we may question why interest arbitration
is so infrequently used in the private sector, so may we wonder why it is used in the
public sector.
3. I have in mind here, and in what follows, the case where a dispute arises over
compensation or some other quantitative issue. Obviously, where the issue involves
a truly "yes or no decision," such as the granting of dues checkoff rights, final-offer
arbitration is the conventional arbitration procedure.
4. In private correspondence J.E. Treble, of the University of Hull, has suggested
that the situation I have just described bares some similarity to the state of affairs in
late 19th century British coal mining.
5. It is sometimes observed that this is much the same as the principle in the civil
law that proposals in settlement negotiations may not be used as evidence in a subse
quent trial. This is presumably designed to encourage negotiated settlements of civil suits!
6. H.S. Farber and M.H. Bazerman, "The General Basis of Arbitrator Behavior:
An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration," Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, October 1984.
7. See David Bloom and Christopher Cavanagh, "An Analysis of the Selection of
Arbitrators," Harvard University, June 1984.
8. The results in this section of the paper are a product of joint work with David
Bloom of Harvard University. See Orley Ashenfelter and David Bloom, "Models of
Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, March 1984,
and Orley Ashenfelter and David Bloom, "The Pitfalls in Judging Arbitrator Impar
tiality by Win-Loss Tallies under Final-Offer Arbitration,'' Labor Law Journal, August
1983.
9. Greater variability of arbitrator preferences will lead to a flatter slope of the rela
tionship between the probability that an employer's offer is selected and the (average
of) the union and employer final offers. Thus, the slope of this relationship in the finaloffer arbitration cases is a measure of the (inverse of) the variability of arbitrator
preferences. The method of estimation we use is called maximum likelihood, because
it assigns values to the mean and standard deviation of arbitrator preferences that are
most likely to have generated observed final-offer arbitration data under our assump
tion about arbitrator behavior. The details of the method we use and some additional
empirical material are contained in Orley Ashenfelter and David Bloom, "Models of
Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, March 1984.
10. The results in this section of the paper are a product of joint work with James
Dow of Princeton University and Daniel Gallagher of the University of Pittsburgh.
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